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I. INTRODUCTION
The past several years have been marked by many important
developments in Minnesota's workers' compensation law. This Ar-
ticle will analyze some of the more significant decisions of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals of the last few years,' and will proffer some ob-
1. For pre-1980 developments, see Workers Compensation Symposium, 6 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 501 (1980). See also Moskal, When Is Workers' Compensation Payable for Subsequent
Nonemployment Injuries?-In Search of the Minnesota Rule, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183
(1982); Pedersen, The Changing Legal Status of Minnesota Farm Employees, 2 WM. MITCHELL
L. RE'. 53, 88-96 (1976) (workers' compensation coverage of farm employees); Steenson,
The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota. Principles of Loss Allocation, 6 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 243, 287-309 (1980) (third party's right to contribution from employer); Note,
Contribution and Indemniy--An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation
Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109, 146-49 (1979) (same); Note, Subrogation and Indem-
nity Rights Under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
119, 148-52 (1978) (workers' compensation insurer's subrogation rights against no-fault
insurer); 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 283 (1982) (employer's right to reimbursement and
third party's right to contribution); 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 228 (1980) (health insurer
intervenor's right to reimbursement in workers' compensation proceeding); 4 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 268 (1978) (calculating temporary partial disability).
[Vol. 8
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servations and suggestions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY ISSUES
Minnesota statutes had a .333 batting average in the three re-
cent Minnesota Supreme Court cases addressing workers' compen-
sation provisions' constitutional validity. The court struck down
two provisions on equal protection grounds, but upheld a third
against contract clause, remedy-for-every-wrong, and due process
challenges.
A. Peace Olicer Heart Attack Deaths
In Dependents of Ondler v. Peace Oftcers Benefit Fund,2 the supreme
court struck down a provision 3 that denied benefits to the survivors
of peace officers killed by heart attack in the line of duty while
allowing benefits to survivors of peace officers killed in the line of
duty by any other cause.4 The court found no rational basis for
distinguishing fatal heart attacks from all other fatal injuries peace
officers might incur in the line of duty.5 After noting that "a clas-
sification which treats one class of persons differently from another
must, under even minimal judicial scrutiny, be reasonable, not ar-
bitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
similarly situated persons will be treated alike, ' '6 the court
2. 289 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1980).
3. MINN. STAT. § 352E.04(e) (1982) ("For the purpose of sections 352E.01 to
352E.045, killed in the line of duty shall not include any peace officer who dies as a result
of a heart attack.")
4. See id. §§ 352E.01-.045. These provisions, deriving from Act of May 15, 1973, ch.
248, 1973 Minn. Laws 489-90, provide $50,000 awards to spouses, children, or parents of
certain officers, firefighters and good samaritans requested to aid peace officers, who are
killed in the line of duty.
5. 289 N.W.2d at 488. The court accepted the dependents' arguments "that 'killed
in the line of duty' was not used to require that the death be the result of the application
of external violence or accident, but was used more broadly to include a death occurring
while the peace officer was in the line of duty" and "that in common understanding peo-
ple are 'killed' by strokes, acute respiratory disorders, aneurysms, and heart attacks." Id.
6. Id. at 489 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), and other United States
Supreme Court cases). The court further quoted what it called "three criteria which a
legislative classification must meet if it is to withstand an equal protection challenge" as
follows:
(1) the classification uniformly, without discrimination applies to and em-
braces all who are similarly situated with respect to conditions or wants justify-
ing appropriate legislation;
(2) the distinctions which separate those who are included within the clas-
sifications from those who are excluded are not manifestly arbitrary or fanciful,
but are genuine and substantial so as to provide a natural and reasonable basis
1982]
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reasoned:
Medical testimony in this case indicated that the same stresses
which triggered Ondler's heart attack could have caused respir-
atory failure, such as an acute asthma attack, and several types
of strokes, including aneurysms, in persons susceptible to such
occurrences. Had Ondler's death resulted from any of these
other causes, however, he would have been entitled to the bene-
fits. We fail to see any reason to distinguish between heart at-
tack victims and victims of the same stresses who die in other
ways. Furthermore, such a distinction subverts the purpose of
the statute, which was to provide additional benefits to depen-
dents of peace officers because of the unusual risks they face in
their work.
7
The court concluded that the exclusion denied equal protection
under both the federal and state8 constitutions.
in the necessity or circumstances of the members of the classification to justify
different legislation adapted to their peculiar conditions and needs; and
(3) the classification is germane or relevant to the purpose of the law; that
is, there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to
the class and the remedy or regulations therefor which the law purports to
provide.
Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 362, 205 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1973));see also
Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981), quoting Guilliams v.
Commissioner, 299 N.W. 2d 138, 142 (Minn. 1980), quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. State,
284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn. 1979):
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification
from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be
genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to
justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification
must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is, there must be an
evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the
prescribed remedy; (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can
legitimately attempt to achieve.
7. 289 N.W.2d at 489. The court rather lamely distinguished a prior 4-3 decision
wherein it had upheld a provision excluding workers' compensation for suicides. The
court said that in that case, Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973),
"this court was called upon to review the legislature's decision to exclude suicide victims
from workers' compensation death benefits of any kind," whereas in the case at hand "the
legislature has already permitted recovery of death benefits by Otis Ondler's dependents."
Id. at 489-90. Interestingly, the court included a footnote stating, "Three months after
our decision in Schwartz, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1, striking
out the language excluding suicide victims from compensation, which Schwartz enforced."
Id. at 490 n.5.
8. The court stated that the provision "denies equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Minnesota
Constitution." Id. at 490. The Minnesota Constitution does not have a specific equal
protection clause, but its "law of the land" provision, MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2, is often
referred to as guaranteeing equal protection. See Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309
N.W.2d 273, 278 n.7, 281 & n.14 (Minn. 1981); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59
v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 354, 147 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1966); G. Thomas Stores Sales
[Vol. 8
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B. Notze to Employer Regarding Third Party Settlement
In Nelson v. State,9 the supreme court found the federal constitu-
tion's equal protection clause' 0 violated by Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 176.061, subdivision 8's distinction between employees of the
state and employees of other employers regarding the employee's
duty to notify the employer of a settlement with a third party
tort feasor. I I
This constitutional issue arose in a very unusual fashion. A
widow's action against a third party tortfeasor for the death of a
state employee was settled for $130,000.12 Upon petition of the
widow, who had remarried twenty-two months after the em-
ployee's death, 13 the district court apportioned the settlement pro-
ceeds so that the widow netted $58,040.20 and each of the minor
children (ages three and five) netted $4,450.14 Since the widow
had remarried, only the amounts apportioned to the children
could be used for the state's credit against future dependency com-
pensation.1 5 The state asserted that it should not be bound by the
Sys. v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 514, 297 N.W. 9, 16 (1941); Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29,
33, 295 N.W. 75, 78 (1940).
By grounding its decision upon a state constitutional provision, a state court insulates
its determination of a state provision's unconstitutionality from United States Supreme
Court review. See O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (law office
search where lawyer not suspect and no threat of evidence destruction violates both fourth
amendment and Minnesota Constitution), notedin 7 Wm. MITcHELL L. REV. 253 (1981);
Note, Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Emerging Independence of State Courts, 1979 HAMLINE
L. REV. 83.
9. 305 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1981).
10. The court made no reference to the state constitution.
11. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(8) (1982) provides:
In every case arising under subdivision 5 when the state is the employer and a
settlement between the third party and the employee is made it is not valid
unless prior notice thereof is given to the state within a reasonable time. If the
state pays compensation to the employee under the provisions of this chapter
and becomes subrogated to the rights of the employee or his dependents any
settlement between the employee or his dependents and the third party is void as
against the state's right of subrogation. When an action at law is instituted by
an employee or his dependents against a third party for recovery of damages a
copy of the complaint and notice of trial or note of issue in such action shall be
served on the state. Any judgment rendered therein is subject to a lien of the
state for the amount to which it is entitled to be subrogated under the provisions
of subdivision 5.
12. 305 N.W.2d at 318.
13. See Relator's Brief and Appendix at A-3, Nelson v. State, 305 N.W.2d 317 (Minn.
1981).
14. Id. at A-10. This was after deduction of $46,219.80 attorney fees and costs and
$16,840 for employer's subrogation for workers' compensation already paid. Id.
15. See Valois v. Escort Serv., Inc., 279 Minn. 293, 156 N.W.2d 754 (1968); Enghusen
v. H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc., 259 Minn. 442, 107 N.W.2d 843 (1961).
1982]
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district court's order apportioning the settlement proceeds because
it was not served with notice of the petition seeking the apportion-
ment.t 6 Apparently under the apprehension that the state's right-
to-notice claim derived from Minnesota Statutes section 176.061,
subdivision 8's provision that when the state is the employer, a
settlement between the employee and the third party tortfeasor is
not valid unless the state is given prior notice within a reasonable
time, 17 the widow asserted that a statute requiring notice only
when the state is the employer violates equal protection by failing
to treat employees of the state and all other employees uni-
formly.' The court agreed that this differential treatment vio-
lated equal protection.19 It stated that section 176.061, subdivision
8 was unconstitutional, 20 and held that failure to serve any em-
ployer with notice of a petition to apportion wrongful death settle-
ment proceeds may invalidate the apportionment obtained.
21
It is remarkable that the Nelson court would have reached out as
it did to strike down a provision not directly involved in the case.
22
Since the employer is bound by a district court's apportionment of
wrongful death proceeds23 but not by an employee's settlement
16. 305 N.W.2d at 319.
17. Actually, Relator's Brief made no mention of section 176.061, subdivision 8.
However, its argument that the state "was an omitted indispensable party," Relator's
Brief at 4, Nelson v. State, 305 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1981), might indicate the relevance of
section 176.061(8)'s third sentence, requiring that the state be served with a copy of the
complaint when a third party action is instituted. For the text of MINN. STAT.
§ 176.061(8) (1982), see supra note 11.
18. 305 N.W.2d at 319.
19. Id. at 320.
20. Id. at 319.
21. See id. ("we hold that failure to provide an interested employer with notice of a
petition to distribute the proceeds of a wrongful death action may invalidate the distribu-
tion obtained"); id at 320 ("upon a proper showing by an employer, a district court
should invalidate any distribution order obtained without service of this requisite notice").
However, since the state conceded that it had actual notice within 30 days after the
district court's order apportioning the proceeds, the supreme court remanded the proceed-
ings to the district court to determine whether the state had waived its right to complain
about any lack of notice by failing to petition to reopen the proceedings within 30 days
after the order. Id. On remand, the district court found that the state had so waived its
rights. Discussion with Mr. Mark Hallberg (the widow's attorney) at William Mitchell
College of Law, Sept. 25, 1981.
22. The court clearly could have held that lack of notice to an employer will invali-
date a district court's apportionment of wrongful death action proceeds without address-
ing itself to MINN. STAT. § 176.061(8). See supra note 17; i'nra note 25.
23. See 305 N.W.2d at 319; Valois v. Escort Serv., Inc., 279 Minn. 293, 296-97, .156
N.W.2d 754, 756-57 (1968).
[Vol. 8
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with a third party tortfeasor,24 there is a much stronger case for
requiring notice to the employer of an apportionment than of a
settlement.25  Perhaps this led the court to feel that section
176.061, subdivision 8's requirement to notify the state of a settle-
ment must include a duty to provide notice of a petition to appor-
tion the settlement proceeds. Perhaps the court felt the statute's
unconstitutionality was so clear and flagrant that a bit of reaching
was justified.
At any rate, the court had little difficulty in discerning the sub-
division's invalidity, reasoning:
The classification set out by that statute does not apply uni-
formly to a similarly situated group, employees, and instead
distinguishes the state as an employer from all other employers
and accords its interests greater protection. Additionally, we
find no genuine or substantial distinctions between the state as
an employer and all other employers and that the purposes of
the Workers' Compensation Act, Minn. Stat. § 176.011, et seq.
(1980), are not advanced by elevating the rights of the state to a
position of greater protection than that accorded other employ-
ers. The classification is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose and its implementing legislation must
therefore be declared unconstitutional.
26
The Nelson decision's holding that lack of notice to an employer
will invalidate a district court's apportionment of wrongful death
action proceeds27 is quite clear. But the decision's impact on sub-
division 8 which it declares unconstitutional is very unclear. Al-
though the opinion repeatedly refers to section 176.061,
subdivision 8 as a whole in striking down the subdivision's distinc-
24. See Aetna Life & Casualty v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 1981); Lang v.
William Bros Boiler & Mfg. Co., 250 Minn. 521, 531, 85 N.W.2d 412, 419 (1957).
25. Perhaps the case is strong enough to show that it would violate due process to
bind an employer with consequences as severe as those that can result for apportioning
wrongful death proceeds without giving the employer notice and opportunity to be heard.
Cf McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 699 (1976) (obscenity defendant cannot be bound by
determination of material's obscenity made in proceeding to which he was not party and
of which he had no notice). If so, the court could have used procedural due process rather
than equal protection as the basis for its decision. The state's brief had argued in terms of
the "right to appear and be heard." Relator's Brief at 5, Nelson v. State, 305 N.W.2d 317
(Minn. 1981).
26. 305 N.W.2d at 319-20.
27. Set supra note 21 and accompanying text. The court would probably extend this
to the kind of district court allocation involved in Henning v. Wineman, 306 N.W.2d 550
(Minn. 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 41-43. If so, lack of notice to an employer
will invalidate a district court's allocation of an employee's settlement proceeds between
amounts recoverable and not recoverable under workers' compensation.
1982]
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tion between the state and other employers, 28 it does not specify as
to each sentence in the subdivision whether the unconstitutionality
is to be remedied by striking down the provision or by extending it
to all employers.
Subdivision 8's first sentence provides, "In every case arising
under subdivision 5 when the state is the employer and a settle-
ment between the third party and the employee is made it is not
valid unless prior notice thereof is given to the state within a rea-
sonable time."
'29
One might suppose that since the Nelson holding requires notice
of an apportionment petition to any employer, this sentence on
notice of settlement should be extended to all employers. But, as
noted above,30 unlike a district court's apportionment, an em-
ployee's settlement with a third party tortfeasor does not bind the
employer. The Minnesota court recently reaffirmed this principle
in Aetna Life & Casualty v. Anderson, 3 1 where it held that if an em-
ployee settles with a tortfeasor without the employer's consent, the
employer may (1) take a credit against the settlement proceeds for
compensation payable, and (2) sue the tortfeasor for the amount
by which employer's compensation liability exceeds the credit.
32
A conclusion that a settlement with a tortfeasor is not valid ab-
sent prior notice to the employer would be inconsistent with the
1957 decision of Lang v. William Bros Boiler & Manufacturing Co. 33
In Lang, the supreme court held that an employee's settlement
28. The court's references to the statute were as follows:
Our attention is then directed to Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 8 (1980) which
provides that a failure to give notice to the state, as an interested employer, of a
settlement reached between an employee and a third-party tortfeasor renders the
settlement invalid. The respondent . . . argues that a statute requiring notice
only when the state is the employer is constitutionally infirm because it fails to
treat all employees uniformly. In its view, that section distinguishes between
employees of the state and all other employees and violates respondent's right to
equal protection under the laws. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
An examination of [certain] factors requires the conclusion that Minn. Stat.
§ 176.061, subd. 8 (1980) is unconstitutional. The classification set out by that
statute does not apply uniformly to a similarly situated group, employees, and
instead distinguishes the state as an employer from all other employers and ac-
cords its interests greater protection. . . . The classification is not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose and its implementing legislation
must therefore be declared unconstitutional.
305 N.W.2d at 319-20.
29. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(8) (1982).
30. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
31. 310 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 1981).
32. Id. at 95.
33. 250 Minn. 521, 85 N.W.2d 412 (1957).
[Vol. 8
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/7
WORKERS' COMPENSATION RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
with a third party tortfeasor without the employer's knowledge
was valid-but did not affect the employer's subrogation rights
against the tortfeasor.34 The Nelson court's only reference to Lang
was to cite it for the proposition, "We have previously commented
upon the critical nature of notice in cases involving pending settle-
ments between recipients of compensation benefits and third party
tortfeasors.
35
Thus, it is hard to say whether Nelson's effect is to strike down
subdivision 8's first sentence or to extend that sentence's effect to
all employers. Until this is clarified, it is prudent for employee's
counsel to notify the employer before settling with a tortfeasor.3 6
Next to be considered is Nelson's impact upon subdivision 8's
second and fourth sentences. They specify:
If the State pays compensation to the employee under the pro-
visions of this chapter and becomes subrogated to the rights of
the employee or his dependents any settlement between the em-
ployee or his dependents and the third party is void as against
the State's right of subrogation. . . . Any judgment rendered
therein [in an action by an employee or dependents against a
third party] is subject to a lien of the state for the amount to
34. Id. at 531, 85 N.W.2d at 419.
35. 305 N.W.2d at 319. The court also cited Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258
N.W.2d 891 (Minn. 1977). The Naig court, in the course of holding that an employee
could validly formulate a settlement with a tortfeasor covering "everything other than the
subrogated interest of the compensation carrier" the proceeds of which would not be sub-
ject to division under MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1982), noted that through certain tele-
phone conversations with its attorney, "the compensation insurer was put on notice that
the employee intended to negotiate a settlement which would not include any items for
which the insurer might have a compensation claim under the Workers' Compensation
statute," 258 N.W.2d at 893, and that when the stipulation of settlement was read into the
district court record, the employer and compensation insurer, although not present or a
party to the settlement, "were aware that they were no longer represented by [employee's]
attorney," id., and stated:
So long as the employer is nottifd ofnegotiations leading to such a settlement so that it can
appear or intervene to protect its interests and so long as the employee demon-
strates that the settlement concerns only damages not recoverable under worker's
compensation, or allocates the settlement into recoverable and nonrecoverable
claims, the employer cannot credit the nonrecoverable portion of the settlement
against compensation payments.
Id. at 894 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
36. See Sargent v. Johnson, 323 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1982) ("Naig requires that
the employer be 'notified of the negotiations leading to such a settlement so that it can
appear or intervene to protect its interest.' "); Easterlin v. State, 34 Minn. Workers' Comp.
Dec. 718 (1982) (proceeds subject to division where employer not notified of settlement
negotiations); Bartlett v. Northwest Exhibition, Inc., No. 483-62-7328 (Minn. Workers'
Comp. Ct. App. July 21, 1982) (special fund entitled to division of proceeds where it was
not notified of impending Naig settlement although the uninsured employer was notified).
1982]
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which it is entitled to be subrogated under the provisions of
subdivision 5.37
Insofar as these provisions purport to reach "any" settlement or
judgment, the Nelson decision probably strikes them down, rather
than extending them to all employers.
Extending the second sentence to "any" settlement would con-
flict with a 1977 case, Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation,38 where the
supreme court held that if the employee notifies the employer of
the settlement negotiations, the employee may validly formulate a
settlement with a tortfeasor covering "everything other than the
subrogated interest of the compensation carrier" with the proceeds
not subject to division under section 176.061, subdivision 6.3 9 The
court has referred approvingly to the Naig holding in a post-Nelson
case.
4 0
Extension of the fourth sentence to "any" judgment would run
counter to a 1981 case decided six weeks before Nelson, Henning v.
Wineman. 4 I In Henning, the court held that a district court may
allocate settlement proceeds between amounts recoverable and not
recoverable under workers' compensation, with the latter not be-
ing subject to division under section 176.061, subdivision 6.42
Although there is a good argument that Naig and Henning are in
clear conflict with the statute's mandate that "[t]he proceeds of all
actions for damages or settlement thereof under this section . . .
shall be divided as" specified in section 176.061, subdivision 6, 4 3 so
that much can be said for a result that would overrule Naig and
Henning, it is doubtful that the Nelson court intended to silently
overrule such significant recent decisions.
If it did not overrule Naig and Henning, the Nelson decision has
the effect of striking down rather than extending subdivision 8's
second and fourth sentences, so that, with reasonable prior notice
to the employer, 44 state employees like other employees may make
Nag settlements and obtain Hennig allocations not subject to the
division specified in section 176.061, subdivision 6.
37. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(8) (1982).
38. 258 N.W.2d 891 (Minn. 1977).
39. Id. at 893-94.
40. See Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 732 n.10 (Minn. 1981) ("In settlements of the
kind at issue in the instant case [claims against liquor and 3.2 beer vendors] the parties
should consider the use of a Naig-type release.").
41. 306 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1981).
42. Id. at 551-52.
43. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1982).
44. See supra notes 27, 29-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
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Finally, subdivision 8's third sentence provides, "When an ac-
tion at law is instituted by an employee or his dependents against
a third party for recovery of damages a copy of the complaint and
notice of trial or note of issue in such action shall be served on the
state."'45 Nelson's emphasis upon the desirability of notice 46 indi-
cates that the decision's effect is to extend this provision to cases
involving employers other than the state rather than striking it
down. Unless and until it becomes clear that this is not so, it is
prudent and good practice for employee's counsel to serve the
specified documents upon the employer.
C Benefits Received in Good Faith
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not strike down evey work-
ers' compensation provision challenged before it in the last two
years. Affirming a judgment against a compensation insurer
which had sued for restitution of a $4,751 check issued through
clerical error for additional permanent partial disability, the
supreme court in Tri-State Insurance Co. v. Bouma 47 rejected contract
clause, remedy-for-every-wrong, and due process challenges to sec-
tion 176.179's protection from having to refund compensation pay-
ments made by mistake but in apparent or seeming accordance
with the law and received in good faith.48
45. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(8) (1982).
46. The Nelson court stated:
We have previously commented upon the critical nature of notice in cases in-
volving pending settlements between recipients of compensation benefits and
third party tortfeasors. . . . It is our view that notice to interested employers is
no less important when a petition to distribute proceeds is involved.
305 N.W.2d at 319 (citations omitted).
47. 306 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 1981).
48. The first sentence of MINN. STAT. § 176.179 (1982), enacted in Act of Apr. 12,
1974, ch. 486, § 5, 1974 Minn. Laws 1237, provides:
Notwithstanding section 176.521, subdivision 3, or any other provision of this
chapter to the contrary, except as provided in this section, no lump sum or
weekly payment, or settlement, which is voluntarily paid to an injured employee
or the survivors of a deceased employee in apparent or seeming accordance with
the provisions of this chapter by an employer or insurer, or is paid pursuant to an
order of the workers' compensation division or court of appeals relative to a
claim by an injured employee or his survivors, and received in good faith by the
employee or his survivors shall be refunded to the paying employer or insurer in
the event that it is subsequently determined that the payment was made under a
mistake in fact or law by the employer or insurer.
The balance of § 176.179 was not involved in Bouma since it was enacted after the case's
facts arose. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 49, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1287. The
1979 amendment provides:
When the payments have been made to a person who is entitled to receive fur-
ther payments of compensation for the same injury, the mistaken compensation
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The Tn-State court found no contract clause violation in apply-
ing this 1974 provision to a 1975 payment for a 1973 work injury.
49
It said, "The fact that the mistaken payment was made subse-
quent to the effective date of the statute . . . destroys plaintiff's
argument that its application results in an impairment of a con-
tract obligation in violation of Minn. Const. Art. 1, § 11. " 50
As to the state constitution provision specifying that "[e]very
person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or charac-
ter," 51 the court first said:
It cannot be denied that when the conditions prescribed in the
statute are satisfied, an employer or insurer who makes a pay-
ment through mistake is denied the remedy of an action
founded on unjust enrichment. But this court refused many
years ago to hold that this constitutional provision was an abso-
lute limitation on the legislature's power to determine both the
form and the measure of the remedy for a wrong. Allen v. Pio-
neer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889). It is obvious
that the statute, by setting forth the specific conditions under
which a refund of a mistaken payment cannot be required,
leaves the remedy of restitution available in many, perhaps
most, cases.
52
Then the Tr-State court added reasoning addressed not just to
may be taken as a credit against future benefit entitlement; provided, however,
that the credit applied against further payments of temporary total disability,
temporary partial disability, permanent total disability, retraining benefits or
death benefits shall not exceed 20 percent of the amount that would otherwise be
payable.
49. Regarding the applicability of the provision, the court said:
Although it is well settled that the law in effect on the date of injury governs an
employee's right to compensation and his employer's liability for it, this principle
is not applicable since section 176.179 neither enlarges an employee's right to
receive compensation nor increases an employer's liability to pay it. Instead, the
statute relates only to mistaken payment and directs that when the specified
conditions--the making of a voluntary payment to an injured employee in ap-
parent or seeming accordance with the Workers' Compensation Act and the em-
ployee's acceptance of the payment in good faith---exist, the payment shall not
be refunded. Since . . . the mistaken payment was made subsequent to the
effective date of the statute, it is clearly available as a defense to this action for
restitution.
306 N.W.2d at 565.
50. Id.
51. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The provision goes on to entitle every person "to ob-
tain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay, conformable to the laws." See generally Note, The Right of Access to Civil
Courts Under State Constitutional Law. An Impediment to Modern Reforms, or a Receptacle of Impor-
tant Substantive and Procedural Right?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (1982).
52. 306 N.W.2d at 565-66.
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the remedy-for-every-wrong point but also the substantive due
process claim. After pointing out that it had recognized "that the
legislature could constitutionally abrogate a common-law right
without providing a resonable substitute if it is pursing a permissi-
ble, legitimate legislative objective," 53 the court concluded:
Consideration of section 176.179, which appears to represent
the judgment of the legislature that the general welfare is pro-
moted by not placing upon an injured employee the probable
hardship of reimbursing an overpayment received in good faith
due to a mistake over which he had no control, leads us to the
conclusion that it embodies a permissible legislative objective
which does not contravene Minn. Const. Art. 1, § 8, nor trans-
gress the requirement of fundamental fairness inherent in the
due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment of the




The foregoing cases indicate that the Minnesota Supreme Court
remains a more hospitable place than the federal courts55 to chal-
53. Id. at 566, citing Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979)
and Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972).
54. Id.
55. Compare Leppala v. Sawbill Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409, 412 (D.
Minn. 1973) (refusing to find due process violation in Minnesota statutory provision bar-
ring employer's liability to indemnify third party tortfeasor absent written agreement)
with Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d.615 (1974) (finding same provision
to violate due process clause of state and federal constitution and remedy-for-every-wrong
provision of state constitution); compare Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn.
375, 383-85, 201 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 (1972) (suggesting that due process may be violated
by Minnesota statue's indirectly barring employer's contribution liability to third party
tortfeasor) with Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting due
process attack on same issue). The Minnesota court subsequently modified its approach
regarding common liability in a way that let it recognize employer contribution liability
without declaring anything unconstitutional. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312
Minn. 114, 128, 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (1977); Steenson, supra note 1, at 288 & n.203.
Aside from a case subsequently overruled, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), over-
niledby New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), only twice in the last 45 years has the
United States Supreme Court stricken down a provision merely because it was not ration-
ally related to any legitimate legislative purpose. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (denying food stamps to household just because it contains
unrelated persons is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest); Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 76-77 (1972) (requiring double bond from tenant appealing
eviction judgment but not other appellants violates equal protection because it bears "no
reasonable relationship to any valid state objective"); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J.
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449, 1245-58, 1480 (5th ed. 1980).
Regarding state courts' greater willingness to strike down legislation for lack of ra-
19821
13
Kirwin: Analysis of Recent Workers' Compensation Developments
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
lenge a statutory provision on the ground-which may be asserted
under the state constitution remedy-for-every-wrong provision,
56
substantive57 due process, 58 or equal protection 5 9 -that the provi-




In Erickson v. Holland,60 the supreme court entered the intricate
area of the employment relationship during tryout periods. 61 In
Erickson, claimant was injured while engaged in a truck driving
"performance test" which a trucking company required prospec-
tive employees to pass.62 Erckson was not a ypical tryout period
case posing the issue whether an employment relationship had
commenced, because the court upheld the conclusion that claim-
ant had already commenced a contract of hire by hauling a trailer
for the company while on the way to the performance test loca-
tion.63 Instead, the court directed itself to the company's "in the
course of" claim "that [claimant] was not performing substantial
services for [the company] when he was injured" because of "the
admitted fact that he did not expect payment for taking the
tional relationship to legitimate legislative purpose, see Carpenter, Our Constitutional Her-
tage: Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45 A.B.A. J. 1027 (1959); Hetherington, State
Economir Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13, 226 (1958);
Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
See generally Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169
(1983).
56. See Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
57. Because of the disparagement that has been heaped upon the concept, see, e.g.,
North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 164-67
(1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949), it may be prudent not to
emphasize that it is "substantive" due process that is being asserted.
58. See Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 2-26.
60. 295 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1980).
At the workers' compensation court of appeals, the case also involved an "identifying
employer" issue, with the court of appeals ruling that claimant was the employee of the
truck tractor's lessee rather than its lessor. Id. at 579. The determination that the lessor
was not claimant's employer was not in issue before the supreme court. See id. at 577, 579;
Brief of Curtis of Iowa, Inc., Erickson v. Holland, 295 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1980); see also
i fa note 119.
61. See IC A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 47.42(b) (1980).
62. 295 N.W.2d at 577, 579.
63. See id. at 579. The court upheld the further conclusion that this contract of hire
would not terminate unless claimant failed to pass the company's tests. Id.
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tests."'64  However, the court's reasoning rejecting that claim is
broad enough to cover a situation posing the issue whether the
employment relationship had commenced:
[The company's] interest in obtaining well-qualified drivers was
plainly furthered by [claimant's] participation in the tests...
and it is reasonable to infer that his doing so conferred a sub-
stantial benefit upon [the company] in view of their objective.
The fact that he did not expect payment for the tests does not
seem significant in light of the fact that they were preliminary
to work for which he did expect payment.
65
The court's approach of finding coverage for the tryout situation
is sound. Since an enterprise receives a substantial benefit from
candidates undergoing tryouts, it should respond with compensa-
tion for resulting injuries.
B. Employee v. Independent Contractor
In Holton v. Jenkins Truck Lines, 66 the Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals found that a truck driver, who drove exclusively
for the company which owned and maintained the truck, was paid
twenty-seven percent of gross receipts, and could choose his own
routes, was an employee rather than an independent contractor.
Although this is not a remarkable result, 6 7 several facets of the
opinion are interesting.
First, the court of appeals rejected the company's argument that
the opposite result was compelled by IRS approval, upon its deter-
64. Id. at 579-80.
65. Id. at 580.
The court's reference to the company's receiving a "substantial benefit" is similar to
its approach to employer-sponsored event cases, where it finds coverage only if the em-
ployee's attendance is required, is rewarded by something understood to be more than a
gift or gratuity, or is of direct and substantial benefit to the employer " 'beyond the intan-
gible value of improvement in the employee's health or morale that is common to all kinds
of recreation and social life.' " Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart, Inc., 297 Minn. 230, 231,
210 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1973) (per curiam), quoting Youngberg v. The Donlin Co., 264
Minn. 421, 427, 119 N.W.2d 746, 750 (1963); see also Ethen v. Franklin Mfg. Co., 286
Minn. 371, 176 N.W.2d 72 (1970).
66. 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 321 (1982), aJ'dmem., No. 82-613 (Minn. Nov. 1,
1982).
Regarding the new prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see in7fa notes 290-94
and accompanying text.
67. See IC A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 44.34 (when principal furnishes valuable
equipment, relationship is almost invariably that of employment); see also Firkus v. Mur-
phy, 311 Minn. 85, 87, 246 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1976) ("presumption that one injured while
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mination that the driver was an independent contractor, of the
company's nonwithholding of income taxes or social security. The
court of appeals reasoned:
We find that this so-called approval has no bearing on the
matter before us. First, we have no knowledge or evidence of
the criteria used by the IRS in making such a determination,
and whether or not it is the same or different than used in
workers' compensation cases. Second, we have no authority to
delegate our duty to determine employee or independent con-
tractor relations to the IRS or any other administrative
agency.
68
The other interesting aspect of the Ho/ton opinion is its emphasis
upon the non-exclusiveness of the familiar five-factor employee v.
independent contractor test which looks to "(1) the right to control
the means and manner of performance; (2) the mode of payment;
(3) the furnishing of materials or tools; (4) the control of the prem-
ises where the work is done; and (5) the right of the employer to
discharge. ' 69 After listing these factors as criteria that should be
employed, the court of appeals noted that the Minnesota Supreme
Court has cautioned that the determination should not be re-
stricted specifically to these factors and that "tests which deter-
mine the legal relationship of the parties must be used as guide
posts and not as hitching posts." 70 And after discussing the appli-
cation of the five factors,7 ' the court of appeals said:
Other factors we consider of some significance are the fact
that while [the driver] was hauling for [the trucking company]
he did no such work for any other organization such as in-
dependent contractors often do. In his other work in the same
field he always worked for one trucking company at a time.
There is no evidence that he in any manner held himself out as
being a contractor with any of the trucking companies he
worked for or spoke to about work.7
2
68. 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 323.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 323-24,'citing Christopherson v. Security State Bank, 256 Minn. 191, 194, 97
N.W.2d 649, 651 (1959).
71. The court of appeals found that (1) although the company may not have exercised
control over the means and manner of performance, a review of all the evidence showed it
retained the right to do so, (2) the mode of payment, which was fairly common in the
trucking industry, was not of great significance, (3) the company furnished the truck,
(4) "the work of truck driving is not done on any particular premises," and (5) the com-
pany retained the right to discharge. Id. at 324-25.
72. Id. at 325.
[Vol. 8
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/7
WORKERS' COMPENSATION RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The court of appeals' emphasis upon the non-exclusiveness of the
five-factor test is highly appropriate.
The supreme court has employed the five-factor test in a
number of recent cases. 73 It apparently derives from a formulation
set forth in its opinion in the 1941 case of Lemkuhl v. Clark.
74
In the 1946 case of Castner v. Christgau,75 the supreme court
quoted and relied upon the much longer list of factors in Restate-
ment of Agency section 220(2), looking to (a) right to control details,
(b) whether the agent is engaged in a distinct business, (c) whether
the kind of work is usually done in the locality by an employee or
by an independent contractor, (d) the skill required, (e) who sup-
plies the instrumentalities, tools and place, (f) the length of time
involved, 76 (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by
the job,77 (h) whether the work is a part of the principal's regular
business, and (i) whether the parties beh'eve they are creating an
employment relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency section
220(2) adds "(j) whether the principal is or is not in business."7 8
The court quoted and relied upon the Restatement list again in
73. Set Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn. 1980); Kahn
v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1980); Brinkman v. Page Trucking Co., 270 N.W.2d
278, 280 (Minn. 1978); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.
1977); Iverson v. Independent School Dist. No. 547, 257 N.W.2d 572, 573 (Minn. 1977);
Wangen v. City of Fountain, 255 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. 1977); Deutsch v. E.L. Murphy
Trucking Co., 307 Minn. 271, 274, 239 N.W.2d 462, 464 (1976); Tretter v. Dart Transit
Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1965); Guhlke v. Roberts Truck Lines, 268
Minn. 141, 143, 128 N.W.2d 324, 326 (1964); cf. Flood v. Morgan Drive-a-Way, Inc., 34
Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 30 (1981) (3-1 decision holding trucker to be independent
contractor).
74. 209 Minn. 276, 277, 296 N.W. 28, 29 (1941).
75. 222 Minn. 61, 66-67, 24 N.W.2d 228, 231 (1946).
76. It would seem this factor has at least three aspects: (1) the anticipated duration of
the overall relationship between the parties; (2) the amount of time the agent must expend
actually performing the work; and (3) whether the relationship is terminable at will with-
out liability.
77. It would seem that when payment is per unit, the issue is whether under all cir-
cumstances it is more similar to payment per time or payment per job.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) specifies:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an in-
dependent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
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the 1951 case of Grafv. Montgomey Ward & Co. 79 In the 1963 case
of Lindbegy v. J.A. Danens & Son,80 the supreme court cited the Re-
statement provision, Castner, and Graf, and said, "In determining
whether a particular relationship is that of an employee or an in-
dependent contractor we have been guided by the rules suggested
in the Restatement.""' Later cases have not expressed any disap-
proval of the Restatement list, but they inexplicably omit reference
to it in favor of the five-part list.
The Restatement list, which Professor Larson says is "one on
which practically every court in the Anglo-American world would
agree, '82 is superior to the five-factor test in focusing upon a
greater number of relevant criteria. Significantly, Minnesota cases
decided both before and after development of the five-part test
have relied upon criteria covered by the Restatement list but not the
five-part test-(b) whether the agent is engaged in a distinct busi-
ness,8 3 (c) whether the kind of work is usually done by an employee
or by an independent contractor,8 4 (d) the skill required, 5 (f) the
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a special-
ist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentali-
ties, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
79. 234 Minn. 485, 491-92, 49 N.W.2d 797, 801 (1951).
80. 266 Minn. 420, 123 N.W.2d 695 (1963).
81. Id at 422, 123 N.W.2d at 696-97.
82. IC A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 43.10.
83. Compare Wangen v. City of Fountain, 255 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1977)
(plumber who had own business held independent contractor as matter of law) and
Lemkuhl v. Clark, 209 Minn. 276, 277, 296 N.W. 28, 29 (1941) (decedent who with part-
ner engaged in painting and repairing buildings over large area extending into three states
could be found independent contractor) with Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational
Church, 276 Minn. 84, 91, 149 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1967) ("The facts are not such as to
support a claim that the two boys were conducting a distinct business of their own as
independent contractors.") and Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bros., 186 Minn. 413, 415, 243 N.W.
436, 438 (1932) (window washer who "had no place of business" could be found em-
ployee). But cf. Myers v. Villard Creamery Co., 189 Minn. 244, 246, 248 N.W. 824, 825
(1933) ("The fact that respondent had a shop should not as a matter of law exclude him
from the benefits of the compensation act.").
84. See Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bros., 186 Minn. 413, 415, 243 N.W. 436, 437 (1932)
("Window washing . . . is usually done by servants.").
85. Compare Wangen v. City of Fountain, 255 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1977)
(plumber was a "skilled artisan") wth Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church,
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length of time involved, 86 (h) whether the work is part of the prin-
cipal's regular business, 87 (i) whether the parties believe they are
creating an employment relationship,8 8 (j) and whether the princi-
pal is or is not in business.89
The additional factors relied upon by the court of appeals in
Holton correspond to some of these Restatement criteria. The fact
that "while [the driver] was hauling for [the trucking company] he
did no such work for any other organization as independent con-
tractors often do" shows that the driver was not engaged in a dis-
tinct business. The fact that "[t]here is no evidence that he in any
manner held himself out as being a contractor with any of the
trucking companies he worked for or spoke to about work" indi-
cates that he believed he was in an employment rather than in-
dependent contractor relationship.
Although the Holton opinion does not cite the Restatement list,
one may hope that its emphasis upon the non-exclusiveness of the
five-part list and its reliance upon criteria corresponding to Restate-
ment factors can be used as a stepping stone back to express reli-
ance upon the superior Restatement list.
C Identifyzng Employer
The recent case of Newland v. Overland Express, Inc. 90 involved the
question whether a truck driver was the employee of a truck trac-
tor's lessor, or of both the lessor and lessee. Lessee claimed the
latter, in order to preclude the driver's common law action against
the lessee for injuries caused by his fellow driver's negligently
276 Minn. 84, 91, 149 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1967) ("the work being done did not require
specialized experience or skill") and Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bros., 186 Minn. 413, 415, 243
N.W. 436, 437 (1932) ("Window washing is humble work, performed mostly by hand
labor") and Anderson v. J.J. Enters., 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 174, 175 (1982) (per-
forming "menial tasks" does not require skill).
86. See Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bros., 186 Minn. 413, 416, 243 N.W. 436, 438 (1932)
("There was no time fixed.').
87. See Myers v. Villard Creamery Co., 189 Minn. 244, 245, 248 N.W. 824, 825 (1933)
("To have that heating device [which claimant helped repair] function properly was per-
haps as needful to the operation of business of the creamery as that of a churn therein.").
88. See Wangen v. City of Fountain, 255 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1977) (plumber
held "himself out to the public as an independent businessman willing to work for
anyone").
89. See Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bros., 186 Minn. 413, 416, 243 N.W. 436, 438 (1932)
(principal was "in the business of buying and selling musical instruments, radios, and
things incident thereto.").
90. 295 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1980).
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crashing the truck while plaintiff slept in the sleeper cab.91
Plaintiff and the other driver were employed by lessor, who had
no intrastate or interstate authority from the ICC to transport
goods and so, for some years, had been leasing his tractors to vari-
ous trucking companies, including lessee. At the time in question,
lessor owned eleven tractors, all of which were leased to lessee, and
had fourteen truck driver employees.
92
Lessee was an irregular-route common carrier hauling freight in
several states. It owned no tractors and, according to one of its
officers, had no truck driver employees.
93
Lessor's normal hiring procedure was that a prospective driver
would come to him and fill out an application. After lessor ap-
proved the application, he would take it to lessee's safety depart-
91. Id. at 616-17. Plaintiff proceeded on the basis that lessee had "contractually as-l .....,, . . o ..... L . ... ric at 9,sumed..... ..... a bi ,n ,, for tortious ;i."uries to, the,. .=ors ... .'° o yces., " see ....... nt' Bt"a .....
Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1980), apparently relying on
the lease provision, required by federal regulations, that "the lessee shall have the exclu-
sive control, possession and use of said equipment, and shall assume full and complete
responsibility to the public, the shippers, and to all regulatory bodies or authorities having
jurisdiction during the entire period of the lease." See Relator's Brief and Appendix at A-
26, Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1980); infia text accompa-
nying note 99.
Neither the court's opinion or the parties' briefs in Newland addressed the possible
applicability of the fellow servant rule as a defense to the lessee's liability. Traditionally,
the fellow servant rule exempts a master from liability to a servant for injury caused by
negligence of a fellow servant. See Novotny v. Bouley, 223 Minn. 592, 601, 27 N.W.2d
813, 818 (1947); Brown v. Winona & St. Peter R.R., 27 Minn. 162, 165, 6 N.W. 484, 485
(1880); Foster v. Minnesota Cent. Ry., 14 Minn. 277, 14 Gil. 36 (1869). Arguably the rule
should not apply in Aewland because the lessee was not plaintiff's "master" (inasmuch as
the court held lessee was not plaintiff's "employer" for workers' compensation purposes).
One might also argue that the Minnesota court should abrogate the fellow servant rule as
a complete defense to a master's liability. Having recognized that "[t]he injustice of mak-
ing this exception to the rule of respondeat superior is obvious, thus compelling those who
receive the least from an industry to assume its hazards to life and limb from the negli-
gence of those over whom they have no control and in whose selection they have no
voice," Headline v. Great N. Ry., 113 Minn. 74, 77-78, 128 N.W. 1115, 1116 (1910), the
court might follow the lead of the New York Court of Appeals which has ruled that the
fellow servant rule is no longer to be followed in New York. See Buckley v. City of New
York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982). Or it might conclude
that since the fellow servant rule is based upon assumption of risk, see Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 60 (1943) (reference to "fellow servant-assumption of risk
rule"); Brown v. Winona & St. Peter R.R., 27 Minn. 162, 166, 6 N.W. 484, 486 (1880)
(servant "assumes the risks from negligence of ... servants"), under the comparative
fault statute, MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982), assumption of the risk of fellow servant negli-
gence, if unreasonable, should only diminish (rather than completely bar) a servant's re-
covery unless it constitutes fault greater than that of the master.
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ment. There lessee would check out the driver's record to see if he
met all requirements of the ICC, the Minnesota Department of
Transportation (DOT), and lessee. If so, lessee would notify lessor
that the driver could be sent to lessee for a day of tests and an
orientation speech. When the driver passed all these requirements,
he could begin hauling lessee's trailers. He was given a copy of
lessee's standard operating procedures and told he must comply
with these rules while hauling lessee's trailers.
94
When lessee needed a tractor, it contacted lessor, who could ac-
cept or reject any particular shipment. If lessor accepted the ship-
ment, he selected the tractor and drivers and sent them to pick up
the trailer. Lessee never specified which driver should drive the
tractor. If a driver failed to meet ICC, DOT, or lessee require-
ments, lessee could tell lessor not to employ that driver hauling
lessee's trailers, but lessor could still use the driver for any other
company, as long as the driver met the other company's
requirements. 95
Lessor and lessee's lease agreement at several points referred to
lessor as an independent contractor, and it provided that lessor
had "sole power and authority to select, engage and control all
employees" lessor used in performing the contract. 96 Although
lessee reimbursed lessor for maintenance and fuel purchased for its
trailers,97 lessor had to pay all expenses related to the tractor. In
the event of a breakdown, lessor authorized repairs. Lessor, not
lessee, paid the drivers so much per mile, withheld income taxes
and social security, and provided workers' compensation and un-
employment compensation benefits.98 The lessee included a provi-
sion, pursuant to federal regulations, that lessee had exclusive
control, possession and use of the leased equipment and accepted
full and complete responsibility to the public, shippers, and regu-
latory bodies. On one occasion lessee paid plaintiff a cash bonus
for safe driving.99
On these facts, the Newland court upheld the trial court's ruling
94. Id.
95. Id. But at the time in question all 11 of lessor's tractors were leased to lessee. See
supra text accompanying note 92.
96. 295 N.W.2d at 617.
97. This referred to fuel for refrigerated trailers. See Relator's Brief and Appendix at
A-27, A-33, Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1980).
98. 295 N.W.2d at 617.
99. Id. at 618.
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as a matter of law'0° that plaintiff was an employee only of
lessor. 101
After setting forth the factors it has generally specified for deter-
mining whether an employer-employee relationship exists 0 2 and
stating that the most important factor was right to control per-
formance, the court held that the evidence of lessee's control over
plaintiff was "not sufficient . . . to conclude that an employer-
employee relationship existed at the time of the accident."'' 0 3 The
court pointed out that although the lease provided, pursuant to
federal regulations, that lessee had exclusive control, possession
and use of the leased equipment and accepted full responsibility to
the public, shippers, and regulatory bodies, the court had previ-
ously held that this language was not determinative of employee
status for workers' compensation purposes. 0 4 The court further
emphasized that lessee had no authority to hire drivers, that its
authority to fire was limited to prohibiting a driver from driving
for lessee and did not prevent lessor from using the driver wherever
100. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and to
strike lessee's asserted defense that plaintiff's sole remedy was under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. Id. at 616.
101. Id. at 619.
The court also upheld the trial court's ruling that lessor and lessee were not engaged
in furtherance of a common enterprise or the accomplishment of the same or related pur-
poses within the meaning of MINN. STAT. § 176.061(4) (1982), as to make plaintiff's re-
ceipt of compensation from lessor a barrier to his lawsuit against lessee. See 295 N.W.2d at
616, 619-20. The court reasoned:
To be applicable, this defense must meet three requirements: (1) the employ-
ers must be engaged in the same project; (2) the employees must be working
together (common activity); and (3) in such fashion that they are subject to the
same or similar hazards. McCourte v. United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 506,
93 N.W.2d 552, 556 (1958).
These requirements are not met in the instant case. Since [lessee] owns no
tractors and hires no truck drivers directly, the employees of [lessor] and [lessee]
are not working together, nor are they subject to the same hazards. [Lessor's]
employees are subject to the risks of traffic accidents. [Lessee's] employees are
subject to the hazards incident to clerical work and truck-loading. Therefore,
the trial court did not err by striking the defense under Minn. Stat. § 176.061
(1978).
Id. at 620 (footnote omitted).
102. The court specified "(1) the right to control the means and manner of perform-
ance; (2) the mode of payment; (3) the furnishing of materials or tools; (4) the control of
the premises where the work is done; and (5) the right of the employer to discharge." 295
N.W.2d at 617; see supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
103. 295 N.W.2d at 618.
104. Id., cting Gibson v. Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 246 Minn. 359, 75 N.W.2d
212 (1956); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 135 N.W.2d 484 (1965).
[Vol. 8
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he wanted, 0 5 that lessee paid no wages and provided no benefits
to plaintiff except for the single cash bonus it awarded plaintiff for
safe driving, the lessee had no control over which tractor and
driver would be used on any trip, and that there was no evidence
lessee dictated what routes to follow or controlled details of the
trips, other than those related to the freight itself.'
0 6
The Newland court then confronted lessee's claim that it was a
co-employer along with lessor under the loaned servant doctrine,
which provides that a special employer becomes a co-employer
along with the general employer if three conditions are satisfied:
(1) the employee has made a contract for hire, express or
implied, with the special employer;
(2) the work being done is essentially that of the special em-
ployer; and
(3) the special employer has the right to control the details
of the work.
0 7
The court said that in addition to these three conditions, 08 the
employee's consent, express or implied, must be found in order to
establish the employment relationship, 10 9 that such consent, while
easily implied from submission to the employer's right to control
where the question is whether one is an employee as opposed to an
independent contractor, "is not so easily implied by submission to
control in the loaned employee context, because apparent submis-
sion may be no more than continued obedience to the general em-
ployer,"" 0 and that when a defendant raises the loaned servant
doctrine as an affirmative defense to a plaintiffs tort claim, the
defendant has the burden of proving that there was consent to the
105. 295 N.W.2d at 618. But as stated above, at the time in question all eleven of
lessor's tractors were leased to lessee. See supra text accompanying note 93.
106. 295 N.W.2d at 618.
107. Id., cting Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng'r Co., 312 Minn. 404, 408, 252 N.W.2d
255, 258 (1977). The Danek court had obtained this formulation from Professor Larson's
treatise. See IC A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 47.00.
108. In Danek, the court had treated this employee consent requirement as part of the
first condition's requirement of a contract for hire. See Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng'r
Co., 312 Minn. 404, 408, 252 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1977).
109. In Danek, the court had pointed out, "Consent is of primary importance since the
application of the loaned-servant doctrine in workers' compensation cases causes an em-
ployee to relinquish the right to sue his special employer at common law for negligence,"
and had noted, "Workers' compensation cases differ from those where an injured party
seeks to impose vicarious liability on the special employer of a loaned employee who
caused his injury since the loaned employee himself loses no personal rights under those
circumstances." Id. at 408-09 & n.2, 252 N.W.2d at 259 & n.2.
110. 295 N.W.2d at 618, citing Rademaker v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 310 Minn.
240, 247 N.W.2d 28 (1976).
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alleged special employment relationship."'
Applying these criteria, the Newland court found that there was
no express contract for hire between plaintiff and lessee, that the
work being done, driving tractor-trucks leased to another, was that
of lessor, that lessee did not have the right to control the selection
of drivers or the manner in which drivers handled lessor's tractors,
and "More importantly, there is no evidence that the plaintiff con-
sented to any control by [lessee] when he accepted employment by
[lessor]."' 12
The court went on to say that it was "this important element of
consent" that distinguished Newland from the 1977 case of Danek v.
Meldrum Manufacturing & Engineering Co. ,13 wherein the court had
held as a matter of law" 14 under the criteria discussed above that
an employee of a temporary manpower service was also employed
by the company to which the manpower service had sent her, so
that she was barred from suing the latter company in tort." 5 The
Newland court explained:
[Clonsent to the special employment relationship could be im-
plied as a matter of law in the labor broker context, because
when plaintiff was hired by Labor Pool she knew that all of her
work would actually be performed for, and controlled-by, vari-
ous customers of Labor Pool.
[Lessor], however, is not a labor broker, and such consent
cannot be implied under the facts of this case. [Lessor] provides
[lessee] with equipment in addition to labor, and under his con-
tract with [lessee] he, rather than [lessee], has the right to con-
trol his tractors, their drivers, and the manner in which the
tractors are operated. . . . There is nothing inherent in the
nature of the relationship between [lessor, plaintiff, and lessee]
which makes it reasonable to imply consent as a matter of law
as there was in the labor broker context."
6
The court cited a number of cases in which it had held under
facts very similar to those in Newland that "no employment rela-
tionship exists between the lessees of trucks and drivers,"' ' 7 de-
111. 295 N.W.2d at 618.
112. Id.
113. 312 Minn. 404, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977).
114. The court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 405,
252 N.W.2d at 257.
115. Id. at 412, 252 N.W.2d at 260.
116. 295 N.W.2d at 619.
117. Id., citing Brinkman v. Page Trucking Co., 270 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. 1978); Tretter
v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 135 N.W.2d 484 (1965); Guhlke v. Roberts Truck
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scribed several cases where an employer-employee relationship was
found as distinguishable from Newland, 18 and concluded that
"though the case is a close one, . . . the facts support the trial
court's determination that [plaintiff] was employed by [lessor], and
not by [lessee], at the time of the injury.",
1" 9
In Krug v. Schanno Transportation,120 decided a month and a half
after but not citing Newland, the Workers' Compensation Court of
Appeals found a driver to be the lessee-s special employee where
the lessee advertised for, interviewed and hired the drivers, owned
the trailers and logbooks, made the assignments, and furnished ex-
pense money and the lessor merely owned the tractor and issued
the paychecks, 12 1 and the driver testified that he believed or under-
stood that he was working for the lessee.122 Krug is distinguishable
from Newland, particularly in light of the employee's explicit testi-
mony bearing on the very important issue of employee consent,
and the holding that the lessee was a special employer is reliable
precedent.
The court of appeals in Krug went on to hold, however, that as
between the lessor as general employer and the lessee as special
employer, the lessee should pay compensation, 123 citing the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's 1951 decision, Pocrmzch v. Snyder Mining
Lines, 268 Minn. 141, 128 N.W.2d 324 (1964); Gibson v. Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,
246 Minn. 359, 75 N.W.2d 212 (1956); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230
Minn. 172, 41 N.W.2d 182 (1950).
118. 295 N.W.2d at 619.
In Hagberg v. Colonial and Pacift Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157
N.W.2d 33, 38-39 (1968), we affirmed the trial court's finding of an employment
relationship, where the lease provided that the lessee had control of the trucks
and drivers and could discharge the drivers at any time. In Elwell V. Fake, 264
Minn. 329, 119 N.W.2d 19 (1962), the lessee provided uniforms for the drivers,
made repairs of the equipment, hired and contacted drivers directly about spe-
cific trips without notifying the owner-lessor, instructed drivers on which routes
to take, and carried insurance for the drivers. Hansen v. Adent, 238 Minn. 540, 57
N.W.2d 681 (1953), can be distinguished from the instant case by the fact that
there the lessee paid the driver's wages and deducted Social Security from the
check. Finally, in Erickson v. Holland, 295 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1980), the lease
provided that the driver was hired subject to the lessee's approval and could be
discharged by either the lessor or lessee, the lessee paid for tractor repairs and
provided workers' compensation insurance, and the driver went to the lessor only
to seek employment with the lessee.
Id. Regarding Erickson, see supra note 60.
119. 295 N.W.2d at 619.
120. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 138 (1980).
121. Id. at 139-40.
122. Id. at 143.
123. Id. at 144.
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Co. 124 This part of the Krug decision appears incorrect. Pocrn'ch
was not a situation of a general employer and a special employer,
but one where the court upheld a finding that the employee had
terminated his employment with the first employer and entered
into a new employment agreement with the second employer.
25 It
seems that the governing authority for this part of Knrg was not
Pocrn'ch, but Minnesota Statutes section 176.071, which provides:
When compensation is payable under this chapter for the
injury or death of an employee employed and paid jointly by
two or more employers at the time of the injury or death these
employers shall contribute to the payment of the compensation
in the proportion of their wage liabilities to the employee. If
any such employer is excluded from the provisions of this chap-
ter and is not liable for compensation, the liability of those em-
ployers who are liable for compensation is the proportion of the
entire compensation which their wage liability bears to the em-
ployee's entire wages. As between themselves such employers
may arrange for a different distribution of payment of the com-
pensation for which they are liable.
12 6
This provision indicates that the lessor in Krug should have paid
compensation since it paid employee's wages, and the facts did not
show that the lessor and lessee had a different arrangement be-
tween themselves. This approach would more likely accord with
the lessor's, the lessee's, and their isurers' expectation.
Also relevant to the issue of ultimate responsibility as between
general employer and special employer is the 1982 case of Bilota v.
Labor Pool, Inc. 127 In Bilotta, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
a finding that Labor Pool rather than a special employer was ulti-
mately responsible to pay the compensation, but it did not rely
upon the fact that it was Labor Pool that issued pay to the em-
ployee. Rather, it held that Labor Pool's representing to the spe-
cial employer that Labor Pool would be responsible for carrying
workers' compensation insurance and its using part of the fee it
charged the special employer to pay for workers' compensation
premiums showed that, within the meaning of section 176.071's
last sentence, Labor Pool and the special employer had agreed
that Labor Pool would be responsible for workers' compensation
124. 233 Minn. 81, 45 N.W.2d 794 (1951).
125. See id. at 86, 45 N.W.2d at 797; cf. Otten v. University Hosps., 229 Minn. 488,
493, 40 N.W.2d 81, 85 (1949) ("the employer-employee relation is not terminated unless
the employer surrenders to such third person all control over the employee").
126. MINN. STAT. § 176.071 (1982).
127. 321 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1982).
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benefits. 128
The Bilota court reached the correct result. But rather than
struggle with the question whether the general employer and spe-
cial employer had made an arrangement within the meaning of
section 176.07 l's last sentence, the court should have relied simply
upon the fact that the general employer had the entire liability for
wages within the meaning of that section's first sentence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has effectively limited the Danek
approach of implying employee consent to employment by a spe-
cial employer to the labor broker situation. In all other situations
actual direct or circumstantial evidence of employee consent
should be required.
IV. ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
,4. Conduct During Layover
The case of major significance 29 in the area of "arising out of
and in the course of employment"' 30 is Voight v. Rettinger Transporta-
tion, Inc. ,'31 addressing the matter of coverage of an employee's
conduct during a layover.1
32
In Voight, a five-two court ordered compensation as a matter of
law 133 for a school bus driver accidentally shot on a Saturday night
in Detroit Lakes, fourteen miles from the camp to which he and
three other drivers had driven buses. Drivers received a flat rate of
seventy-five dollars to make a weekend charter run, and were pro-
vided meals and lodging at the camp. They were to transport
128. Id. at 890.
129. Less significant, although interesting, is Kahn v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737, 742-44
(Minn. 1980), where the court upheld compensation for an injury to an employee travel-
ing from her workplace to her home which she regularly used, and intended to use that
evening, as an additional workplace. The employee "was so preoccupied with her plans
for the presentation that she missed her exit from Highway 12 on her way home" and was
on an alternate route when injured. Id. at 740.
Another somewhat less significant "arising out of and in the course of" case is Fenton
v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 1980), holding that the
evidence compelled a finding that a truck driver's work aggravated his arthritis into
disability.
130. See generally Bradt, An Examination of the "Ansing out of" and the "%i the Course of"
Requirements Under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Law, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533
(1980).
131. 306 N.W.2d 133 (1981).
132. See also Bradt, supra note 130, at 562-64.
133. The court reversed the workers' compensation court of appeals' denial of compen-
sation and remanded the matter with directions to reinstate the compensation judge's
findings and award. 306 N.W.2d at 134.
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campers to the camp on Friday evening, sweep out and refuel the
buses Saturday morning at Detroit Lakes, and make the return
trip Sunday at noon. It was customary for drivers to go to Detroit
Lakes for dinner, drinks, shopping or a movie on lay-over time.
The employer knew of and acquiesced in this, but did not reim-
burse any expense.
1 34
On the Saturday evening in question, the drivers agreed to go
into town for dinner instead of eating at the camp. Because the
employer prohibited the drivers from taking buses into town other
than for refueling, one of the drivers borrowed a vehicle, and they
went to a bar-restaurant at about 6 p.m. After drinks and dinner,
two of the drivers decided to go to a movie, and claimant and the
other driver chose to stay at the bar, where they would be picked
up around 11 p.m. or midnight for the ride back to the camp.1 35
At the bar, claimant and the other driver met two deer hunters,
who agreed to give the two drivers a ride to a local bar that had
live music. At about 10:30, as they were in the second bar's park-
ing lot preparing to return to the first bar, one of the deer hunters
inadvertently shot claimant with a pistol.136 The claimant testified
that but for the charter trip to the camp, he would not have been
at the bar in Detroit Lakes on the night he was shot.
37
By way of general principles, the court pointed out:
The "arising out of" and "in the course of" requirements have
been liberally applied in traveling employee cases. The general
rule is that an employee whose work entails travel away from
the employer's premises is, in most circumstances, under con-
tinuous workers' compensation coverage from the time he
leaves home until he returns. . . . A bus driver who is re-
quired to be away from home overnight is in a position substan-
tially analogous to that of a traveling salesperson and therefore
comes within the general rule of continuous coverage.'
38
134. Id. at 135.
135. Id.
136. Id. This deer hunter, to whom the bartender by this time refused to serve any
more drinks, sat in the car while the other deer hunter and claimant's fellow bus driver,
having noticed that claimant was not with them in the parking lot, went back into the bar
and told claimant that they were ready to leave. As claimant approached the right rear
door of the auto and was about to enter, the deer hunter "leaned out the door and began
firing a pistol in an attempt to generate some excitement and inadvertently shot the em-
ployee." Id.
The shooting rendered employee a quadriplegic. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 136-37 (citations to Snyder v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 379, 152
N.W.2d 743, 746 (1976); IA A. LARSON, supra note 61 § 25.00, omitted); see also Larson v.
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The court then confronted the employer's argument that claim-
ant was not in the course of his employment because his trip to the
second bar was for personal recreation rather than for business
purposes. 39 The court considered this argument in light of the
rule enunciated in Epp v. Midwestern Machineiy Co. ,140 a 1973 case
wherein it had upheld compensation when an over-the-road truck
driver, required to lay over at his employer's expense 4 because his
return shipment was not ready, was killed at 2:30 a.m. walking
back from a tavern to his motel. 142 The Voight court quoted the
Epp decision's rationale as follows:
Where . . . an employee is directed by his employer to
remain at a certain locale on behalf of the employer for a speci-
fied time or until directed otherwise, "the rule applied is simply
that the employee is not expected to wait immobile, but may
indulge in any reasonable activity at that place, and if he does so
the risk inherent in such activity is an incident of his
employment."
43
After reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions,144 the Voight
court concluded:
An employee who is required to be out-of-town overnight
has no choice but to eat, sleep and conduct all his activities
away from home. Just as injuries sustained as a consequence of
the necessity of sleeping in hotels . .45 or traveling between
a restaurant and a hotel, Epp, are compensable, we are of the
United States Steelworkers of Am., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 16 (1981). In Larson
compensation was awarded to an employee paid to attend a week-long educational pro-
gram at a resort. He decided to skip a presentation that duplicated one he had previously
attended so he could bring his motorcycle to town to get gas and make sure it was in
proper working order for the return trip the next day. In addition, he was going to pick
up some wine for a friend. He was injured in an accident on the way back to the resort.
Id. at 17-19.
139. 306 N.W.2d at 137.
140. 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973).
141. The Epp court had stated, "The employer confirmed that its policy was to reim-
burse employee for all expenses of lodging, food and drinks incurred while traveling on
employer's behalf.. . . [Ilt was not established that the purchase of such food or refresh-
ment was limited to purchases made at or near mealtime." Id. at 234, 208 N.W.2d at 89.
142. Id. at 232-35, 208 N.W.2d at 88-89.
143. 306 N.W.2d at 137, quoting Epp v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 234,
208 N.W.2d 87, 89 (1973). The Epp court was quoting Robards v. New York Div. Elec.
Prods., Inc., 33 A.D.2d 1067, 1068, 307 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (1970). The Volght opinion
discussed Robards and other cases from New York and other jurisdictions. 306 N.W.2d at
137-38 nn. 5-7.
144. 306 N.W.2d at 137-38 n.5.
145. At this point, the court cited Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183
N.W. 977 (1921), wherein the court upheld compensation when a traveling salesman
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view that an employee does not leave the course of his employ-
ment while engaging in reasonable relaxation or recreational
activities after working hours. 146  Reasonable activities are
those which may normally be expected of a traveling employee
as opposed to those which are clearly unanticipated, unforesee-
able and extraordinary. 147 In so holding, we note that travel-
ing employees have a sul generis status since their work
necessarily requires that they be away from home ...
. . . The employee's trip to the [second bar] for recreational
purposes was a reasonable activity. . . . We note that . . .
the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the em-
ployee was intoxicated at the time of the accident, the injury
took place at a relatively early hour, the employee was proceed-
ing to the first restaurant to meet the other drivers for a ride
back to the camp when he was injured and the bar was located
a reasonable distance from the camp. Moreover, the employer
had acquiesced in the employees' trips to town for meals and
recreation.
We limit this decision to cases involving traveling employees.
It must be stressed that in all other situations, the question of
coverage must still turn on whether the injury arose out of and
in the course of employment without regard to tort concepts of
reasonableness or foreseeability.
t48
Justice Peterson's dissent, joined by Justice Otis, took issue with
the majority's "in the course of" ruling as follows:
The unique factual situation in Epp . . . is clearly distinguish-
whose work required him to stay at a hotel was killed while attempting to escape a fire
that broke out one night at the hotel. 306 N.W.2d at 138.
146. At this point, the court included a footnote acknowledging the existence of con-
trary authority from several other jurisdictions. 306 N.W.2d at 138 n.6.
147. At this point, the court included a footnote stating:
See e.g. Howell Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. , 78 Ill.2d 567, 38 Ill.
Dec. 127, 403 N.E.2d 215 (1980) (employee's conduct in walking back to motel
alone in unfamiliar town after drinking at tavern constituted unreasonable ac-
tion); Humphrey v. Industrial Comm'n., 76 Ill.2d 333, 29 IlI.Dec. 464, 392 N.E.2d 21
(1979) (denial of compensation upheld where employee was injured while re-
turning to his motel after party on working day); US Industris v. Industrial
Comm'n., 40 Ill.2d 469, 240 N.E.2d 637 (1968) (employee injured on midnight
pleasure drive in unfamiliar, mountainous terrain was engaged in unreasonable
activity); Hebrank v. Parsons, 88 N.J. Super. 406, 212 A.2d 579 (1965) (claimant's
return trip at 3 a. m. from tavern 25 miles away and in different state from motel
not covered).
306 N.W.2d at 138 n.7.
148. 306 N.W.2d at 138-39. At this point, the court included a footnote stating in part,
"Injuries that result from reasonable or foreseeable conduct are not compensable if they
do not arise out of and in the course of employment. Conversely, injuries that result from
unreasonable or unforeseeable conduct are compensable if they do arise out of and in the
course of employment." Id. at 139 n.8.
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able from that in the instant case. The employer in Epp ex-
pressly authorized and assumed the expense of the employee's
motel bill, food, and alcoholic beverages.1 49 By necessity, the
employee, an over-the-road truckdriver, was required to eat or
drink at public restaurants ...
It is clear that the majority opinion's reasoning is inconsistent
with prior decisions of this court that have held that the reason-
ableness or negligence of the employee's conduct is irrelevant in
determining whether the injury arose out of and in the course
of employment. . . . The majority opinion creates an excep-
tion for traveling employees, based on reasonable conduct, that
will inject uncertainty into the workers' compensation statute.
. . . Any further attempts to expand the classification of em-
ployees subject to this artificial distinction would establish a de-
fense of contributory negligence specifically prohibited by our
case law and by Minn. Stat. § 176.021(1) (1980). 150
The Vo'ght majority did not refer separately to the "arising out
of" issue, except to observe early in the opinion, "The phrase 'aris-
ing out of' refers to the causal connection between the employment
and the injury whereas the phrase 'in the course of' refers to the
causal connection between the employment and the injury
whereas the phrase 'in the course of' refers to time, place and cir-
cumstances of the accident."' 5'
Justice Peterson's dissent, joined by Justice Otis, protested:
The majority opinion fails to apply the statutory requirements
of "arising out of and in the course of employment" in deter-
mining whether compensation is appropriate in this case.
Rather, the majority opinion concludes that because the em-
ployee's activities at the time of injury were "reasonable," re-
covery should be allowed ...
An injury "arises out of" employment when it appears from
all the facts and circumstances that there is a causal connection
between the employment and the employee's injury.. . . The
requisite causal connection exists if the employment, by reason
of its nature, obligations, or incidents, is the source of the in-
jury-producing hazard ...
The shooting incident which resulted in employee's injury
outside the tavern was entirely unconnected with his employ-
ment. There was no hazard associated with employee's duties
as a busdriver that increased his risk of injury beyond that
149. See supra note 141.
150. 306 N.W.2d at 140-41 (Peterson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 136; see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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shared by the general public. See Auman v. Breckenridge Tele-
phone Co., 188 Minn. 256, 246 N.W. 889 (1933). The risk of
being injured by bullets fired at random by an intoxicated per-
son outside a tavern was not an incident of the exposure occa-
sioned by the nature of employee's work.. . . Since employee
failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the hazard
producing his injury and his employment, it cannot be said
that his injury arose out of his employment.
152
The Voight court's conclusion that claimant's injury was "in the
course of" his employment is appropriate, on the ground that an
employee whose work necessitates standing by at a place other
than the employee's home is, in a sense, serving the employer con-
tinuously by standing by. Claimant was doing so although he had
decided to eat in town at his own expense rather than stay at the
camp.
Although the dissenters properly question the relevance of the
reasonableness of claimant's conduct to the "in the course of" is-
sue, the majority's approach was not unprecedented. In an unduly
strict 1973 decision, Efelt v. Red Owl Stores,' 53 the court's basis for
affirming a denial of compensation to an employee who jumped to
touch a rafter as he was leaving the work premises and caught his
finger between two bolts was that "[e]mployee's unfortunate, but
improvident, act created a hazard in an otherwise safe route" and
"took him outside the scope of his employment."'' 54
Theoretically, the nature of the claimant's conduct should not
be deemed relevant to the "in the course of" (as opposed to the
"arising out of"' 55) issue unless it is so great a departure from the
work "that an intent to abandon the job temporarily may be in-
ferred.' 5 6 At least it is comforting that the Voight court now indi-
152. 306 N.W.2d at 139 (Peterson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
153. 296 Minn. 41, 206 N.W.2d 370 (1973).
154. Id. at 42, 206 N.W.2d at 371.
155. See Bradt, supra note 130, at 564. For example, in Kerpen v. Bill Boyer Ford, Inc.,
305 Minn. 47, 232 N.W.2d 21 (1975), the court relied upon a lack of "arising out of"
rather than "in the course of" in affirming a denial to an employee injured when he sub-
mitted to a co-employee's "amateur chiropractic" massage of his back. The court
reasoned:
[W]e [have] held . .. that the term "arising out of" employment refers to a
causal connection between the employment and the injury. We think the com-
mission could conclude, as it did, that there was no reasonable relationship be-
tween the employment as a used-car salesman and this episode of amateur
chiropractic between two adult employees.
Id at 48, 233 N.W.2d at 22.
156. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 21.00, stating:
Employees who, within the time and space limits of their employment,
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cates that it will not deem the reasonableness or foreseeability of
claimant's conduct to be relevant in cases other than those involv-
ing traveling employees.' 57
The Voight court's conclusion that claimant's injury "arose out
of" his employment may have been correct also, although, as the
dissent emphasizes, the court should have focused separately on
the "arising out of" requirement and demanded that it be satisfied
under the increased-risk test. 58 (Since the injury here occurred in
a parking lot, it probably does not fit within the street-risk test.159)
The increased-risk test requires that something about the employ-
ment-not necessarily its "nature" but perhaps a condition, obli-
gation, or incident of the employment'6---exposed the employee
to the injury to a greater degree than the public generally' 6' or
than the employee apart from work.
162
In Voight the only thing about the employment that could be
engage in acts which minister to personal comfort do not thereby leave the
course of employment, unless the extent of the departure is so great that an in-
tent to abandon the job temporarily may be inferred, or unless, in some jurisdic-
tions, the method chosen is so unusual and unreasonable that the conduct
cannot be considered an incident of the employment.
157. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
158. See 306 N.W.2d at 139 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
159. See Auman v. Breckenridge Tel. Co., 188 Minn. 256, 246 N.W. 889 (1933). The
Auman court, affirming denial of compensation, found the street-risk test inapplicable
when a telephone company employee who had just returned from a service call was walk-
ing on the employer's property from the garage to his office when he was hit by a bullet
accidentally fired by a boy in a nearby apartment. The court said:
[A]ccidents. . . where compensation has been awarded to servants whose serv-
ices required them to be upon streets and public highways, are attributed to the
risks and hazards originating upon or connected with the use of public streets.
. . . They do not relate to accidents or incidents which neither originate upon
nor are referable to the use of public ways. In the instant case the gun was not
fired from the street, but from a private apartment. It did not even pass across a
public street. Nor was relator hit or injured when traveling a public street in
performance of his duties.
Id. at 260, 246 N.W. at 890. See generally Bradt, supra note 130, at 546 n.48.
160. See Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 118 N.W.2d 786 (1963), where the court
said, "[w]e have held that an injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the
nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the
employment looked at in any of its aspects." Id. at 207, 118 N.W.2d at 789.
161. See Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 323, 229 N.W. 138, 138 (1930) ("not
• . . the same as the public generally"); State ex rel. People's Coal & Ice Co. v. District
Court, 129 Minn. 502, 503, 153 N.W. 119, 119 (1915) ("more than the normal risk to
which all are subject").
162. See Snyder v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 385, 152 N.W.2d 743, 749
(1967) (greater "than if he had been pursuing his ordinary personal affairs"); Olson v.
Trinity Lodge No. 282, A.F. & A.M., 226 Minn. 141, 147, 32 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1948)
(same); Dunnigan v. Clinton Falls Nursery Co., 155 Minn. 286, 289, 193 N.W. 466, 467
(1923) (not "equally exposed to the same danger apart from his employment").
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argued to have increased the risk was the enforced idleness away
from home. Arguably this increased the risk of being near a bar
where a possibly-intoxicated patron would be firing bullets, be-
yond what that risk was to the public generally or to claimant
apart from work. If so, the Voight majority's ordering of compen-
sation was correct.
B. Idiopathic Falls 
163
In Arone v. Arone's Bar, Inc. ,164 the court of appeals apparently
disregarded the "arising out of" requirement by awarding benefits
for a hip fracture from a fall at work without requiring a showing
that anything about the employment increased the risk of the fall
or aggravated its effects. 165 The court of appeals' action was in
line with a 1943 Minnesota Supreme Court case cited by the court
of appeals, 66 but was inconsistent with a 1979 Minnesota
Supreme Court decision wherein the court indicated it was up-
holding benefits for an employee's death from an idiopathic fall
only because employment conditions aggravated the fall's
effects. 1
67
The Arone court of appeals' awarding benefits merely because
the evidence revealed "that the employee's knee gave out causing
him to fall and fracture his hip while he was performing employ-
163. Idiopathic falls are those caused by a purely personal, innate condition of the
employee, such as a heart attack, epileptic seizure, or trick knee. See 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 61, § 12.11; Bradt, supra note 106, at 604.
164. No. 477-36-2641 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 14, 1981).
165. Id., slip op. at 2; see Frye v. United States Steel Corp., No. 476-16-4614 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1982) (similar); cf. Seils v. Westlund Provisions, 35
Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 260, 261-62 (back injury "could have happened at home or
any other place" but employee had "rather heavy job").
166. See Arone v. Arone's Bar, Inc., No. 477-36-2641 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App.
July 15, 1982), slip op. at 2, citing Barlau v. Minneapolis Moline Power Implement Co.,
214 Minn. 564, 9 N.W.2d 6 (1943).
The Arone court of appeals also cited Stenberg v. Raymond Co-op. Creamery, 209
Minn. 366, 296 N.W. 498 (1941), but the increased-risk test was satisfied in that case. The
Stenberg court upheld a finding that the fall caused by decedent's weak heart or trick knee
"resulted in a fracture at the base of the skull when he struck an iron stand or the concrete
floor, both of which were instrumentalities of the employment." Id. at 372, 296 N.W. at
501. The evidence showed that as employee fell, he struck "the corner of the typewriter
stand with his head just about the left eye" and "then struck the floor smack on his face,"
and that he died 25 minutes later from a hemorrhage from a ruptured artery caused by a
comminuted fracture at the base of the skull. Id. at 368, 296 N.W. at 499.
167. O'Rourke v. North Star Chems., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Minn. 1979); see
Bradt, supra note 130, at 607.
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ment activity"'' 6 8 was in line with the 1943 Minnesota Supreme
Court case of Barlau v. Minneapohs Mo/me Power Implement Co. 169 In
Barlau, the court upheld compensation for an epileptic employee's
injury from a fall while working in employer's machine shop, with-
out referring to anything about the employment increasing the
risk of the fall or aggravating its effects. 1 70 However, the court did
specify that "the evidence showed that the employee, in doing his
work, reached over to the right for castings and that when he was
through drilling them, he reached over to the left to place them in
the tray.' 7 ' This might justify explaining Barlau on the ground
that the employment-related need to reach back and forth in-
creased the risk of falling for the epileptic employee. Or perhaps
Barlau may be explained on the assumption that the machine shop
cement floor, a harder-than-average surface onto which to fall, in-
creases the risk of a fall's effects beyond those confronted on the
average by the public generally or the employee apart from
work. 
7 2
The Arone decision is inconsistent with the 1979 case of O'Rourke
v. North Star Chemicals, Inc. '113 where the Minnesota Supreme Court
indicated it was only because employment conditions aggravated
the fall's effects that it was upholding compensation for the death
of an employee who, because of a brain hemorrhage, fell into a
boxcar containing bauxite and suffocated on the bauxite.174 The
O'Rourke court said:
[The employee's] fall itself was caused by an idiopathic condi-
tion not shown to have had any relation to his employment. It
is generally agreed, however, that if an employee who falls be-
cause of such a condition is placed by his employment in a posi-
tion which aggravates the effects of the fall, resultant injury
and death are causally related to and arise out of his employ-
ment. . . . Thus, if employee's death was caused by suffoca-
tion and the inability to obtain prompt resuscitative measures,
because of his employment conditions, it arose out of his
168. Arone v. Arone's Bar, Inc., No. 477-36-2641, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. July 15, 1981).
169. 214 Minn. 564, 9 N.W.2d 6 (1943).
170. Id. at 578-79, 9 N.W.2d at 12-13.
171. Id. at 579, 9 N.W.2d at 13.
172. Cf. Stenberg v. Raymond Co-op. Creamery, 209 Minn. 366, 372, 296 N.W. 498,
501 (1941) (reliance upon finding that when employee fell his head "struck an iron stand or
the concrete floor, both of which were instrumentalities of the employment") (emphasis ad-
ded); see also supra note 166.
173. 281 N.W.2d 192 (Minn. 1979).
174. Id. at 193-94.
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employment. 175
The "arising out of' requirement should be maintained in fall
cases as well as other cases. Except for death cases where "arising
out of" may be satisfied by the presumption that a death during
the hours of and at the place of work arose out of as well as in the
course of employment, 76 an employer should be liable for an em-
ployee's injury from a fall at work only if the claimant shows that
something about the employment either increased the risk of the
fall or aggravated its effects.
C Stress Injun'es
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld compensa-
tion when a physical work injury produced emotional effects
177
and when emotional stress at work produced physical effects,178 in
Lockwood v. Independent School District No. 877179 it refused to allow
compensation when work-related mental stress without physical
trauma produced only mental disability.180
In Lockwood, claimant was a senior high school principal in one
of the state's fastest growing school districts. The district's growth
caused a significant increase in claimant's duties, and his average
workday extended to 11 p.m. His duties made him feel increas-
ingly nervous and the pit of his stomach felt like a knot. He began
to lose weight, to have trouble sleeping, and to fall behind in his
work. He became unable to control his temper, and started using
excessive violence in disciplining students. Finally, he was accused
of using school funds to purchase items unrelated to school busi-
ness and, when he sent back many of the items, the superintendent
criticized him for using school funds to pay the postage. He left
175. Id. at 194 (citations omitted).
176. See Lange v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 257 Minn. 54,
57 n.4, 99 N.W.2d 915, 918 n.4 (1959).
177. Kirwin, Compensation for Disease Under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Law, 6
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 619, 678 n.300 (1980). Regarding recovery from traumatic neu-
rosis under the permanent partial disability schedule for the brain as an internal organ,
see infta notes 465-75 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 678 n.301; see Mack v. Pilgrim Lutheran Church, No. 51036 (Minn. Mar.
11, 1981), aJ'g mem. 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 534 (1980) (stress from schism within
church was substantial contributing cause of pastor's fatal heart attack).
Regarding the new prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see nfina notes 290-94
and accompanying text.
179. 312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1980), noted in 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 439 (1982) and 66
MINN. L. REV. 1194 (1982).
180. Id at 927. Justice Yetka dissented.
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his job and began to consult a psychiatrist. 8" The psychiatrist tes-
tified that claimant suffered from a manic depressive disorder, that
there is a genetic predisposition to the disorder but that stress trig-
gers the biochemical reaction causing it, and that in his opinion
the stress of claimant's job caused his mental disorder. The court
of appeals awarded temporary total disability compensation.
18 2
In reversing the court of appeals' award, the supreme court rec-
ognized that the majority of other jurisdictions confronting the is-
sue have allowed compensation, 83 and that several courts which
have denied compensability have done so "based on their interpre-
tation of particular statutory requirements."'' 84 (The cases cited as
181. Id. at 924-25.
After claimant left his job the school board voted to conduct an audit which resulted
in claimant being indicted by a grand jury, but the criminal charges were later dismissed.
Employer's psychiatrist testified that claimant's mental disorder was precipitated by the
criminal action, but claimant's psychiatrist opined that its process had commenced some
months before claimant left his job. Id. at 925.
Compare Cooley v. Construction Laborers Union, 25 Minn. Workmens' Comp. Dec.
12 (1969), afd, 287 Minn. 559, 178 N.W.2d 697 (1970), where the Commission denied
compensation for a suicide committed at home by an employee apparently possessed of an
uncontrollable impulse because of depression from (1) his non-job-related heart attack,
(2) the union's having reduced his pay from $125 to $47 per week, (3) the probable loss of
his job, and (4) an audit of the union's financial records. The Commission reasoned:
[W]e cannot legally conclude that the employee's death arose out of and in the
course of his employment. The employee's concern did not arise out of condi-
tions of employment-worry over loss of pay, loss of a job, defalcation, are worry
over loss of the employment itself. There must be a reasonable relationship be-
tween the employee's depression and the duties of the job. Here the depression
occurred because of the worry about the possible termination of the job.
182. 312 N.W.2d at 925 (Minn. 1981).
The same day as it decided Lockwood, the court handed down Taylor v. Aqua Boats,
No. 52086 (Minn. Dec. 4, 1981),rev'gmem. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 265 (1980). In
that case the court of appeals had awarded temporary total disability benefits on the
ground that the preexisting paranoid schizophrenia claimant had had since being in the
Army in Korea was aggravated into disability by stressful events at work including the
employer's (1) giving claimant stock which proved to be worthless, (2) refusing to pay
claimant any of his wages which caused him to sue employer and collect a $9,000 judg-
ment which was uncollectable, and (3) using claimant's tools (valued at $7-8,000) as col-
lateral for a loan. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 268-69. The supreme court
"summarily reversed under our opinion in Lockwood." Justice Yetka dissented.
Regarding the new prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see infra notes 290-94
and accompanying text.
183. 312 N.W.2d at 926; see lB A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 42.23; Kirwin, supra note
177, at 677-78; 66 MINN. L. REV. 1194, 1197. See generally Joseph, Causation in Workers'
Compensation Mental Disability Cases: The Michigan Experience, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1079
(1981); Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmens' Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1243
(1970); Note, Determining the Compensabi'ty of Mental Disabilties Under Workers' Compensation,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (1981).
184. 312 N.W.2d at 926.
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denying compensation were a Montana case'8 5 under a statute de-
fining "injury" as "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature
from an unexpected cause, or unusual strain, resulting in either
external or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as
a result therefrom,"186 a Tennessee case' T7 under a statute confin-
ing recovery to "injury by accident,"' 8 and a Texas case'8 9 under
a statute with "personal injury" and "occupational disease" defini-
tions requiring "damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body."' 190 )
The court also recognized that "[u]nquestionably, disablement
resulting from a mental illness caused by mental stimulus is as real
as any other kind of disablement,"' 91 and said, "Nor do we quarrel
with Professor Larson's position that there can be no medically
valid distinction made between physical and nervous injuries.' 92
The majority nevertheless denied compensability on the ground
that it was "unable to determine . . . whether the legislature
. . . intended to impose on employers liability for compensation
for an employee's disabling mental condition resulting from work-
related mental stress"'193 when in 1953 it removed from the "per-
sonal injury" definition the requirement that the injury be "caused
. . . by accident,"' 94 and accordingly omitted the definition of
"accident," z.e., "a sudden or unforeseen event, happening sud-
denly and violently, with or without human fault and producing
at the time, injury to the physical structure of the body.' 95 The court
stated:
Under the prior law no employee had claimed compensation
for such a disability, and it seems unlikely that the legislature
contemplated the possibility of such claims when it enacted the
1953 revision. Undoubtedly, sound medical opinion can often
relate mental injury to employment stresses, whether unusual
or minor daily stresses. Until recently workers' compensation
185. Erhart v. Great W. Sugar Co., 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055 (1976).
186. See id. at 377, 546 P.2d at 1057.
187. Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1977).
188. See id. at 84.
189. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979).
190. See id. at 336.
191. 312 N.W.2d at 926.
192. Id., citing Larson, supra note 183, at 1253.
193. Id. at 926-27.
194. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, § 9, 1913 Minn. Laws 675, 677 (repealed 1953); see
Kirwin, supra note 177, at 624 & n.35, 629 & n.50, 677-82, 692-701.
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has not extended to such injuries, and historically health disa-
bility insurance has provided benefits for them. Reallocating
the costs resulting from stress-related disability between health
insurance and workers' compensation insurance is a major pol-
icy determination. In the absence of proof that the legislature
considered the far-reaching ramifications of extending workers'
compensation coverage to employees who are mentally disabled
by employment-related stress, we decline to construe the Work-
ers' Compensation Act in a manner probably not intended by
that body. . . . If [the legislature] wishes to extend workers'
compensation coverage to mental disability caused by work-
related mental stress without physical trauma, it is free to artic-
ulate that intent clearly.
1 96
Justice Yetka dissented, finding "mental disability caused by
work-related mental stress . . . clearly within the purview of the
definition of personal injury in Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 16
(1980) "197
It is difficult to understand how the majority could resist Justice
Yetka's conclusion that mental harm from work-related mental
stress falls within the "personal injury" definition as amended in
1953 to delete the "by accident" and "physical structure of the
body" requirements. 98 In the cases the court cited as denying
compensability, the denials were only because of such require-
ments, not anything inherent in the words "personal injury.'
99
For example, in a Tennessee case, 2 ° the state supreme court made
clear that it was not denying recovery because the injury was
"mental," but only because it was not "caused by accident":
This Court is not inclined to limit recovery to cases involving
physical, traumatic injury or to impose any other artificial limi-
tation upon the coverage afforded by the compensation stat-
utes. In proper cases, we are of the opinion that a mental
stimulus, such a fright, shock or even excessive, unexpected
anxiety could amount to an "accident" sufficient to justify an
award for a resulting mental or nervous disorder.
20 1
196. 312 N.W.2d at 927.
197. Id. at 927 (Yetka, J., dissenting). Justice Yetka advocated the approach of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, "that this type of injury is compensable if the employee can
show that he was exposed to stresses and strains beyond the ordinary day-to-day stresses
and strains to which all the employees were exposed." Id., caing Swiss Colony, Inc. v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976).
198. See supra notes 194 and 195 and accompanying text.
199. See cases cited supra notes 185, 187, 189.
200. Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1977).
201. Id. at 84.
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There is nothing inherent in the phrase "personal injury" that
excludes mental harm from work-related mental stress.20 2 Given
the majority's recognition that disablement from such harm is as
real as any other kind of disablement 20 3 and that "there can be no
medically valid distinction made between physical and nervous in-
juries, ' 20 4 the court should not have construed the phrase to make
just such a distinction. In fact, in light of the court's recent earlier
action declaring unconstitutional a provision which excluded
heart attack deaths from peace officer deaths covered by a statu-
tory compensation award on the ground that there was no rational
basis for excluding a peace officer killed by a heart attack while
making an award for a peace officer killed in any other way, 205 the
Lockwood court's distinction raises a serious constitutional question.
A court should construe a statute in a manner that avoids serious
doubt as to its constitutionality. 20 6 The court in the peace officer
case observed that medical testimony indicated that the same
stresses which triggered the peace officer's heart attack could have
caused respiratory failure or a stroke, and could see no reason to
exclude compensation merely because the officer instead suffered a
heart attack.20 7 By the same token, it would be inconsistent to al-
low compensation when emotional stress at work produces physi-
cal effects but deny it when similar emotional stress produces only
emotional effects. For example, in the 1960 case of Anderson v. Ar-
mour & Co. ,208 the supreme court upheld death benefits when a
truck driver's worry about having hit a pedestrian caused a
psychotic depressive reaction resulting in suicide. The court
hardly could have denied medical and disability benefits if the
truck driver had been able to curb his "uncontrollable impulse"
toward suicide and required hospitalization for his mental disor-
der. Similarly, in Aker v. State ,209 the supreme court upheld death
202. See Kirwin, supra note 177, at 696-97 & nn.409-1 1.
203. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 2-8 and accompanying text.
206. See Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1979); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 38, 199 N.W.2d 774,
786 (1972) ("if a statute can reasonably be given two constructions, one which would
render it valid and one which would render it invalid, it is our duty to accept the first
alternative and construe the statute so as to obviate constitutional objections"); Zochrison
v. Redemption Gold Corp., 200 Minn. 383, 390, 274 N.W. 536, 540 (1937) (interpretation
rejected because, itter alia, it "might well lead to grave constitutional questions").
207. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
208. 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960).
209. 282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979).
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benefits when a Department of Natural Resources employee's
emotional stress from handling badly decomposed bodies and
transporting them some miles by canoe produced a heart attack
that, in turn, caused a fatal second heart attack two weeks later. It
is hard to believe that the court would have denied medical and
disability benefits if the "ordeal" of handling and transporting the
bodies had resulted in a nervous breakdown instead of a heart
attack.21
0
Thus, New York's highest court has observed:
[A]s noted in the psychiatric testimony there is nothing in the
nature of a stress or shock situation which ordains physical as
opposed to psychological injury. The determinative factor is
the particular vulnerability of an individual by virtue of his
physical makeup. In a given situation one person may be sus-
ceptible to a heart attack while another may suffer a depressive
reaction. In either case the result is the same-the individual is
incapable of functioning properly. . . and should be compen-
sated under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
21 1
There is no valid basis for excluding compensation for mental
harm from work-related stress.212 Like other personal injury, it
should be compensable as long as it arises out of and in the course
of employment. The increased-risk test213 would require that the
work-related stress be greater than the stress normally endured by
the public generally or the employee apart from work.
214
Unless the court corrects its position, the legislature should re-
spond by amending the opening words of the "personal injury"
definition to make it read, "'Personal injury' means mental or
physical harm to an employee arising out of and in the course of
employment. "215
210. See Kirwin, supra note 177, at 681-82. Given Lockwood, the author turned out to
be a poor prophet.
211. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603, 606,
369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975).
212. The reasons given for the common law's failure to impose liability for negligence
resulting only in emotional disturbance do not justify this exclusion from workers' com-
pensation. See Kirwin, supra note 177, at 679-80.
213. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
214. Compare the Wisconsin Supreme Court's approach advocated by Justice Yetka's
dissent. See supra note 197.
215. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 10 2 .01(2)(c) (West. 1981) (" 'Injury' means mental or
physical harm to an employee .... "); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.401 (2)(b) (Supp.
1981),discussedin Joseph, supra note 183, at 1084, 1134-46 (mental disabilities compensable
"if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant man-
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D. Peace Officer-Firefighter Presumption
In Linnell v. City of St. Louis Park,216 remanding a case because
the court of appeals had erroneously failed to consider Minnesota
Statutes section 176.011, subdivision 15's presumption that a po-
lice officer's coronary sclerosis was an occupational disease and was
due to the nature of his employment, 2' 7 the court indicated that it
was willing to give the presumption a much greater effect than it
theretofore had indicated. 218 As recently as 1977 the court had
reversed a firefighter's heart attack award, saying that the pre-
ner" and "when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions
thereof").
216. 305 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. 1981).
217. The last sentence of MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15) (1982) sets forth the presumption
in question:
"Occupational disease" means a disease arising out of and in the course of
employment peculiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged and
due to causes in excess of the hazards ordinary of employment and shall include
undulant fever. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally
exposed outside of employment are not compensable, except where the diseases
follow as an incident of an occupational disease, or where the exposure peculiar
to the occupation makes the disease an occupational disease hazard. A disease
arises out of the employment only if there be a direct causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is performed and if the occupational dis-
ease follows as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occa-
sioned by the nature of the employment. An employer is not liable for
compensation for any occupational disease which cannot be traced to the em-
ployment as a direct and proximate cause and is not recognized as a hazard
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment
or which results from a hazard to which the worker would have been equally
exposed outside of the employment. If immediately preceding the date of his
disablement or death, an employee was employed on active duty with an or-
ganized fire or police department of any municipality, as a member of the Min-
nesota highway patrol, conservation officer service, state crime bureau, as a
forest officer by the department of natural resources, or sheriff or full time dep-
uty sheriff of any county, and his disease is that of myocarditis, coronary sclero-
sis, pneumonia or its sequel, and at the time of his employment such employee
was given a thorough physical examination by a licensed doctor of medicine,
and a written report thereof has been made and filed with such organized fire or
police department, with the Minnesota highway patrol, conservation officer serv-
ice, state crime bureau, department of natural resources, or sheriff's department
of any county, which examination and report negatived any evidence of myocar-
ditis, coronary sclerosis, pneumonia or its sequel, the disease is presumptively an
occupational disease and shall be presumed to have been due to the nature of his
employment.
The court of appeals in Linnell apparently considered the presumption inapplicable
because the police department had no report on file showing employee had received a
thorough preemployment physical examination. See 305 N.W.2d at 600. The supreme
court held that this was overcome by the fact that claimant presented uncontroverted
evidence that employer required a preemployment examination, that employee under-
went such an examination, and that he would not have been hired if he had not under-
gone it and received "a clean bill of health." Id. at 600-01.
218. See Kirwin, supra note 177, at 702-03.
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sumption is not evidence and that "[b]ecause substantial evidence
to rebut the presumption was introduced in this case, the presump-
tion should properly have disappeared. ' 21 9 But in Lznnell the
court stated:
We recognize that our past decisions have perhaps not articu-
lated [the presumption's] force and effect beyond stating that it
governs decision on unopposed facts and that it is rebuttable
but only by substantial proof to the contrary. . . . We con-
strue section 176.011(15), however, to embody the legislature's
presumably informed acceptance of the thesis that the occupa-
tions of firemen, policemen, and the other occupations specified
in that provision are likely to involve greater stress, whether
physical or emotional, or both, than other occupations and its
acceptance also of the thesis, widely but not uniformly held,
that such stress is causative of or contributory to the develop-
ment of the specified heart and lung diseases. . . . It would
seem that the presumption, if it is to have its intended effect,
should not be rebuttable by medical opinion denying generally
the correctness of either thesis accepted by the legislature ...
In our view, the presumption is something more than a proce-
dural device initially relieving the employee of proving causal
relationship between the stress of his occupation and the disease
which results in his disability in that, to rebut the presumption,
an employer is required to make a strong showing either that
the particular claimant's duties were significantly less stressful
than those of most employees in his occupation or that his dis-
ease and disability were the result of recognized causative fac-
tors which are not related to his occupation.
220
Although one might argue the statute should not treat the few
specified employees and disease differently from other employees
and diseases, 22 1 as long as the statute includes the presumption the
court acted appropriately in endeavoring to give it some real
meaning.
The court of appeals applied the Lrnnell holding in Mz'nogue v.
Cit of St. Paul,22 2 where it awarded benefits for a police officer's
death saying:
219. Jerabek, v. Teleprompter Corp., 255 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Minn. 1977), award upheld
after remand sub nom. Jerabek v. City of Rochester, 281 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1979).
220. 305 N.W.2d at 601 (citations omitted).
221. See Kirwin, supra note 177, at 704; MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMP. STUDY
COMM., A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR 20 (1979) (urging
removal of the presumption).
222. No. 477-09-3144 (Minn. Worker's Comp. Ct. Aug. 10, 1981), afd in part, remanded
in part on other grounds , 320 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1982).
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After a careful review of the record, we determine that the em-
ployer has not made "a strong showing either that the particu-
lar claimant's duties were significantly less stressful than those
of most employees in his occupation or that his disease and dis-
ability were the result of recognized causative factors which are
not related to his occupation." (Linndl, supra)
Taking into consideration our determination that the em-
ployer has not overcome the statutory presumption of Minn. St.
176.011(15) and further reviewing the entire evidence of record
relating to the causal relationship of the employee's heart con-
dition to his employment, we conclude that the employee's em-
ployment was a substantial contributing cause of the
employee's heart attack of June 21, 1976 and his death on July
12, 1978.223
The court of appeals in Minogue appears to have effected appropri-
ate implementation of Linnell.
V. EXCLUSIONS
The case of significance 224 in the area of exclusions from cover-
age is Manthey v. Charles E Bernick, Inc. ,225 involving the provision
which excludes coverage when the employer proves that "the in-
toxication of the employee is the proximate cause of the injury. ' 226
Decedent's blood alcohol level was .16, but he did not act intoxi-
cated and was reputedly able to handle his liquor, and his uneven
loading of his beer truck may have contributed to the accident.
227
A six-three court affirmed a death award, saying, "Over a period
of many years this court has construed the statute narrowly, hold-
ing that intoxication is a bar to compensation 'only when shown to
223. Id., slip op. at 2.
224. Much less significant is that part of Voight v. Rettinger Transp., Inc., 306
N.W.2d 133 (Minn. 1981), holding that coverage for being shot inadvertently by a possi-
bly intoxicated person is not excluded by MINN. STAT. § 176.01 l(16)'s provision on "in-
jury caused by the employee intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal
to him, and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his employment." The
court noted that the evidence was "undisputed that the shooting was inadvertent and not
motivated by personal animosity" and cited State ex rel. Anseth v. District Court, 134
Minn. 16, 158 N.W. 713 (1916) (bartender awarded compensation when struck by glass
thrown by patron who was so drunk he did not know nature of his act and no personal
altercation preceded injury). 306 N.W.2d at 136 & n.3.
225. 306 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1981).
226. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1982). See Thake v. Backhauls, Inc., 35 Minn. Work-
ers' Comp. Dec. 628, 632 n.l (1983) (4-1) (intoxication from drinking all afternoon while
talking business with supervisor at bar was proximate cause of injury; need not be "one
and only" cause).
227. 306 N.W.2d at 546.
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be the proximate, as distinguished from the contributory, cause of
the injury complained of.' "228
Justice Otis, joined by Justices Peterson and Simonett, dissent-
ing, objected to looking to decedent's uneven loading of the truck
as a cause, saying that this overlooked "the fact that the problem
was of decedent's own making at a time when he was intoxi-
cated. '2 29  But it is not clear that his being intoxicated proxi-
mately caused him to load the truck as he did. It is at least equally
probable that he loaded the heavy full kegs on one side and the
empties on the other merely because it was easier.230 This "would
be negligence not related to his intoxication."
'23 1
The majority proceeded appropriately in continuing to give the
intoxication defense a narrow construction and application.
VI. NONWORK INJURY SUBSEQUENT TO WORK INJURY
2 3 2
In Schander v. Northern States Power Co. ,233 the supreme court held
that a claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation for an
injury sustained on the way home from a retraining class. The
court of appeals, while recognizing that the supreme court in Hen-
drickson v. George Madsen Construction Co .234 ruled out compensation
for a heart attack caused by the stress of testifying at one's com-
pensation hearing, had nevertheless awarded compensation.
2 35
The court of appeals reasoned that the case was governed by the
supreme court's cases allowing compensation for injuries sustained
while returning from medical treatment for a compensable in-
228. Id. at 545 (quoting State ex rel. Green v. District Court, 145 Minn. 96, 98, 176
N.W. 155, 156 (1920), and citing Olson v. Felix, 275 Minn. 335, 146 N.W.2d 866 (1966)).
229. Id. at 548 (Otis, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 547.
231. Id.
232. See generally Wallace v. Judd Brown Constr. Co., 269 Minn. 455, 131 N.W.2d 540
(1964); Eide v. Whirlpool Seeger Corp., 260 Minn. 98, 109 N.W.2d 47 (1961); 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 61, §§ 13.00-.23; Moskal, supra note 1; cf. Anderson v. Crown Iron
Works, 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 430 (1982) (no compensation for stomach injury
caused by taking excessive and illegal drugs for pain from a work-related injury); Andrews
v. Village of Circle Pines, 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 57 (1981) (no compensation for
reinjury of back in scuffle with police attempting traffic violation arrest); Gaspers v.
Minneapolis Elec. Steel Castings Co., 31 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 367, aj'd on other
grounds, 290 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1979) (roller skating with work-injured back was "rash
undertaking" constituting independent intervening cause of reinjury of back).
233. 320 N.W.2d 84 (1982), rev'g 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 347 (1981).
234. 281 N.W.2d 672 (Minn. 1979).
235. 33 Minn Workers' Comp. Dec. at 350.
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jury,236 one of which was a summary affirmance subsequent to
Hendric/son .237 Judge Pomush concurred, noting that the Hendrick-
son court had referred to the seeking of medical care for a compen-
sable injury as a special errand and concluding that "[i]f the
employee is engaged in a special errand while seeking medical
care, he is just as much on a special errand while seeking retrain-
ing. '2 38 (Actually, the situation in Schander did not fit Minnesota's
"special errand" approach because the retraining was a seventy-
eight-week auto mechanics course at a vo-tech institute,2 39 and the
Minnesota court has held that travel is not a special errand if the
task is "regular and recurring during the normal hours of employ-
ment.' 24  However, the employer in Schander paid mileage for the
claimant's travel to the retraining class,24I and travel has been held
to be in the course of employment when the employer pays mile-
age.2 42) The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' award,
reasoning:
It is well settled that personal injuries suffered by an em-
ployee while traveling between his home and his work premises
236. Pedersen v. Maple Island Inc., 256 Minn. 21, 97 N.W.2d 285 (1959); Fitzgibbons
v. Clarke, 205 Minn. 235, 285 N.W. 528 (1939).
237. Aaserud v. National Food Stores, Inc., No. 51443 (Minn Dec. 15, 1980),affgmem.,
32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 525 (1980).
Regarding the new prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see ifro notes 290-94
and accompanying text.
238. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 352 n.2 (Pomush, J., concurring). In Hendrick-
son v. George Madsen Constr. Co., 281 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (Minn. 1979), the court had
stated:
Pursuing a compensation claim against the employer. . . is not analogous
to traveling to or from the medical doctor for treatment of a compensable injury.
The rationale if cases allowing compensation for injuries during trips to or from
the doctor is frequently stated in terms of the employer's obligation to provide
medical treatment (often authorized on company time), and the employee's obli-
gation to receive treatment and thereby avoid further medical complications.
Thus, in many cases the travel is actually a "special errand." These considera-
tions are not involved when a person pursues a compensation claim and under-
takes a lawsuit against the employer.
239. See 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 347.
240. See Youngberg v. Donlin Co., 246 Minn. 421, 425, 119 N.W.2d 746, 749 (1963)
(affirming denial for injury while returning from company team bowling which "was a
regularly scheduled weekly event and there was nothing about it to characterize it as a
special job or errand or the trip itself as an integral part of the employment"); cf. Jonas v.
Lillyblad, 272 Minn. 299, 307, 137 N.W.2d 370, 375 (1965) (affirming award for injury
while returning from turning on employer's furnace, which employee had to do on many
but not all nights during spring months--Commission could find employee "was not en-
gaged in daily, regular, recurring trips").
241. See 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 347.
242. See Lundgaard v. State, 306 Minn. 421, 237 N.W.2d 617 (1975); 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 61, § 16.30.
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do not fall within the coverage of workers' compensation....
Despite this general rule, the Court of Appeals determined that
employee's injuries were compensable in reliance on decisions
holding that injuries sustained by an employee while traveling
to or from a doctor for medical treatment of a compensable
injury are also compensable.. . . We pointed out in Hendrick-
son .. . that the usual rationale advanced for allowing com-
pensation for injuries which occur during trips to or from a
doctor is that the employer has an obligation to provide medi-
cal treatment and the employee has an obligation to receive
such treatment and thereby avoid further medical
complications.
Here, the Court of Appeals pointed out that, when necessary,
an employee has as much right to receive retraining as he does
to receive medical treatment. It may be added that retraining,
when necessary to restore an employee to gainful employment,
is also in the interests of both employer and employee. We are
not convinced, however, that there is a sufficiently direct rela-
tionship between employment and injuries sustained by an em-
ployee while returning from his retraining course to his home to
justify the conclusion that during that time he is in the course
of employment. Obviously, the employer exercises no control
over, and derives no benefit from, the employee's choice of
route. Moreover, the employee during the course of his travel is
exposed to the same risks as all other members of the general
public and in the absence of exceptional circumstances the cov-
erage of the Workers' Compensation Act does not extend to
such risks. In Hendrickson we recognized that workers' compen-
sation is a "pure creature of the legislature" and declined judi-
cially to extend coverage to a nonwork-related event.. .. We
again decline to do SO.
2 4 3
The Schander court's reasoning is unpersuasive. Nothing in it
really distinguishes the trip to and from retraining from the trip to
and from medical treatment of the work injury. It is true of both
trips that "the employer exercises no control over, and derives no
benefit from, the employee's choice of route" and that "the em-
ployee during the course of his travel is exposed to the same risks
as all other members of the general public." The answers to these
objections are that if the employee does not choose a reasonably
direct route of travel, he will be excluded from coverage under the
principles applicable to "deviation ' 244 and that Minnesota's
243. 320 N.W.2d at 85 (citations omitted).
244. See Rau v. Crest Fiberglass Indus., 275 Minn. 483, 485-86, 148 N.W.2d 149, 151-
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"street risk" doctrine allows coverage of traveling employees even
though other members of the public are equally exposed to the
injurious street risk.
245
The claimant's travel to and from retraining was like travel to
and from medical treatment for the work injury but unlike the
testifying at the compensation hearing in Hendrzcson because it ac-
tually served the employer by mitigating the employer's future
compensation liability. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should
have allowed compensation under Professor Larson's approach,
quoted with approval in an earlier case, 246 which extends coverage
"[w]hen the injury following the initial compensable injury arises





In the 1980 case of Roraffv. State,249 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the employer is liable for the employee's attorney
fees necessitated to make the employer pay medical expenses.
250
The court found attorneys' fees covered by that part of the medi-
cal benefits section which states, "In case of [employer's] inability
or refusal seasonably to [furnish medical treatment] the employer
shall be liable for the reasonable expense incurred by or on behalf
of the employee in providing the same."' 25 1 The court held the
medical benefits provision governed, rather than the attorney fees
section,252 which the court said "was intended to govern awards of
attorneys' fees in proceedings in which an employee is awarded
disability compensation, but was not meant to apply to awards of
52 (1976) (alternative route chosen because it had less traffic); Falkum v. Daniel Starch &
Staff, 271 Minn. 277, 135 N.W.2d 693 (1965) (no compensation for injury during devia-
tion from employment trip); Bradt, supra note 130, at 581-85.
245. See Bookman v. Lyle Culvert & Road Equip. Co., 153 Minn. 479, 481, 190 N.W.
984, 984 (1922); Bradt, supra note 130, at 545-46.
246. Wallace v. Judd Brown Constr. Co., 269 Minn. 455, 460, 131 N.W.2d 540, 544
(1964).
247. 1 A. LARSON,.rupra note 61, § 13.11, at 3-366.
248. See generally Kirwin, Worker's Compensation Benefit Issues in WORKERS'
COMPENSATION: BENEFITS AND THIRD PARTY ISSUES 1 (Wm. Mitchell Forums 1981).
249. 288 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. 1980).
250. Id. at 16.
251. MINN. STAT. § 176.135(1) (1982).
252. See id. § 176.081.
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attorneys' fees in proceedings brought solely to recover medical
expenses."
253
The court did not explain how this squared with subdivision 7
of the attorney fees section, which provides for making the em-
ployer pay twenty-five percent of that part of the attorneys' fees
which exceeds $250 if the employer, inter aha, "shall fail to make
payment of compensation or medical expenses within the statutory
period. . . or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of
compensation or medical expenses ."254 No doubt the court was pro-
ceeding upon the assumption either (1) that medical benefits were
not "compensation" within the meaning of subdivision 1 of the
attorney fee section, providing for approval of attorney fees "up to
25 percent of the first $4,000 of compensation awarded to the em-
ployee and up to 20 percent of the next $27,500 of compensation
awarded to the employee," 255 or (2) that the value of medical ben-
efits would often be so low that fees thus computed would be
inadequate.
The first assumption ignores the fact that the Act's definitions
section specifies that " 'Compensation' includes all benefits pro-
vided by this chapter on account of injury or death ' 256 and the
fact that the supreme court has specifically held medical benefits
to constitute "compensation" within the meaning of the Act.
2 5 7
The second assumption ignores the fact that subdivision 2 of the
attorney fee section authorizes the court of appeals to approve at-
torney fees in excess of the amount authorized in subdivision 1.258
With regard to the medical benefits provision stating, "In case
of [employer's] inability or refusal seasonably to [furnish medical
treatment] the employer shall be liable for the reasonable expense
incurred by or on behalf of the employee in providing the same,"
the court reasoned:
[W]e believe that "reasonable expenses" was, in all likelihood,
intended to include attorneys' fees for two reasons. One is that
the words "reasonable expenses" would otherwise have little
253. 288 N.W.2d at 15-16.
254. See MINN. STAT. § 176.081(7) (1982).
255. See id § 176.081(1).
256. See id. § 176.011(8) (emphasis added).
257. See Livgard v. Cornelius Co., 308 Minn. 467, 469, 243 N.W.2d 309, 311 (1976);
Frank v. Anderson Bros., 236 Minn. 81, 84, 51 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1962).
258. See Saari v. McFarland, 319 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1982) (evidence did not support
giving lawyer who requested $15,000 only $7,500); Lennartson v. Fairway Foods, Inc., 310
N.W.2d 673 (Minn. 1981) (25/20 formula does not limit fees awarded under subdivision
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meaning. The statute obligates the employer to furnish medi-
cal treatment and supplies in the first sentence so this language
clearly imposes an additional obligation to pay the additional
reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by an employee who is
required to commence a proceeding to obtain payment of the
cost of his medical treatment and supplies. The other reason is
that this construction furthers the basic purpose inherent in
workers' compensation legislation . . . of imposing on indus-
try the cost of workers' injuries for which it is responsible.
2 59
The court's first reason seems unsound. The plain meaning of
"reasonable expense incurred by or on behalf of the employee in
providing [medical care]" after employer has failed to furnish it, is
the cost of the medical care, for which the employee or whoever
paid for the medical care should be reimbursed. 26° The court's
second reason is weightier, but seems insufficient to outweigh the
strong inference from subdivision 7 of the attorney fees section that
onlypart, rather than all, of employee's attorneys' fee is to be im-
posed on the employer as part of "the cost of workers' injuries for
which it is responsible."
The Roraff result is equitable, in that attorneys' fees necessitated
in order to recover any kind of workers' compensation benefits are
part of "the cost of workers' injuries" which arguably should be
imposed on industry. Nevertheless, the Roraff result seems inconsis-
tent with the statute.
In Walraven v. State,26 1 an evenly divided court of appeals held
that the employer's liability for attorney fees under Roraff was not
limited to situations where medical benefits were the only issue.
262
In Walraven, in addition to obtaining certain medical benefits,
claimant's attorney assisted employee in contesting termination of
disability benefits and obtaining an award of permanent total dis-
ability benefits. 263 Judge McCarthy's lead opinion concluded, "I
believe the case of Roraff to be self-explanatory and that the Com-
pensation Judge's award of $150.00 of additional attorneys' fees to
petitioner's attorney for securing certain medical benefits, is well
within the prerogative outlined by Mr. Justice Yetka in Roraff"
2 6 4
Judge Gard concurred in the result, saying that he agreed "with
259. 288 N.W.2d at 16.
260. See Carmody v. City of St. Paul, 207 Minn. 419, 291 N.W. 895 (1940); Lading v.
City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 464, 190 N.W. 981 (1922).
261. No. 331-40-7908 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1982).
262. Judge Reike took no part.
263. No. 331-40-7908 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1982), slip op. at 2.
264. Id. slip op. at 3.
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the award of attorney fees for unpaid bill collection upon the facts
in this case."
'265
Judges Wallraff and Adel dissented. Judge Wallraf stated that
in his opinion "attorney's fees, per Roraff . . . should only be
awarded when medical bills are the only issue."'26 6 Judge Adel
reasoned:
I agree with Judge Wallraff that attorney fees should not
be awarded on the medical expense in this case. The Roraff case
dealt with a situation where no compensation was due the em-
ployee but only medical expense was at issue. The Supreme
Court held that reasonable attorney fees should be awarded in
that situation. Though Roraff involved a situation where medi-
cal expense only was an issue, I believe that it could be applied
also where the compensation was small in amount so that the
fee developed from compensation would be too small. In that
case a fee could be awarded partially against the compensation
and partially with regard to the medical ...
In this case a fee of $5,000.00 was awarded against the com-
pensation. I believe that is a reasonable fee. I believe it is not
necessary or proper to award a fee with regard to the medical
expense in this case since a reasonable fee has already been
awarded.
26 7
It is very hard to say which of the approaches in the Walraven
opinions the supreme court would adopt. The fact that the Roraff
court said that the attorney fees section "was intended to govern
awards of attorneys' fees in proceedings in which an employee is
awarded disability compensation, but was not meant to apply to
awards of attorneys' fees in proceedings brought solely to recover
medical expenses," points in the direction of Judge Wallraff's posi-
tion that attorneys' fees should be awarded under the medical ben-
efits section only "when medical bills are the only issue," although
it is easy to foresee the court preferring Judge Adel's somewhat less
stringent approach. On the other hand, the Roraf court's rationale
that attorney fees were part of the "expense incurred . . . in pro-
viding [medical benefits]" under the medical benefits section, justi-
fies the approach of Judges McCarthy and Gard. Since the Rorarf
result is barely (if at all) justifiable under the statute, arguably it
should be given the narrow yet equitable interpretation specified
by Judge Adel.
265. Id. (Gard, J., concurring).
266. Id. slip op. at 4 (Wallraff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
267. Id. slip op. at 5 (Adel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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2. Reasonableness of Charges268
The court of appeals has decided several recent cases dealing
with the reasonableness of charges for chiropractic treatment. In
Rosalez v. 3M Co. ,269 it held that the reasonable and necessary
charge for chiropractic care was $1,416, as testified by a consulting
chiropractor, not the $5,825 claimed by the treating chiropractor
who in 18 1/2 months gave the employee between 175 and 200
examinations and treatments-sometimes two treatments per
day.
270
But in Hagle v. S/ate, 2 71 a four-one court of appeals upheld
charges for chiropractic treatment, saying:
The Court conclude[s] that the treatment rendered was nec-
essary and reasonable based upon the record submitted. There is
insufficient evidence of record to indicate the treatments ren-
dered by the chiropractor were unreasonable or unnecessary.
No adverse chiropractor was called to testify and the testimony
of the orthopedic specialist contributes little to the determina-
tion of this issue due to his lack of knowledge of chiropractic
treatment and his opinion that the employee has no
268. See MINN. STAT. § 176.136 (1982). This provision specifies in part (with
strikeouts and underlining to show the effect of the Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 87, 1981
Minn. Laws 1611, 1664):
The commissioner of Lb..a. iu. insurance shall by rule establish
procedures for determining whether or not t echarge for a health service is
excessive. In order to accomplish this purpose, the commissioner of insurance
shall consult with insurers, associations and organizations representing the
medical and other providers of treatment services and other appropriate groups.
The procedures established by the commissioner of insurance shall limit the
charges allowable for medical, chiropractic, podiatric, surgical, hospital and
other health care provider treatment or services, as defined and compensable
under section 176.135, to the 75th percentile of usual and customary fees or
charges based upon billings for each class of health care provider during all of
the calendar year preceding the year in which the determination is made of the
amount to be paid the health care provider for the billing. The procedures
established by the commissioner for determining whether or not the charge for a
health service is excessive shall be structured to encourage providers to develop
and deliver services for rehabilitation of injured workers. . . . If the
commissioner of insurance, a compensation judge, the workers compensation
court of appeals or a district court determines that the charge for a health service
or medical service is excessive, - _.." l.1;i no payment to in excess of the
reasonable charge for that service shall be made-under this chapter nor may the
provider collect or attempt to collect from the injured employee or any other
insurer or government amounts in excess of the amount payable under this
chapter; however, the commissioner of insurance shall by rule establish
roeires allowing for a provider to appeal such determination. ...
269. No. 470-62-4696 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1980).
270. Id., slip op. at 2.
271. No. 475-66-3337 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1981).
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disability. 27
2
Judge Adel dissented on grounds that the chiropractor's credibility
was undercut by the fact he (1) was proved wrong in his opinion
regarding employee's ability to work by the employee's returning
to work, 273 (2) purported to determine functional loss to the back
to the nearest one-tenth of one percent, which was "impossible and
incredible," (3) gave "responses to simple questions that defy com-
prehension," (4) used "words and terms that cannot be located in
standard dictionaries or medical dictionaries," and (5) had
problems with the Board of Chiropractic Examiners causing sus-
pension from practice and probation.
2 7 4
Four days later, in Nelan v. Target Stores ,275 the court of appeals
upheld only $595 of a $2,282.90 bill from the same chiropractor.
Judge Adel's lead opinion, joined only by Judge Pomush, listed
the same five points as his dissent in the previous case. 27 6 Judges
Rieke and Wallraff concurred in the result.
2 77
Finally, in Wright v. Kimro, Inc. ,278 the court of appeals found
that reasonable and necessary chiropractic care was $1,704, pursu-
ant to the testimony of a chiropractor who reviewed the charges,
rather than the $3,514 billed by the treating chiropractor.2 79 The
272. Id., slip op. at 4 (emphasis in original).
Compare Lair v. Energy Savers Unlimited, No. 476-52-5434 (Minn. Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1981), where a three-two court of appeals held an employee entitled to
further chiropractic treatment. The majority relied on the chiropractor's testimony that
further chiropractic treatment was needed, the employee's testimony that she received
considerable help and experienced considerable improvement during the treatment, the
fact that the chiropractor was experienced and well qualified and had "demonstrated
some element of his character by treating [employee] with no charge to her after the in-
surer cut her off." Id., slip op. at 3-4.
273. Judge Adel stated, "Dr. Proetz testified that the employee was totally disabled
from work during a period totaling one year and eleven weeks during which the employee
was employed full time." Id., slip op. at 4 (Adel, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
275. No. 472-58-3985 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1981).
276. Id., slip op. at 3. As to the first point, Judge Adel said:
The employee testified that Dr. Proetz told her not to return to work in
May, 1979. Dr. Boxall told her she should return to work. The employee re-
turned to work on May 22, 1979 and worked continuously thereafter until the
hearing. This, we conclude, does not add any weight to the opinions of Dr.
Proetz.
Id.
Judge Adel noted as examples of words Dr. Proetz used which were not in standard
or medical dictionaries "stressology," "stressologist," "nervoscope," "opsiometer," and "in-
ternal drag." Id. slip op. at 3 n.2.
277. Id. slip op. 3 (McCarthy, J., took no part).
278. 34 Minn. Worker's Comp. Dec. 702 (1982).
279. Id. at 704.
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court of appeals also relied upon testimony by medical doctors
who did not see the need for chiropractic treatments to the extent
the treating chiropractor had been giving them.28 0 The court of
appeals concluded, "Reasonableness and necessity of health care
services must be proved; it is not to be assumed merely because it
has been rendered.
'28 1
The recent court of appeals decisions on reasonableness of
charges for chiropractic care show that the court of appeals is ap-
plying some scrutiny in this area. This seems appropriate, and this
approach should be applied to all kinds of health care covered by
workers' compensation.
3. Family Member's Nursing Services
Several recent decisions deal with the employer's duty to "pay
for the reasonable value of nursing services by a member of the
employee's family in cases of permanent total disability.
282
In Alexander v. Kenneth R. LaLonde Enterprses,283 the supreme
court upheld an award for a wife's nursing services based on the
wage of a licensed practical nurse for an eight-hour day, over the
employer's objection that the wife was not a licensed practical
nurse and over the wife's objection that she had to be available on
a twenty-four-hour basis.2 4 As to the employer's objection, the
court pointed out that the employer suggested no better yardstick
for ascertaining the services' value, that the wife's services had
some similarities to those of a licensed practical nurse, that she had
received training from the Kenny Institute to perform some of the
tasks, and that "only hourly wage rates, exclusive of substantial
'fringe benefits' were used as a measurement. "285 As to the wife's
280. Id.
281. Id. at 705.
282. MINN. STAT. § 176.135(1) (1982). See generally Bushnell v. City of Duluth, 241
Minn. 189, 62 N.W.2d 813 (1954); Halonen v. Holt Ice Co., 27 Minn. Workmen's Comp.
Dec. 333 (1974).
283. 288 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. 1980).
284. Id. at 20-21.
285. Id. Regarding the wife's services, the court said:
Petitioner can do little for himself; so, during a typical day, his wife undresses
him, bathes him, washes his hair, helps him brush and clean his dentures, serves
him meals on a tray, cuts his food and aids in feeding him, helps him out of
chairs and into and out of automobiles, affixes his leg brace, places a splint on his
hand 10 to 12 times a day, and exercises his arm and leg. Petitioner must fre-
quently use the bathroom, both during the day and during the night, and his
wife must assist him in getting out of bed, walking to the bathroom, and going
back to bed, where he must be placed in a certain position in the bed in order to
[Vol. 8
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objection, the court noted that her services were not full time, that
an institutional nurse would have constant duty during the regular
workday, performing services for numerous patients, and that
some of her services were "attributable to the marital status
itself."
28 6
Lest too much emphasis be put on the last point, it should be
noted that subsequent to Alexander the Minnesota Supreme Court
summarily affirmed an award in Vicars v. Marquette National
Bank, 287 wherein the court of appeals had stated:
[The wife] is not asking for . . . payment for ordinary house-
hold tasks such as preparation of meals, washing of employee's
clothes, etc ... [T]he insurer's argument that [it is] in effect
subrogated to the husband and wife's marriage vows and that
she thereby must put in a 24 hour vigil of the employee, free of
charge for an injury compensable under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act, is without merit. Before the injury, she was free to
come and go, sleep a restful night without having to be awake
to see that her husband got back to bed safely and not have to
perform for her husband anything more than her wifely du-
ties. 288 Now she is bound to a 24 hour constant supervision of
the employee's activities.
28 9
Regarding the fact that the supreme court summarily affirmed
in Vicars, it should be pointed out that on December 17, 1981, the
supreme court amended the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure by
adding a sentence to Rule 133.01, subdivision 1, stating, "Sum-
mary dispositions have no precendential value and shall not be
cited." It is unfortunate that the supreme court adopted this
amendment. It is not accurate for the court's rules to state that
sleep. As a result of this need for nighttime assistance, petitioner's wife averages
4 hours of interrupted sleep.
Id. at 20.
286. Id. at 21.
287. No. 50626 (Minn. July 2, 1980), af'g man. 33 Minn. Worker's Comp. Dec. 296
(1979).
288. At this point the court of appeals included a footnote citing and quoting from
Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69, 74, 228 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1975), where the
court said:
Serving meals in bed and bathing, dressing, and escorting a disabled person are
not ordinary household tasks. That a "conscientious" spouse may in fact per-
form these services does not diminish the employer's duty to compensate him or
her as the person who discharges the employer's duty to provide them.
33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 303 n.4.
289. Id. at 300-01. It should be noted that the supreme court's affirming the award
does not necessarily indicate approval of the court of appeals' reasoning. See Colorado
Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 920-21 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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summary dispositions have no precedential value, and a prohibi-
tion on citing them seems to unconstitutionally abridge freedom of
speech and of the press. The new provision is particularly trouble-
some in the area of workers' compensation, where court of appeals
decisions are disseminated both in slip opinion form and in the
service entitled Minnesota Workers' Compensation Decisions, published
by the state. The latter publication reports the supreme court's
summary dispositions29° and court of appeals opinions refer to
them.291 A litigant is entitled to know if it is not worthwhile to seek
review because the supreme court has summarily decided a similar
case.
If the new provision denying that summary dispositions have
precedential value and barring their citation is not stricken down,
at least it should be narrowly construed to apply only to practice
before the supreme court. It should not be applied to practice
before the court of appeals, and certainly not to law review articles
like this one. Construing it to apply only to practice before the
supreme court is consistent with the principle of construing a pro-
vision in a manner that avoids serious doubt as to its constitution-
ality and with the fact that Rule 101 of the Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure, entitled "Scope of Rules," specifies that the
rules "govern procedure in the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
' '292
290. See, e.g., 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 4, 11, 20, 24, 30, 56, 111, 143, 146, 149,
158, 191, 196, 326, 331, 335, 390, 393, 395, 454, 463, 506, 509, 512, 516, 584, 642; 34 Minn.
Workers' Comp. Dec. 48, 54, 56, 127, 129, 162, 176, 275, 352, 374, 451, 477, 482, 487, 490,
517, 526, 529, 531,539, 546, 573, 592,608, 611,614, 619, 654, 659, 751; 33 Minn. Workers'
Comp. Dec. 65, 260, 303, 484, 530, 674-76.
291. See, e.g., Carr v. Trail Dodge, Inc., No. 474-14-1491, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Workers'
Comp. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1983); Mann. v. Wanek Constr. Co., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp.
Dec. 660, 665 (1982); Heibert v. Green Giant Co., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 386,
387 (1982); Huck v. A.B.I. Contracting, Inc., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 346, 348
(1981); Server v. State, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 331, 333 (1981); cf. Bartlett v.
Northwest Exhibition, Inc., No. 483-62-7328 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 21,
1982), slip op. at 3 (Wallraff, J., dissenting); Holter v. Munsingwear, Inc., 34 Minn. Work-
ers' Comp. Dec. 381, 385 (1982) (Adel, J., dissenting); Provost v. Hoerner-Waldorf Co., 34
Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 375, 380 (1982) (Wallraff, J., dissenting); Bicha v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 320, 324 (1981) (McCarthy, J., concurring);
Kroening v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 609, 611 (1981), affd
mem, No. 81-1094 (Minn. May 11, 1982).
292. Regarding the principle of construing a provision to avoid serious doubt as to
constitutionality, see supra note 206 and accompanying text.
In McClish v. Pan-O-Gold Baking Co., 336 N.W.2d 538, 542 n.4 (Minn. 1983), the
supreme court itself cited a summary affirmance, but only to point out that relator's reli-
ance upon it was misplaced because "[t]he summary affirmance indicates that the case has
no precedential value and should not be cited in briefs." See Hoff v. Kempton, 317
N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (Minn. 1982).
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The State Register and Public Documents Division and the
court of appeals apparently have not construed the new provision
to be applicable to them. Minnesota Workers' Compensatzn Decisions
has continued to report the supreme court summary dispositions
after December 17, 1981,293 and court of appeals opinions after
that date continue to refer to supreme court summary
dispositions.
294
Relying upon the fact that its award in Vicars had been summa-
rily affirmed, the court of appeals in Server v. State295 held that a
wife's assistance to her work-injured husband constituted "nursing
services" within the meaning of the statute.296 Applying the dic-
tionary definition of the verb "to nurse," ie., "to take care of or
attend, as an invalid, to care for tenderly or sedulously, to cherish,
foster,"297 the court of appeals ordered the employer to pay for the
wife's services, saying:
The record discloses that the employee has made some
progress in his physical capabilities since his injury. Neverthe-
less, the evidence revealed that at the time of hearing the em-
ployee's wife still washed his hair, tied his shoes, clipped his
nails, assisted in his shaving, poured his coffee, cut up his food
for him and regulated his medication.
Most importantly, the employee's wife must almost continu-
ally observe the employee due to his mental condition. The
record reveals that the employee becomes easily confused and
at times becomes "lost" and does not remember his phone
number or the address of his residence. The employee, when
left alone, has attempted to fix a water faucet without turning
the water off either below or in the basement and has tried to
do electrical work in his house without turning the power off.
The record clearly demonstrates that the employee could not
be expected to be relied upon to take his medication at the ap-
propriate times.
298
The court of appeals seems to be proceeding appropriately in
293. See,e.g., 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 4, 11, 20, 24, 30, 56, 111, 143, 146, 149,
158, 191, 196, 326, 331, 335, 390, 393, 395, 454, 463, 506, 509, 512, 516, 584, 642; 34 Minn.
Workers' Comp. Dec. 374, 451, 477, 482, 487, 490, 517, 526, 529, 531, 546, 573, 592, 608,
611, 614, 654, 659, 751.
294. See 1982 and 1983 opinions cited supra note 291.
295. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 331 (1981).
296. Id. at 333-34.
297. Id. at 334, quoting Vicars v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp.
Dec. 296, 299 (1979), aj'dmem., No. 50626 (Minn. July 20, 1980).
298. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 333.
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In Rippentrop v. Imperial Chemical Co .300 the supreme court held
that under the rehabilitation section adopted in 1979, 30 a claim-
ant engaged in job hunting under a "rehabilitation plan" is not
entitled to the 125% compensation rate.30 2 The statute requires
the employer to pay "up to 156 weeks of compensation during re-
habilitation under a plan in an amount equal to 125% of the em-
ployee's rate for temporary total disability. '30 3  The court
concluded that this does not apply to job hunting under a rehabili-
tation plan because (1) subsequent language in the same subdivi-
299. See generally MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION: REHABILITATION ISSUES
(Minn. Continuing Legal Educ. 1980) (setting forth rehabilitation statute, rules, policies,
procedures, and forms); BenAnav, Workers' Compensation Amendments of the 1979 Ainnesota
Legislature, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 745-51 (1980).
300. 316 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 1982).
301. MINN. STAT. § 176.102 (1982), added by Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 36, 1979
Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1278-81, as amended by Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 76, 1981 Minn.
Laws 1657. The 1981 amendment, providing for rehabilitation services for surviving
spouses, is not relevant to the issues in Rippentrop.
Regarding the effective date of MINN. STAT. § 176.102(11) (1982) (125% compensa-
tion rate), see Solberg v. FMC Corp., 325 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1982) (retraining benefits
for which liability was not established before October 1, 1979) and Walsh, Employees'
Claims for Concurrent Payment of Temporaly Disabi'ty and Retraining Benefits, 6 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 731, 734 n.12 (1980).
302. 316 N.W.2d at 514-16. The court also upheld the court of appeals' ruling that
section 176.102 does not authorize the director of rehabilitation services and the rehabili-
tation review panel to determine when claimants are entitled to increased compensation
under subdivision 11 of the section. Id. at 514, 516-17.
Not in issue before the supreme court was the court of appeals' ruling that a claimant
engaged in job hunting under a rehabilitation plan is entitled to travel costs under section
176.102, subdivision 9, which makes the employer liable for "rehabilitation expenses" in-
cluding "[rleasonable cost of ... travel." See Rippentrop v. Imperial Chem. Co., 33
Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 453, 457 (1981),af'don other grounds, 316 N.W.2d 514 (Minn.
1982).
303. MINN. STAT. § 176.102(11) (1982). This subdivision specifies:
Compensation during rehabilitation. The insurer or employer shall pay up
to 156 weeks of compensation during rehabilitation under a plan in an amount
equal to 125 percent of the employee's rate for temporary total disability. This
payment is in lieu of payment for temporary total, temporary partial, or perma-
nent total disability to which the employee might otherwise be entitled for this
period under this chapter, but shall be considered to be the equivalent of tempo-
rary total disability for the purposes of section 176.132. If on the job training is
part of the rehabilitation program, the weeks during which the insurer or em-
ployer pays compensation pursuant to subdivision 5 shall be subtracted from the
156 weeks of retraining compensation which has been paid, if any, pursuant to
this subdivision. This subdivision shall not apply to retraining benefits for which
liability has been established prior to July 1, 1979.
[Vol. 8
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sion refers to "the 156 weeks of retratning compensation,"3°4 (2) the
subdivision's legislative history shows that it was designed to re-
place the practice under which claimants could sometimes
"double dip" by receiving retrainng benefits concurrently with
temporary total disability benefits, 30 5 (3) the subdivision's head-
note in the bill before the legislature specified "Compensation During
Retrainihng,"306 and (4) "providing the 125% benefit only as an in-
centive to formal vocational retraining . . . seems reasonable in
that an employee who does not succeed in direct job placement
efforts may then be encouraged to obtain formal vocational train-
ing through the incentive of increased compensation.
'30 7
The Ri'ppentrop court's conclusion was correct, for the reasons the
court specified and for the additional reason which had been given
by the court of appeals, that "[t]here is no indication that the legis-
lature intended to allow dissipation of the 156 weeks by the time
spent in direct placement-which if unsuccessful would, of course,
leave the employee with none or a reduced portion of his 156
weeks for possible needed formal vocational training.
'30 8
C Disability Benefits
. Temporay Total and Permanent Total
a. Time of In'u,-
In Blegen v. Data Dispatch, Inc. ,309 the employee hurt his knee at
work on January 6, 1978 but this did not cause him to lose time
from work until July 31, 1979. The court of appeals held that dis-
304. 316 N.W.2d at 516; see supra note 303.
305. Id.; see MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMP. STUDY COMM'N, supra note 163, at 16;
Walsh, supra note 301, at 734-35.
306. 316 N.W.2d at 516. This subdivision was denominated "Compensation during
retraining" in Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1281, and in
MINN. STAT. § 176.102(11) (Supp. 1979). It was only changed to "Compensation during
rehabilitation" in MINN. STAT. § 176.102(11) (1980). The court said "the headnote...
in the bill before the legislature . . . is 'intrinsic evidence of the legislative author's own
understanding of its purpose and intent,' " and noted that "the headnote [now] appearing
in the statute, is not part of the statute." 316 N.W.2d at 516 & n. 1, quottgIn re Contest of
Gen. Election, 264 N.W.2d 401, 404 n.5 (Minn. 1978), and citing MINN. STAT. § 648.36
(1982). Section 648.36 specifies:
The headnotes of the sections of any edition of the Minnesota Statutes printed
in black-face type are intended to be mere catch words to indicate the contents
of the section and are not any part of the statute, nor shall they be so deemed
when any of such sections, including the headnotes, are amended or reenacted,
unless expressly so provided.
307. 316 N.W.2d at 516.
308. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 457.
309. No. 468-58-8582 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 9, 1981).
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ability benefits were to be based on employee's wage on the earlier
date. 310 It stated:
The employee argues that the interpretation of "time of
injury" as a matter of law means the date upon which disable-
ment or lost wages begins. He cites cases in his brief from other
jurisdictions as Minnesota apparently has not construed M.S.
176.011, Subd. 3, referring to the daily wage at the time of in-
jury. A review of these cases reveals that the majority involved
an occupational disease. In the instant case we are not dealing
with an occupational disease.
It is axiomatic under Minnesota Law that the date of the
injury controls the benefits that the employee is to receive
under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Law.
The statutes should be construed so that the words are given
their common meaning. It is clear that the time of injury
should be interpreted to mean the actual date upon which the
injury occurs.
3 11
The court of appeals' approach seems inappropriate for three
reasons. First, since the 1953 legislature31 2 deleted the "caused by
accident" element from the definition of "personal injury, ' 313 it
often will be difficult to pinpoint the time of injury other than
with reference to the time of disablement. 314 Particularly will this
be so in cases of aggravation of an underlying disorder 33 or repeti-
tive minute trauma.
3 16
310. Id., slip op. at 3;cf. Crepeau v. Krost Insulation Co., 332 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Minn.
1983) ("While employee did not sustain compensable disability until February 1980, he
had sustained the underlying injury through exposure to asbestos by June 14, 1978, and
the compensation judge correctly used that date in determining the amount of depen-
dency compensation").
311. Blegen, slip op. at 3.
312. Act of Apr. 24, 1953, ch. 755, § 1(16), 1953 Minn. Laws 1099, 1101.
313. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1982).
314. See lB. A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 42.00 (" 'Personal injury' includes any harm-
ful change in the body. It need not involve physical trauma, but may include such inju-
ries as disease, sunstroke, nervous collapse, traumatic neurosis, hysterical paralysis, and
neurasthenia."); V ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPEDIA Injuly 357 (1974) ("any
damage done the body, particularly by an outside force"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (UNABRIDGED) 1164 (1976)
("hurt, damage, or loss sustained"); cf. B. MALOY, THE SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY FOR LAWYERS 323 (2d ed. 1951) ("A hurt suffered by a person or a thing; a hurt or
damage sustained, as a severe injury. A hurt of any sort; a wound, a maim, a lesion");
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 709 (4th unabridged lawyers' ed. 1976) ("Damage;
trauma; an accidental or inflicted wound.").
315. See,e.g., Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 323, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960)
(sales clerk's constantly being on feet aggravated preexisting deteriorative foot disorder).
316. See, e.g., Jensen v. Kronick's Floor Covering Serv., 309 Minn. 541, 245 N.W.2d
230 (1976) (per curiam). TheJensen court held that impairment from repetitive minute
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Second, there is considerable authority for equating injury with
disability. The Minnesota Supreme Court made disability rele-
vant to "time of injury" in Balow v. Kellogg Coop. Creamey Associa-
lion, 317 where it held, under the provision requiring notice of
injury within a certain time "after the occurrence of the injury," 3 18
that the time for notice "commences to run when the disability
occurs or when it becomes reasonably apparent that it is likely to
occur."3 19 The supreme court equated disablement of a member
with "injury to" the member in Tracy v. Streater/Litton Industries .320
In Tracy, claimant injured his spinal cord at work on August 5, he
experienced sensory loss and some weakness in his legs by August
26 and by September 8 his legs were paralyzed. 321 The court up-
held the application to claimant's benefits of the fifteen percent
increase provided for permanent partial disability "caused by si-
multaneous injury to two or more members.
'322
Third, with respect to occupational disease, the statute specifies,
"The disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational
disease shall be regarded as a personal injury within the meaning
of the workers' compensation law.
' '323
The Blegen court of appeals should have accepted claimant's
contention that the "time of injury" for "daily wage" purposes was
July 31, 1979, when disability commenced. Claimant's injury did
not really culminate or take hold to affect his earning ability until
that time. Since the compensation is for disability, it should be
measured by the wage when the disability commenced.
The court of appeals did take this approach in a later case in-
volving, not a single employer's liability for total disability, but
apportionment of liability between several employers for tempo-
rary partial disability. In Brink v. Metropolitan Waste Control Commis-
sion,324 claimant was temporarily partially disabled in 1981 as a
trauma may be compensated as either personal injury or occupational disease. Id. at 543,
245 N.W.2d at 232.
317. 248 Minn. 20, 78 N.W.2d 430 (1956).
318. See MINN. STAT. § 176.141 (1982).
319. 248 Minn. at 26, 78 N.W.2d at 434; see Kitt v. McGlynn Bakeries, 30 Minn.
Workers' Comp. Dec. 213 (1977) (time for notice runs only after employee learns of in-
jury's "probable work-related nature"); cf. Kahn v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737, 745-46 (Minn.
1980) (notice time extended for employer's agent inducing delay).
320. 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979).
321. Id. at 911.
322. Id. at 917;see MINN. STAT. § 176.101(3) (1982) (emphasis added). For discussion
of the latter provision, see infra notes 453-60 and accompanying text.
323. MINN. STAT. § 176.66(1) (1982).
324. 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 745 (1982).
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result of three injuries: a 1979 injury while working for Employer
A at $371 per week, a 1980 injury while working for Employer B at
$437 per week; and a 1981 injury while working for Employer C at
$671 per week. In his temporarily partially disabled condition
claimant was able to earn over $450 per week.32 5 Responsibility
was apportioned to fifty percent to the Employer A injury and
twenty-five percent each to the Employer B and Employer C inju-
ries.3 26 Employer A protested that it should not be liable for any
temporary partial disability benefits because those benefits are
based on two-thirds of the difference "between the daily wage of
the worker at the time of injugy and the wage he is able to earn in his
partially disabled condition, 3 27 and claimant here was making
more now than at the time of his EmployerA injury. 328 The court of
appeals rejected Employer A's argument and held it liable for fifty
percent of two-thirds of the difference between $671 and $450,329
saying:
The employee's claimed wage loss occurred subsequent to his
last work injury. . in 1981 and it is this period that demon-
strates his entitlement to benefits. The . . 1979 injury estab-
lished the liability of [Employer A] . . . for so long as this
injury contributes to the employee's disability.
330
The court of appeals' approach in Brink is basically inconsistent
with and vastly superior to its approach in Blegen. One may hope
that in some future case the court of appeals will reconsider and
overrule Blegen.
b. "Community"
With regard to work available in a totally disabled employee's
325. Id. at 745-46. Claimant's earnings in February 1981 were $450.80 and in October
1981 $527.91. Id. at 746.
326. d. at 747.
327. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101(2) (1982) (emphasis added). See generally tinfra notes
363-407 and accompanying text.
328. 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 747-48.
329. From February until October 1981 and 50% of two-thirds of the difference be-
tween $671 and $527.91 after October 1981. Id. at 746-47, 750; see supra note 325. The
court of appeals added:
Obviously, the amount payable by [Employer A] for the employee's . . . 1979
injury should never exceed that which would equal its maximum compensation
liability rate for this . . . 1979 date of injury and in this case it would appear
that the appellant is only responsible for approximately half of that maximum
compensation rate.
34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 750.
330. 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 749.
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"community," 33' the Minnesota Supreme Court has decided sev-
eral interesting recent cases. Two of the cases concerned claimants
who moved to communities other than where they were employed
when injured, 332 and two with the size of the "community" in
which claimant must seek work.
333
In Paine v. Beek-s Pizza 3 3 4 a six-three court held as a matter of
law that when a claimant injured while working in a metropolitan
area leaves that area, which has employment opportunities within
his physical restrictions, and, allegedly hoping to better himself,
moves to an area with few, in any, employment opportunities, the
claimant is not entitled to total disability benefits.335 The claim-
ant, who had lived in the Twin Cities for some time, sustained
back and neck injuries in a multi-vehicle accident while working
as a pizza deliverer for the employer. Thereafter, he worked for
two weeks as a janitor for a different Twin Cities employer, but
quit because he wanted to find another job. Subsequently he ob-
tained a settlement from the other driver who had been involved
in the accident, began receiving social security disability benefits,
and married a woman with two teenage children who also re-
ceived social security. The family moved to a farm near Glencoe,
Minnesota, then to a farm near Badger, Minnesota, and finally to
a farm in Roseau County, Minnesota, on which the claimant's
wife gardens and he raises chickens and a few pigs. The claimant
made a few unsuccessful attempts to find work in nearby small
towns. 336 Reversing the court of appeals' award of total disability
benefits, the court reasoned:
In the case at bar, from an objective standpoint as distin-
guished from the self-serving statement of [claimant] saying
that he hoped to "better himself" by making the move, there
was no evidence to sustain the conclusion that a reasonable per-
son in the employee's place would have quit a job in the metro-
politan area to make a move expecting to earn his livelihood
from extremely marginal farming or by obtaining employment
in the area of the move.
331. See Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 153 N.W.2d 130, 134
(1967); Reese v. Preston Mktg. Ass'n, 274 Minn. 150, 153, 142 N.W.2d 721, 723 (1966).
332. Paine v. Beek's Pizza, 323 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1982); Kurrel v. National Con
Rod, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1982).
333. Petschl v. Britton Motor Serv., 323 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1982); Fredenberg v. Con-
trol Data Corp., 311 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1981).
334. 323 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1982).
335. Id. at 815-16.
336. Id. at 813-14.
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Moreover . . . this case involves an employee who, at the
time of the injury and for [a] considerable time before, had
lived in the metropolitan area, but after the injury he had vol-
untarily removed himself from that job market to an area of
low employment opportunity ....
The employee, of course, has the right to choose where he
will live. It does not follow, however, that if an employee
chooses to live in an area where employment opportunities for
him are virtually non-existent, an employer-insurer must subsi-
dize him by continued payment of total disability
benefits ...
[I]n our view, it cannot be said that a reasonable per-
son in the employee's place would have made the move expect-
ing to earn any reasonable livelihood either from the source of
farming under the circumstances here existing or by obtaining
outside employment in the area of Badger. More correctly, it
seems to us, this move is to be viewed as a withdrawal from the
labor market .... 337
In reaching its decision, the Paine court distinguished a case it
had decided only a month earlier, Kurrell v. Natinal Con Rod, Inc.
338
In Kurrell, the court upheld a ruling of entitlement to rehabilita-
tion benefits for a claimant who, while recovering from surgery
from an injury sustained working for a Twin Cities employer, de-
cided that she could not afford to stay in the Twin Cities on disa-
bility benefits and, after arranging for work as a fry cook there,
moved 150 miles to Walnut Grove, Minnesota, where she had once
lived and still had relatives. She was unable to perform the fry
cook job, had to quit after two weeks, and was unable to find other
work in Walnut Grove. Her former employer, however, offered
her light duty employment under a rehabilitation plan in the
Twin Cities.339 Upholding the court of appeals' determination
that the claimant was entitled to rehabilitation benefits while re-
maining in Walnut Grove, the court said:
Indeed, Kurrell's motivations in moving to Walnut Grove
may be viewed as "merely personal," but the relevant inquiry is
whether the actions were antithetical to the purposes of the
statute. It would be a harsh and rigid rule that allowed an em-
ployee to better her personal situation only at the expense of
her statutory right to rehabilitation benefits. . ..
The standard employed by the Workers' Compensation
337. Id. at 815, 816.
338. 322 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1982).
339. Id. at 200-02.
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Court of Appeals examines whether an employee's actions ad-
vance or impede the return to gainful employment. In deter-
mining that Kurrell's relocation was not part of a plan to retire
from the labor market, the Court of Appeals found that "she
looked for and did find work at her new location, indicating not
an intent to retire, but the very opposite." . . . There is sub-
stantial evidence that Kurrell made an earnest effort to return
to the work force by accepting the job as a frycook. When this
failed, she made a diligent search for other employment in the
Walnut Grove area.
340
The Paine court distinguished Kurrell on the ground that in Kur-
rell the evidence showed that the claimant made extensive efforts
to return to the work force and had actually found work at her
new location.
34 1
The Paine court's distinguishing of Kurrell was appropriate, and
Kurrell should continue to be viewed as reliable precedent. First, it
should be emphasized that the issue in Kurrell was rehabilitation,
and the claimant's moving to an area of less employment opportu-
nity did not negate the fact that she had suffered a "decrease in
employability" that would be "significantly reduce[d]" by the
rehabilitation.
342
Moreover, with regard to disability benefits, defining the rele-
vant job availability community should involve a reasonableness
standard. Thus it could be found that a claimant should not have
to make a job search in a metropolitan area when she moved to a
small town feeling she could no longer afford to live in the metro-
politan area and reasonably expecting to be able to work in the
small town, and yet that a claimant like Paine should have to
make such a job search when his moves were not accompanied by
such justifications.
That defining the relevant job availability community involves
a reasonableness standard is further indicated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Petschl v. Britton Motor Service
343
and Fredenburg v. Control Data Corp .344
In Petschl, the court held as a matter of law that an employee
injured while working in a metropolitan area to which he com-
muted sixty miles may not receive disability benefits if he fails to
340. Id. at 202.
341. Paine v. Beek's Pizza, 323 N.W.2d at 815.
342. See MINN. STAT. § 176.102(4) (1982).
343. 323 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1982).
344. 311 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1981).
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make a diligent job hunt in the metropolitan area, when his work
injury does not prevent him from commuting in the same manner
as before the injury.345  The court distinguished Fredenburg,
wherein ten months earlier it had required disability benefits as a
matter of law for a claimant who, after his injury while working
for a Twin Cities employer, did not seek work in the Twin Cities
but only in the area near his Waterville, Minnesota, home, sixty
miles from the Twin Cities.346 Basing its distinction of Fredenburg
upon a point the Fredenburg court had made only in footnote,
34 7
that Fredenburg's post-injury physical condition contraindicated
lengthy commuting, 348 the Pe/schl court reasoned:
In Fredenburg . . . [w]e . . . held that under the unique cir-
cumstances of that case the employee was not required to seek
substitute employment outside the community in which he
lived. That conclusion rested on the evidence of employee's
back pain and his low tolerance for physical activities, factors
leading us to conclude that the Court of Appeals had erred as a
matter of law in requiring the employee to seek employment
which would necessitate his spending over an hour each way in
traveling to his work and from it. In this case, there is no claim
and no evidence that employee is physically incapable of driv-
ing the 60 miles to the Twin Cities as a consequence of his
work-related injury. He clearly regarded the metropolitan
work area as his employment community prior to the injury,
and it is only reasonable that he should still do so, particularly
when there are few if any job opportunities in the community
where he lives.
349
The court's approach in Petschl was sound. Fredenburg is reliable
345. 323 N.W.2d at 789.
346. Id. at 789-80; see Fredenburg v. Control Data Corp., 311 N.W.2d 860, 864-65
(Minn. 1981).
347. See 311 N.W.2d at 864 n.2:
Moreover, the medical testimony indicates that such a trip was not recom-
mended for the employee unless he could stop enroute and walk about. Given
the evidence of the employee's pain and his low tolerance for physical activities,
it is unreasonable to require the employee to add several painful hours of travel
to his ordinary workday in order to commute to his workplace.
348. Only one of the four experts involved in the case referred to any restriction on
Fredenburg's ability to travel. Fredenburg's chiropractor testified that he should be re-
stricted from riding in a vehicle more than 30 minutes. See id. at 862-63.
349. Petschl v. Britton Motor Serv., 323 N.W.2d at 789-90.
Justice Wahl, joined by Justices Todd, Yetka, and Scott, dissented from the reversal
of the award. She did not dispute claimant's duty to make a diligent job hunt in the
metropolitan area, but felt that the evidence showed, contrary to the compensation judge's
finding, that claimant had made a sufficient effort to find work in both the metropolitan
area and his home area. See id. at 790 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
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precedent only subject to the narrow interpretation placed upon it
by the Petschl court. The court is proceeding appropriately in us-
ing a reasonableness standard to identify and delineate each claim-
ant's job availability "community.
'3 5o
c. Economic Unemployment
In johnson v. Rochester Silo, Inc. ,351 the court of appeals dealt with
the issue of distinguishing unemployment caused by disability
from unemployment caused by economic conditions. The
supreme court has indicated the possibility that an employer
should be able to defeat a total disability claim by proving that
there would normally be a market for claimant's services, and that it
is only temporary economic conditions that prevent claimant from
finding work. 352 The court of appeals, however, refused to apply
this approach to the situation in Johnson. Claimant, who in Au-
gust, 1979, sustained a work injury producing a thirty-five percent
leg disability, returned to work with employer from January until
mid-February 1980, when he was laid off along with other workers
because of an economic decline in employer's business.353 Thereaf-
ter he sought work elsewhere, but was unsuccessful. Finally, in
November 1980, employer offered him a job at his compensation
350. The court of appeals evinced a similar "reasonableness" approach regarding the
issue whether work is "available" in Salmon v. Southland Corp., 34 Minn. Workers'
Comp. Dec. 655 (1981),af'dmem. No. 81-1311 (Minn. May 26, 1982). In that case a four-
one court of appeals awarded total disability, saying:
Although an employment position existed as a telephone operator. . . that the
employee might have been able to perform, the circumstances surrounding the
hours of employment, transportation, and child care arrangements made this
employment position unreasonable for the employee to attempt.
Id. at 658 (footnote omitted). Judge Adel dissented, stating:
Minn. Stat. 176.101, subd. 2 does not provide any excuses for the employee
not working in this case. The hours were not unusual work hours. The em-.
ployee could arrange for a babysitter, as many working parents do. Similarly,
public transportation or ride sharing are utilized by many people in going to
work.
If there were some unreasonable condition or conditions, such as the job
being outside the employee's community, dangerous work for a frail person (such
as a night guard in a tough neighborhood) and so forth, it could make this re-
fusal a different matter.
Id. at 659 (Adel, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Regarding the recent prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-
94 and accompanying text.
351. 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 20 (1981).
352. See Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 220, 50 N.W.2d 266, 270 (1952); Krnetich v.
Oliver Iron Mining Co., 202 Minn. 158, 159-60, 277 N.W. 525, 526-27 (1938). Seegenerally
2 A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 57.63.
353. 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 20.
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hearing and he readily accepted. 354 Rejecting the compensation
judge's determination that claimant was not entitled to compensa-
tion because his inability to work was not due to his injury but to
the general layoff caused by the nature of the employer's business
and the winter slowdown, the court of appeals said:
The work injury to the employee's leg establishes that the em-
ployee has sustained a significant impairment of earning capac-
ity. The fact that he was able to return to work for a month
and a half before he was laid off does not relieve the employer-
insurer of future responsibility for further workers' compensa-
tion benefits. The real questions in this case concern the em-
ployee's ability to earn and whether or not the employee, after
being laid off, made a reasonable diligent effort to find employ-
ment within his physical restrictions. There is no evidence to
contraindicate a reasonable job search, and, therefore, tempo-
rary total disability benefits should have been awarded.
355
Judge McCarthy dissented, stating:
Like the Compensation Judge, I find the employer in the in-
stant case to have done almost everything humanly possible to
rehire the employee. In fact, the employer did. Unfortunately,
due to circumstances beyond anyone's control, the employer
and employee included, economic conditions dictated a layoff
of workers (not uncommon in the economy at this time). The
employee was a victim of same along with others in the employ
of the employer, many with more seniority than the employee.
This layoff was not dictated by the employee's work-related
injuries. To now place this burden on the employer to me
under the peculiar facts herein seems to be an adulteration of
the Workers' Compensation Act ...
At first glance, [denying compensation] may seem a harsh
result. This is particularly true in view of employee's inability
to draw unemployment compensation due to a short tenure at
employer's place of business, namely less than one week. How-
ever, the Workers' Compensation Act, as I understand it, was to
place the burden of work-related injuries on the employer. . ... It
was not meant to be a substitution for welfare or unemploy-
ment compensation. Therefore, I concur with Compensation
Judge Leigh J. Gard on the termination of temporary total or
temporary partial disability in February of 1980. To do other-
wise, would shift the burden of recession to the employer, some-
thing not contemplated in the enactment of workers'
354. Id. at 20-21.
355. Id. at 21.
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compensation statutes.3
56
The majority's approach is preferable. With claimant sus-
taining a thirty-five percent leg disability and making a diligent
job search, the court of appeals could fairly determine that em-
ployer had not proven that it was only temporary economic condi-
tions that kept claimant from finding work.
d Retirement
In Prek/ker v. Mastermotive, Inc. ,357 the Minnesota Supreme Court
cleared up confusion caused by language in its earlier opinion in
Gaston v. North Star Lanes,358 and held that to cause total disability
benefits to cease on the ground of the claimant's voluntary retire-
ment, the employer need not "unequivocally establish" but only
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claimant in-
tended to and did retire at a specific time.35 9 In line with this
standard are Nbbe v. City of St. Paul,36° where the court held that
the evidence did not support the court of appeals' finding that the
claimant had retired, but rather showed that he was forced to re-
tire by a mandatory retirement policy and intended to and but for
his work injury would have moved on to other employment,36' and
other cases allowing compensation where disabled claimants' deci-
sions to retire were caused by their work injuries.362 The court's
approach in these cases seems appropriate.
356. Id. at 23-24 (McCarthy, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
357. 314 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1982).
358. 295 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 1980). The Gaston court had distinguished Joens v.
Campbell Soup Co., 281 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 1979), by pointing out that inJoens there
had been "evidence unequivocally establishing employee's intent to retire on a specific
date regardless of her disability." 295 N.W.2d at 626. The Prekker court explained, "That
statement was not intended to suggest that only such evidence can establish such intent on
the part of an employee nor that the issue requires greater proof than any other question
of fact." 314 N.W.2d at 841.
359. 314 N.W.2d at 841.
360. 320 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1982).
361. Id. at 93-94.
362. See, e.g., Smith v. Armour & Co., 316 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Minn. 1982); Brenno v.
O.A. Stocke & Co., No. 468-36-8606 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981);
Schinke v. Central Supply Co., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 173 (1981), a'd mem., No.
81-260 (Minn. Sept. 16, 1981).
Regarding the recent prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-
94 and accompanying text.
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2. Temporary Parlt'a363
A claimant with a reduced (as opposed to destroyed 364) ability
to earn has several incentives for seeking temporary partial disabil-
ity benefits365 rather than just 3 6 6 ) unenumerated permanent par-
tial disability benefits. 367 Unlike unenumerated permanent partial
363. Regarding apportionment of liability between several employers for temporary
partial disability, see supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text.
Regarding temporary partial disability benefits for injury to a minor, see Kokesh v.
Methodist Hosp., No. 474-74-3294 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1982). In
that case, the court of appeals held that under MINN. STAT. § 176.101(6) (1982), when a
minor sustains a work injury that produces both permanent partial disability and
temporary partial disability, the temporary partial disability is compensable on the basis
of two-thirds of the difference between either the statewide average weekly wage or claimant's
actual pre-injury wage, and what the claimant is able to earn in his or her partially
disabled condition. The majority accepted claimant's argument "that the statute is in
recognition of the difficulty of determining the earning capacity of a minor and treats the
minor as if he or she has the earning capacity of making the statewide average weekly
wage," and said:
The minor has been prevented from attaining his full capacity to earn because of
the permanent injury. The legislature has relieved the employee and other
minors from such inequity caused by permanent injury before the minor has
been able to reach full earning capacity upon reaching majority.
Id. slip op. at 3. Judge Adel dissented, stating:
[Minn. Stat. § 176.101(6)] provides for the compensation rate to be used for minors
in cases of temporary total, temporary partial, etc. It does not relate to the wage
of the employee.
If the employee does show a wage loss, as required by M.S. 101, Subd. 2, for
entitlement to temporary partial disability, then the compensation rate of the em-
ployee is to be determined as provided in M.S. 176.101, Subd. 6.
Id. slip op. at 4 (Adel, J., dissenting).
Although Judge Adel's approach has textual support, the majority's holding better
effectuates the evident over-all purpose of MINN. STAT. § 176.101(6) (1982).
364. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101(1), (4) (1982) (temporary total and permanent total
disability benefits).
365. MINN. STAT. § 176.101(2) (1982) provides:
In all cases of temporary partial disability the compensation shall be 66-2/3
percent of the difference between the daily wage of the worker at the time of
injury and the wage he is able to earn in his partially disabled condition. This
compensation shall be paid during the period of disability, payment to be made
at the intervals when the wage was payable, as nearly as may be, and subject to a
maximum compensation equal to the statewide average weekly wage. If the em-
ployer does not furnish the worker with work which he can do in his temporary
partially disabled condition and he is unable to procure such work with another
employer, after reasonably diligent affort, the employee shall be paid at the full
compensation rate for his or her temporary total disability.
See Eisinger v. Eisinger Sanitation Serv., 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 344, affd mem.,
No. 81-163 (Minn. Sept. 9, 1981) (temporary partial benefits measured by wages paid to
extra part-time employee necessitated by claimant's reduced ability).
Regarding the recent prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-
94 and accompanying text.
366. Regarding the possibility of seeking both temporary partial and unenumerated
permanent partial benefits, see myfra notes 395-407 and accompanying text.
367. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(49) (1982) provides:
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benefits, temporary partial benefits (1) have no 350-week limit ,368
(2) may be recovered in addition to enumerated permanent partial
benefits, 369 and (3) are included in the statute's adjustment of ben-
efits "escalator clause.
'370
In Morehouse v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co. ,371 the supreme court held
In all cases of permanent partial disability not enumerated in this schedule
the compensation shall be 66 2/3 percent of the difference between the daily
wage of the worker at the time of the injury and the daily wage he is able to earn
in his partially disabled condition, subject to a maximum equal to the statewide
average weekly wage, and continue during disability, not to exceed 350 weeks;
and if the employer does not furnish the worker with work which he can do in
his permanently partially disabled condition and he is unable to secure such
work with another employer after a reasonably diligent effort, the employee shall
be paid at his or her maximum rate of compensation for total disability.
368. Compare MINN. STAT. § 176.101(2) (1982) (quoted supra note 365) with id.
§ 176.101, subd. 3(49) (quoted supra note 367).
The temporary partial provision had a 350-week limit like that in the unenumerated
permanent partial provision until it was deleted by Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 342, § 12,
1977 Minn. Laws 703.
At first blush, this may appear to be a legislative determination that "temporary"
may be longer than "permanent." Further reflection suggests that it was appropriate to
remove the arbitrary limit from the provision that compensates for reduction in earning
ability while leaving the limitation in a provision that compensates for impairment of
bodily function. See ihz/a notes 383-87 and accompanying text.
369. Compare MINN. STAT. 176.101, subd. 3(49) (1982); (quoted supra note 367) wlth id.
§ 176.021(3) ("Compensation for permanent partial disability is payable in addition to
compensation for. . . temporary partial disability. . . as provided in subdivision 3a");
see also infra notes 378-94 and accompanying text.
370. See MINN. STAT. § 176.645 (1982) (adjustment of benefits "payable under section
176.101, subdivisions 1, 2 and 4, and section 176.111, subdivision 5"). Subject to certain
limitations, including a six percent limit on increases, the provision specifies:
[O]n the anniversary of the date of the employee's injury the total benefits due
shall be adjusted by multiplying the total benefits due prior to each adjustment
by a fraction, the denominator of which is the statewide average weekly wage for
December 31 of the year two years previous to the adjustment and the numera-
tor of which is the statewide average weekly wage for December 31 of the year
previous to the adjustment ...
It is odd to apply an inflationary adjustment to a benefit measured by the dirence be-
tween the claimant's wage when injured and what the claimant is able to earn now, since
the latter will vary from time to time. But application of the statutory adjustment partially
compensates for the Minnesota court's refusal to factor out inflation in determining what
a claimant is able to earn now. See Mathison v. Thermal Co., 308 Minn. 471, 473, 243
N.W.2d 110, 112 (1976), criticizedin 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 268, 274-75 (1978); see also
2 A. LARSON, supra note 50, § 57.32 ("In determining loss of earning capacity, earnings
after the injury must be corrected to correspond with the general wage level in force at the
time preinjury earnings were calculated."). Mathison should be overruled. The legislature
could do this by adding to section 176.101(2)'s first sentence language stating that the
wage employee is able to earn in his or her partially disabled condition shall be "corrected
to correspond with the wage level for the work at the time of injury." If this were done,
the section 176.645 escalator provision should be amended to not apply to section
176.101(2) benefits.
371. 313 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 1981).
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that in cases arising after August 1, 1974, recovery of temporary
partial disability benefits does not necessitate showing that claim-
ant's physical impairment is "temporary rather than permanent in
nature. "372 In Morehouse, claimant sustained injuries to her back
for which she was awarded ten percent permanent partial disabil-
ity benefits and was thereafter continuously employed at a wage
loss. 37 3 Employer countered claimant's quest for temporary partial
disability benefits by pointing out that the supreme court in Dorn v.
A.J Chromy Construction Co. 374 and Kuehn v. State3 75 had set out as
one of the requirements for temporary partial disability benefits
that "the disability must be temporary rather than permanent in
nature."
376
The court responded that Dorm and Kuehn were decided under
the pre-August 1, 1974 statute before an amendment provided for
permanent partial disability benefits to be paid in addition to tem-
porary partial benefits. 3 77 It emphasized that whereas the 1974
372. Id. at 9.
373. Id. at 9-10.
374. 310 Minn. 42, 245 N.W.2d 451 (1976).
375. 271 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
376. See 313 N.W.2d at 9.
In Dorn v. AJ. Chromy Constr. Co., 310 Minn. 42, 46-47, 245 N.W.2d 451, 454
(1976), the court had stated:
There has been no definitive statement in the case or statutory law of the
requisite elements of temporary partial disability. This is probably due to the
relative scarcity of cases involving awards of this type and the fact that the term
temporary partial disability appears to be self-defining. At a minimum, four
necessary factors appear. First, there must be a physical disability. Second, the
disability must be temporary rather than permanent in nature. Third, it must
be partial, or in other words, the employee must be able to work subject to the
disability. Finally, there must be an actual loss of earning capacity that is caus-
ally related to the disability.
Only the last requirement was in dispute in Dorn, and the court upheld benefits. Id. In
Kuehn v. State, 271 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Minn. 1978), the court reiterated the four require-
ments, but was not very strict about the second one. Although claimant's condition had
remained the same for the five years since his injury and the employer argued that his
disability was permanent, the court in upholding benefits apparently found the second
requirement met merely by testimony that many cases like claimant's improve over a long
period, that the neurosis need not be permanent, and that six to eighteen months of psy-
chotherapy would help. Id.
The court also reiterated the requirements in Bliss v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co., 303 N.W.2d 460, 461 (Minn. 1981). Only the last requirement was in dispute. The
court held as a matter of law that the requirements were satisfied, and reversed a denial of
benefits. Id.
377. Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 486, § 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 1230, 1231, added the follow-
ing to MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3):
Compensation for permanent partial disability is payable concurrently and in
addition to compensation for temporary total disability and temporary partial
disability as set forth in Minnesota Statutes Section 176.101, Subdivisions 1 and
[Vol. 8
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amendment provides that permanent partial disability is payable
for "functional loss of use or impairment of function, permanent in
2, and for permanent total disability as defined in Minnesota Statutes Section
176.101, Subdivision 5; and such compensation for permanent partial disability
shall not be deferred pending completion of payment for temporary disability or
permanent total disability, and no credit shall be taken for payment of perma-
nent partial disability against liability for permanent total disability. Liability
on the part of an employee or his insurer for disability of a temporary total,
temporary partial, and permanent total nature shall be considered as a continu-
ing product and part of the employee's inability to earn or reduction in earning
capacity due to injury or occupational disease and shall be payable accordingly.
Permanent partial disability is payable for functional loss of use or impairment
of function, permanent in nature, and payment therefore shall be separate, dis-
tinct, and in addition to payment for any other compensation.
Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 57, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1645, changes this language as
follows:
Compensation for permanent partial disability is payable in addition to
compensation for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability
pursuant to section 176. 101, subdivisions 1 and 2, as provided in subdivision 3a.
Compensation for permanent partial disability is payable concurrently and in
addition to compensation for permanent total disability pursuant to section
176.101, subdivision 5, as provided in subdivision 3a. Compensation for perma-
nent partial disability shall be withheld pending completion of payment for tem-
porary total and temporary partial disability but shall not be withheld pending
payment of compensation for permanant total disability, and no credit shall be
taken for payment of permanent partial disability, against liability for tempo-
rary total or permanent total disability. Liability on the part of an employer or
his insurer for disability of a temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent
total nature shall be considered as a continuing product and part of the em-
ployee's inability to earn or reduction in earning capacity due to injury or occu-
pational disease and shall be payable accordingly, subject to subdivision 3a.
Permanent partial disability is payable for functional loss of use or impairment
of function, permanent in nature, and payment therefore shall be separate, dis-
tinct, and in addition to payment for any other compensation, subject to subdivi-
sion 3a.
The 1981 amendment adds the following:
Payments for permanent partial disability as provided in section 176.101,
subdivision 3, shall be made in the following manner:
(a) If the employee returns to work, payment shall be made by lump sum;
(b) If temporary total payments have ceased, but the employee has not
returned to work, payment shall be made at the same intervals as temporary
total payments were made;
(c) If temporary total disability payments cease because the employee is
receiving payments for permanent total disability or because the employee is
retiring or has retired from the work force, then payment shall be made by lump
sum;
(d) If the employee completes a rehabilitation plan pursuant to section
176.102, but the employer does not furnish the employee with work he can do in
his permanently partially disabled condition, and the employee is unable to pro-
cure such work with another employer, then payment shall be made by lump
sum.
Id. § 58, 1981 Minn. Law at 1646 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3a) (1982)).
Until 1967, permanent partial benefits were payable at the same intervals as tempo-
rary total benefits unless special approval was obtained for a lump sum payment. See Act
of Apr. 24, 1953, ch. 755, §§ 2(3), 19, 1953 Minn. Laws 1099, 1102-03, 1124. In 1967, the
legislature provided that "payments for permanent partial disability shall be made by
lump sum." See Act of June 2, 1967, ch. 40, § 5, 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 2225, 2227-28.
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nature," the amended statute specifies that liability for temporary
partial disability "shall be considered as a continuing product and
part of the employee's . . . reduction in earning capacity due to
injury or occupational disease and shall be payable accord-
ingly." 37 8 The court concluded:
The unambiguous language of this amendatory act requires
rejection of relator's claim that the Dorn requirement of a tem-
porary physical disability has survived the amendment. With
respect to claims for temporary partial disability benefits aris-
ing out of injuries sustained subsequent to August 1, 1974, it is
obvious that an employee is entitled to such benefits so long as
he has a "reduction in earning capacity due to injury or occu-
pational disease," and whether his physical condition has stabi-
lized and resulted in a permanent partial disability is no longer
relevant to his right to receive compensation for temporary par-
tial disability.
3 7 9
In Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 30, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1271, the legislature
substituted language, deleted in 1981, which provided:
[P]ayments for permanent partial disability in cases in which return to work
occurs prior to four weeks from the date of injury shall be made by lump sum
payment. . . . In cases in which return to work does not occur prior to four
weeks after injury, payments for permanent partial disability shall be made ac-
cording to the following schedule: 25 percent of the amount due after four weeks
from the date of injury, 25 percent after eight weeks, 25 percent after 12 weeks
and 25 percent after 16 weeks, provided that any and all payments remaining
shall be paid upon the cessation of payments for temporary total disability and
upon the employee's return to work.
Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 57, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1644-45.
Although Dorn and Kuehn were decided under the pre-1974 statute, Bliss v. Minneap-
olis Star & Tribune, 303 N.W.2d 460, 461 (Minn. 1981), setting forth the same require-
ment that temporary partial disability be temporary rather than permanent in nature,
apparently involved a 1977 injury. But the requirement was not in issue in that the evi-
dence clearly established that it was satisfied. See id.
It should be noted that the supreme court had summarily affirmed a case wherein the
court of appeals awarded temporary partial disability benefits over Judge Adel's objection
that the majority was disregarding the Dorn requirement that the disability be temporary
in nature. See Lewis v. Armour & Co., 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 607 (1980), af'd
mem., No. 52036 (Minn. May 20, 1981). Other such court of appeals cases include Corkill
v. Winona Plumbing Co., No. 707-18-3606 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
1981); Larson v. Century Mercury Freight, No. 477-42-2120 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 1981); Skogheim v. Freeborn Foods, 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 39
(1981); Huck v. A.B.I. Contracting Inc., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 346 (1981), aft'd
mere., No. 81-572 (Minn. Dec. 17, 1981);see also Jacob v. Totino's Finer Foods, No. 477-44-
0538 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1981) (similar); Gunderson v. Sebesta
Constr. Co., No. 472-64-7774 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 28, 1981) (similar).
Regarding the recent prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-
94 and accompanying text.
378. See Morehouse v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn. 1981).
379. Id. at 10.
[Vol. 8
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The Morehouse result is sound. First, the court was correct in
indicating that "disability" in the provision for compensation in
"cases of temporary partial disability" should mean impairment of
earning ability rather than physical bodily impairment. 3 0 Im-
pairment of earning ability probably will most often be "tempo-
rary rather than permanent in nature," given opportunities for
rehabilitation 38 ' and inflation (in light of the Minnesota court's
refusal to factor 'out inflation in computing temporary partial
benefits38 2).
Second, even if a claimant did have a permanent rather than
temporary impairment of earning ability, the claimant should be
able to recover temporary partial disability benefits. With section
176.021, subdivision 3 providing since 1974 that "[p]ermanent par-
tial disability is payable for functional loss of use or impairment of
function, permanent in nature, and payment therefor shall be sep-
arate, distinct, and in addition to payment for any other compen-
sation,"' 383 the "temporary partial disability" provision has become
the only provision in the statute compensating for reduction in
earning ability.38 4 To deny an employee such compensation be-
cause his reduction in earning ability is permanent while compen-
sating employees with temporary earning ability reduction is an
absurd and unreasonable result. The legislature has instructed
courts interpreting statutes to presume that the legislature does not
intend an absurd or unreasonable result. 38 5 In fact, the result is
unreasonable enough to raise a serious equal protection issue,
386
making relevant the principle of construing a statute in a manner
that avoids serious doubt as to its constitutionality.
3 7
In sum, the Morehouse court properly upheld temporary partial
benefits to a claimant whose scheduled permanent partial disabil-
ity reduced her ability to earn.
380. See supra text accompanying note 378.
381. See MINN. STAT. § 176.102 (1982).
382. See supra note 370.
383. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3) (1982). For a more complete quotation, see supra
note 377.
384. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(49) (1982), although measured by reduction in
earning capacity, compensatesfor impairment of bodily function. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 395-99.
385. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (1982) ("In ascertaining the intention of the legisla-
ture the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: (1) The legislature does not
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable").
386. See supra notes 3-26, 55-59 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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The 1981 amendment to section 176.02 1, subdivision 3 probably
does not affect the Morehouse result. Its provision that
"[c]ompensation for permanent partial disability shall be withheld
pending completion of payment for. . . temporary partial disabil-
ity" 388 is in conflict with the provision in section 176.02 l's subdivi-
sion 3a (added in 1981) that "[i]f the employee returns to work,
[permanent partial disability] payment shall be made by lump
sum. ' 38 9 The latter should control because it is later in the stat-
ute,390 more specific, 39' and more in line with the 1981 amend-
ment's manifest purpose to encourage claimants to return to
work.392
Even if subdivision 3 did control, it would not preclude a claim-
ant's recovering scheduled permanent partial benefits in addition
to temporary partial benefits, but would only delay claimant's do-
ing so until after payments for temporary partial ceased (which
they would do when advancement, rehabilitation and/or inflation
brought claiamant's wage up to what it was at the time of
injury393).
Thus, under Morehouse, temporary partial benefits-based on
two-thirds of the difference between the wage at the time of injury
and the wage claimant is able to earn in his partially disabled con-
dition-are payable to a claimant whose ability to earn is reduced
by a scheduled permanent partial disability.
394
If an unenumerated permanent partial disability reduced a claim-
ant's ability to earn, the claimant should be able to recover two-
388. Act ofJune 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 57, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1645 (codified as MINN.
STAT. § 176.021(3) (1982)). For a more complete quotation, see supra note 377.
389. Id § 58, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1646 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3a)
(1982)). For a more complete quotation, see supra note 377.
390. See MINN. STAT. § 645.26(2) (1982) ("When, in the same law, several clauses are
irreconcilable, the last in order of date or position shall prevail.").
391. See id § 645.26(1):
When a general provision in a law is in conflict with a special provision in
the same or another law, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect
may be given to both. If the conflict between the two provisions be irreconcila-
ble, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to
the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted at a later
session and it shall be the manifest intention of the legislature that such general
provision shall prevail.
392. See id. § 645.16(4) (intention of legislature may be ascertained by considering "ob-
ject to be attained").
393. See supra note 370.
394. Morehouse was awarded benefits for 10% permanent partial disability to her
back. Morehouse v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 1981); see MINN. STAT.
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thirds of the difference between the wage at the time of injury and
the wage claimant is able to earn in his partially disabled condi-
tion under both the provision on temporary partial disability 395
and the provision on unenumerated permanent partial disabil-
ity,39 6 the duplication not persisting, however, beyond the first 350
weeks. 397 Although the measure of both benefits is the same, the
purposes are different-one is to compensate for reduction in earn-
ing ability,398 the other to compensate for impairment of bodily
function.
399
395. MINN. STAT. § 176.101(2) (1982) (quoted supra note 365).
396. Id § 176.101, subd. 3(49) (quoted supra note 367). In Mitchell v. White Castle
Sys., Inc., 290 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Minn. 1980), the court held that if an unenumerated
disability destroyed claimant's earning capacity, she could recover under both the provision
for temporary total disability, see MINN. STAT. § 176.101(1) (1982), and the provision for
unenumerated permanent partial disability.
Few disabilities would fall outside section 176.101(3)'s enumerations. A permanent
skin condition on the chest that was not a burn, disfiguring or scarring but produced pain
reducing earning capacity would qualify. So would fractured ribs that would not heal
because of some incurable disease, if they produced pain reducing earning capacity. The
Mitchell court proceeded on the assumption that traumatic neurosis was unenumerated
where the injury occurred before the addition of the provision on "head injuries," see id.
§ 176.101, subd. 3(39), but other cases have held that injury to the brain or "emotional
system" is compensated under the internal organ provision, see id. § 176. 101, subd. 3(40),
rather than the "head injuries" provision. See Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 293
N.W.2d 909, 912, 918 (Minn. 1979) (organic damage to emotional system); Mack v. City
of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 289, 292-93 (1980) (organic damage to
brain); Crowson v. Valley Park, Inc., 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 127, 137 n.1 (1980)
(organic damage to brain destroying intellectual processes); see also Tidwell v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 170 (1982) (discussed infra notes 465-75 and accompa-
nying text) (traumatic neurosis); cf Fleming v. Minnesota River Coop. Vocational School,
35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 229, 230-31 (1982) (3-2) (five percent under head schedule
for loss of "two upper front central incisor teeth"); Joy v. Superior Mach. Co., No. 473-72-
8756 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 29, 1981) (five percent under head schedule
for damage to three teeth); Schaefer v. North Star Steel Co., No. 477-32-6191 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1980) (seven percent under head schedule for deviated
septum in left nostril and loss of smell). But see Johnson v. Par-Z Contracting, Inc., No.
343-24-6470 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1981) (33% under head schedule for
loss of mental function from rupture of aneurysm in brain).
397. See supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text; see also Larson, The Wage-Loss trin-
ciple in Workers' Compensation, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 501, 520 (1980) (decrying fact
that Minnesota statute may allow such "duplicate benefits both measured by loss of earn-
ing capacity").
398. See supra notes 380, 383-84 and accompanying text.
399. See id
Clearly it would make more sense for MINN. STAT. § 176. 101, subd. 3(49) (1982) to be
measured by impairment of bodily function. For example, it could provide as the internal
organ provision does for "that proportion of 500 weeks . . . which is the proportionate
amount of permanent partial disability caused to the entire body by the injury as is deter-
mined from competent testimony." See id § 176.101, subd.3(40).
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For reasons similar to those stated above4oo in reference to More-
house, the 1981 amendment to section 176.021, subdivision 3, stat-
ing that "[c]ompensation for permanent partial disability shall be
withheld pending completion of payment for. . . temporary par-
tial disability," 4° should not affect a claimant's ability to recover
unenumerated permanent partial benefits simultaneously with
temporary partial benefits. Section 176.021, subdivision 3a's pro-
vision that "[i]f the employee returns to work, [permanent partial
disability] payment shall be made by lump sum ' '4°2 should be read
to require payment of unenumerated permanent partial disability
when claimant returns to work even though the nature of the pay-
ment-two-thirds of the difference between claimant's wage when
injured and the wage claimant can earn now--may preclude pay-
ment by lump sum.
4 °3
It is interesting to contemplate how subdivision 3 would operate
in a situation of unenumerated permanent partial disability and
temporary partial disability if it did control. Unlike scheduled per-
manent partial benefits, 40 4 unenumerated permanent partial bene-
fits would be precluded rather than merely delayed, if they had to
be measured by difference in wage at time of injury and the wage
claimant is able to earn during the weeks after temporary partial
benefits cease, because temporary partial benefits do not cease un-
til claimant is able to earn as much as the wage at time of in-
jury.4° 5 But perhaps the unenumerated permanent partial benefits
should not be measured according to the weeks after temporary
partial benefits cease, but according to the same weeks used to
measure the temporary partial benefits. 40 6 If this were the case,
after claimant's reduction in earning ability ceased, claimant
would recover unenumerated permanent partial benefits based on
the first 350 weeks of claimant's partially disabled condition. In
this way, claimant could be paid in a lump sum, consistently with
400. See supra notes 388-92 and accompanying text.
401. Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 57, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1645 (codified as MINN.
STAT. § 176.021(3) (1982)). For a more complete quotation, see supra note 377.
402. MINN. STAT. § 176 .021(3a) (1982). For a more complete quotation, see supra note
377.
403. See infra note 407 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 368, 370 and accompanying text.
406. Because of the effects of advancement, rehabilitation and/or inflation, the wage
difference will probably be larger in the earlier weeks than in the later ones. If so, it would
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a. Paralysis or Coma
Three recent cases demonstrate that in paralysis and coma situ-
ations, large awards are possible because of cumulation of loss of
use amounts.
In Lerich v. Thermo Systems, Inc. ,40 where a work back injury ren-
dered employee a quadraplegic, the supreme court upheld perma-
nent partial benefits410 of $152,950 plus interest for 1,529.5 weeks
based on 100% loss of use of each arm, each leg, and the back, all
plus 15% under the "simultaneous injury" provision. 411
In Crowson v. Valley Park, Inc. ,412 where brain damage from
nearly drowning while cleaning the "Flume" ride rendered em-
407. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3a) (1982). For quotation of that provision and dis-
cussion of earlier provisions regarding lump sum payment of permanent partial benefits,
see supra note 377.
408. Regarding unenumerated permanent partial disability under MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 3(40) (1982), see supra notes 395-407 and accompanying text. Regarding
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(39), (40) (1982) (head injuries and internal organs), see
supra note 396. See also Hanson v. Country Club Mkts., Inc., No. 477-88-0109 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 20, 1982). In Hanson, the court of appeals held that where
burns caused permanent harm to claimant's arm, collarbone, rib cage, and face, he could
recover under both the arm schedule and the burns schedule. Judge Reike, joined by
Judges Wallraff and Adel, concurring separately, explained:
The award of 10% permanent partial disability attributable to the arm should
be based entirely upon the functional loss of use of this member. In this case, the
employee experienced intermittent pain upon certain motions. The employee is
unable to use his arm in the same manner as he was prior to the injury since
exposure to temperature extremes causes sensitivity and discomfort. Skin
appendages have been destroyed relating to sensation, control of temperature,
tactile sense, and skin lubrication.
The award of 15% permanent partial disability attributable to the body as a
whole is a reasonable estimate. This rating in this case should be given without
consideration to the functional loss of use of a member, but rather with respect to
all other permanent partial disability sustained by the employee as a result of the
burns. This includes the cosmetic disability to all areas of the employee's body
affected by the burns including his arm. See Minn. Stat. 176.101, Subd. 48.
Id slip op. at 3 (Rieke, J., concurring).
409. 292 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1980).
410. This was in addition to continuing temporary total disability benefits. Id. at 743.
Under the 1981 amendment to MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3a) (1982), a permanently para-
lyzed or comatose claimant would be entitled to a lump sum permanent partial disability
payment in addition to continuingpermanent total disability benefits. See infia note 418.
411. 292 N.W.2d at 742-43; see MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(46) (1982).
412. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 127 (1980).
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ployee permanently comatose, 4 13 the court of appeals awarded
$428,869 plus interest for 2,177 weeks.414 This was based on 100%
loss of use of each arm, each leg and the voice mechanism, all plus
15% and 95% under the internal organ provision for injury to the
brain.4
15
Finally, in Mack v. City of Minneapols ,416 where choking on vomit
after being shot in the course of duty caused brain damage which
left a thirty-six-year-old police officer in a permanent vegetative
state,417 the court of appeals awarded $712,013 for 3,142.5 weeks
(over sixty years) of permanent partial disability. 418 This was
based on 100% loss of use of each arm, each leg, each eye, the back,
and the voice mechanism, all plus 15%, and 90% under the inter-
nal organ provision for brain damage, another 10% under the in-
ternal organ provision for loss of use of internal sexual organs, and
100% loss of hearing. 41 9 The court of appeals' award for loss of
hearing and loss of use of the voice mechanism was based on unre-
futed medical testimony that the officer had sustained 100% loss of
function of hearing and 100% loss of function of the voice mecha-
413. Id at 127-28. As explained by the court of appeals:
The employee is in a condition that is called decorticate rigidity. The em-
ployee's cerebral cortex, the thinking part of the brain, has been severely dam-
aged and because of this, he is in an abnormal posture with his legs extended, his
toes pointed down, and with his arms very tightly in contracture pulling up to
his chest. Medical opinion indicated that the employee lost use of 50% of his
brain mass and that all that was functioning with the employee were "a few
vegetative functions."
Id at 128.
414. Order at 2, Crowson v. Valley Park, Inc., 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 127
(1980).
415. 33 Minn. Worker's Comp. Dec. at 133.
The court of appeals made no award under the "head injuries" provision on the view
that damage to an employee's "brain" or "intellectual processes" should be compensated
instead under the internal organ provision. Id at 133, 137 n.i. (For further discussion of
the brain and head injuries, see supra note 396.) The Crowson court of appeals decided not
to make awards under the loss of hearing or loss of sight provisions because "no one has
been able to demonstrate how much or how little the employee is able to see or hear." Id
at 136. The Crowson court of appeals did not mention the possibility of an award under
the provision for "disability resulting from injury to the back." See MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 3(42) (1982). For additional discussion of the "injury to the back" provi-
sion, see infia note 420.
416. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 289 (1980) (per curiam).
417. Id at 289-90.
418. Order at 2, Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 33 Workers' Comp. Dec. 289 (1980).
This was "in addition to compensation for permanent total disability paid and payable
herein." Id
419. The Mack court of appeals set forth the following schedule:
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nism, both due to the brain injury. 4 20
Today permanent partial benefits for 3,142.5 weeks would
amount to $911,325. If this were invested at ten percent interest, it
would produce an income of over $1,752 per week (six times the
maximum rate for total disability), none of which would have to
be used for medical expenses for which the employer is liable
under section 176.135.421 This would be in addition to permanent
total disability benefits which would give claimant a nontaxable
income starting at $290 per week422 ($15,080 per year) with annual
Percentage of Member Weeks 1.15 * Rate Amount
90 percent of Brain 450 Not $226.00 $101,700.00
(Under M.S. 176.101 applicable
Subd. 3, (40)
100 percent of Left Arm 270 310.5 $226.00 5 70,173.00
100 percent of Right Arm 270 310.5 $226.00 5 70,173.00
100 percent of Left Leg 220 253 $226.00 5 57,178.00
100 percent of Right Leg 220 253 $226.00 5 57,178.00
100 percent of the Back 350 402.5 $226.00 S 90,965.00
100 percent Loss of Vision 320 368 $226.00 5 83,168.00
100 percent of Sexual 50 Not $226.00 5 11,300.00
Organs (10 percent of the applicable
body as a whole under
M.S. 176.101 Subd. 3
(40))
100 percent of Voice 500 575 $226.00 $129,950.00
Mechanism
100 percent Hearing-Both 170 Not $226.00 $ 40,228.00
Ears applicable
TOTAL ------------------------------------------------ $712,013.00
*Includes simultaneous injury factor
Id It may be noted that there is a mathematical mistake in the last entry, where 170 times
$226 should have been $38,420 (the $40,228 figure apparently resulted from taking 178
rather than 170 times $226). With this mistake corrected, the TOTAL is $710,205.
420. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 294. For additional discussion of brain inju-
ries, see supra note 415.
The Mack court of appeals' award under the provision for "disability resulting from
tnjuky to the back," see MINN. STAT. § 176. 101, subd. 3(42) (1982) (emphasis added), im-
plicitly equates loss of use of a member with "injury to" the member. This is in line with
Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909, 917 (Minn. 1979), where a work injury
to employee's spinal cord later caused paralysis to his legs and the court upheld the appli-
cation of the 15% increase provided for permanent partial disability "caused by simultane-
ous injury to two or more members." See supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
421. MINN. STAT. § 176.135 (1982).
The Mack court of appeals ordered the employer to pay the outstanding medical bill
of $56,770.85 and all future medical expenses reasonably related to the work injury. Or-
der at 2-3, Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 289 (1980).
422. The maximum rate for the year commencing October 1, 1982 is $290. For the
year commencing October 1, 1979 (involved in Mack) it was $226; for the year commenc-
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six percent increases.
4 23
ing October 1, 1980 it was $244; and for the year commencing October 1, 1981 it was
$267.
423. MINN. STAT. § 176.645 (1982), with underlining and strikeouts to show the effect
of the amendment in Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 137, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1687-88,
provides:
Subdivision 1. AMOUNT. For injuries occurring after October 1, 1975 for
which benefits are payable under section 176.101, subdivisions 1, 2 and 4, and
section 176.111, subdivision 5, the amount total benefits due the employee or any
dependents shall be adjusted in accordance with this section. On October 1,
49-, 1981, and each Getobei-+ thereafter on the anniversary of the date of the
empelo-"'sin ury the amout total benefits due the employee or any dependents
shall be adjuste in accordance with this section. On October 1, -+946 1981, and
eatteh Oetaer thereafter on the anniversary of the date of the employee s injury
the afetint total benefits due shall be adjusted by multiplying the total benefits
due prior to eachTadjustment by a fraction, the denominator of which is the
statewide average weekly wage for December 31, 21 ,- nhs. prior of the year two
ears revious to the adjustment and the numerator of which is the statewide
average weekly wage for December 31,.. .. ,.-moths pr.r of the year previous to
the adjustment. For injuries occurring after October 1, 19, a justments
provided for in this section shall be included in computing any benefit due under
this section. Any limitations of amounts due for daily or weekly compensation
under this chapter shall not apply to adjustments made under this section. No
adjustment increase made on October 1, 1977 or thereafter under this section
shall exceed six percent a year. In those instances where the adjustment under
the formula of this section would exceed this maximum the increase shall be
deemed to be six percent.
Subd 2. TIME OF FIRST ADJUSTMENT. For injuries occurring on or
after October 1, 1981, the initial adjustment made pursuant to subdivsion I
shall be deferred until the first anniversary of the date of the injury.
It would appear that in Mack, claimant's benefits for permanent total disability would be
$226 per week from the December 13, 1979 date of injury until September 30, 1980;
$239.56 per week from October 1, 1980 to September 30, 1981; $254 per week from Octo-
ber 1, 1981 to December 12, 1982 (under MINN. STAT. § 176.021(8) (1982) specifying that
"[a]mounts of compensation payable by an employer or his insurer under this chapter
may be rounded to the nearest dollar amount"); and $269 per week ($13,988 per year)
from December 13, 1982 until December 12, 1983.
Although MINN. STAT. § 176.645 on its face appears to provide for pre-October 1,
1981 injury benefits being adjusted twice within the year following October 1, 1981 (unless
injury occurred precisely on October / of 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 or 1980), a three-two court
of appeals rejected this construction in Northrop v. House of Hope Presbyterian Church,
No. 327-34-1848 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1982). Ruling that an October
1, 1981 adjustment should not be followed by another on December 1, 1981, the majority
reasoned:
The 1981 change in the law provides that on October 1, 1981 and thereafter
on the anniversary of the date of the employee's injury the total benefits due
shall be adjusted. Subd. I then goes on to say: "No adjustment increase made
on October 1, 1977 or thereafter under this section shall exceed 6% a year. In
those instances where the adjustment under the formula of this section would
exceed this maximum the increase shall be deemed to be 6%."
Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 13 provides that the word "year" means a calen-
dar year, unless otherwise expressed.
Based upon the clear statutory provisions, we find that since a 6% adjust-
ment was made on October 1, 1981, another adjustment cannot be required to
be made on December 1, 1981.
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b. Short Survival
Because of the interaction of the permanent partial lump sum
provision 424 and the accrued compensation provision, 425 survivors
of an employee who died after a short work-induced severe coma
Id slip op. at 2.
Judge Wallraff, joined by Judge McCarthy, dissented, saying:
The statute clearly sets forth that the total benefits due the employee or any
dependents shall be adjusted in accordance with this section on October 1, /981
and thereafter on the anniversary date of the employee's injury. We agree with
the Compensation Judge that the language in subdivision I limits the individual
adjustment increase. Thus, if there were two adjustment increases in the same
year, each of the increases cannot exceed 6%, but the two could total 12%. If this
was not intended by the legislature, it would have been so stated, as the legisla-
ture stated in Minn. Stat. § 176.645, Subd. 2 (Laws of 1981), that: "For injuries
occurring on or after October 1, 1981, the initial adjustment made pursuant to sub-
division I shall be deferred until theftrst anniversary of the date of the injury."
Id. at 3 (Wallraff, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
The majority's construction barring two adjustments in a single calendar year appears
to yield these results:
Injury date Adjustment dates








It will be noted that benefits for pre-October 1, 1981 injuries are limited to two adjust-
ments within the two years following injury only ifthe ijwuy occurred between October I and
December 31. See Allison v. Herald Belan Constr. Co., No. 395-34-3639 (Minn. Workers'
Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1983) (October 1, 1981 adjustment may be followed by February
24, 1982 adjustment).
424. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3a) (1982) (quoted supra note 377).
This provision on lump summing permanent partial disability benefits is to be distin-
guished from MINN. STAT. § 176.165 (1982), which provides:
The amounts of compensation payable periodically may be commuted to one
or more lump sum payments only by order of the commissioner of the depart-
ment of labor and industry, compensation judge, or workers' compensation court
of appeals in cases upon appeal, and on such terms and conditions as the com-
missioner of the department of labor and industry, compensation judge, or work-
ers' compensation court of appeals prescribes. In making these commutations
the lump sum payments shall amount, in the aggregate, to a sum equal to the
present value of all future installments of the compensation calculated on a five
percent basis.
Id.; see infra note 433.
425. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3) (1982) provides in part that:
The right to receive temporary total, temporary partial, a permanent partial or
permanent total disability payments shall vest in the injured employee or his
dependents under this chapter or, if none, in his legal heirs at the time the disa-
bility can be ascertained and the right shall not be abrogated by the employee's
death prior to the making of the payment.
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may be able to recover the kind of permanent partial disability
award just discussed (in addition to death benefits if the survivors were
dependent426) as long as the permanent partial "disability can be
ascertained. '427 The Crowson court of appeals referred to a Massa-
chusetts decision, Bagges Case,4 28 wherein dependents of an em-
ployee who lived only seventeen to twenty-four minutes after the
work accident recovered the compensation the employee would
have received had he survived.429 Professor Larson uses Bagge's
Case as an example of the shortcomings in a system that compen-
sates functional bodily impairment rather than wage loss. 430 He
raises the possibility that this type of claim might be made in al-
most every death case:
Suppose instead of seventeen or twenty-four minutes, the em-
ployee lives one minute. Should this random fact of sixty-sec-
ond survival rather than instantaneous death determine
whether relatives get a $400,000431 windfall? Or if one minute,
why not one second? How often, one wonders, is accidental
death absolutely instantaneous?
432
The legislature should respond to this problem by abolishing
mandatory lump summing of permanent partial disability bene-
fits. 4 3 3 Lump sum payment of workers' compensation benefits gen-
See Borchardt v. Biddick, 306 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1981) (provision in effect at time of
death, not time of injury, controls).
426. See MINN. STAT. § 176.111 (1982).
427. See id § 176.021(3) (quoted supra note 425); Erickson v. Gopher Masonry, Inc.,
329 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. 1983) (widow who claimed benefits for permanent partial disa-
bility to employee's back and leg after employee died from unrelated causes eight months
after work injury may recover "if the employee's permanent partial disability is deter-
mined to have been capable of ascertainment prior to the employee's death and the claim-
ant successfully establishes the extent of disability"). But see Stevens v. Asleson's Whole
Food, No. 472-46-9251 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1983) (widow may not
recover for permanent partial disability of various members or organs where employee
died from work injury three and one-quarter hours after it occurred; Erckson applies only
where employee died from unrelated cause). Stevens is difficult to square with MINN.
STAT. § 176.021(3) (1982).
428. 369 Mass. 129, 338 N.E.2d 346 (1975).
429. See id. at 134-35, 338 N.E.2d at 352, discussed zn Crowson v. Vallley Park, Inc., 33
Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 127, 132 (1980). The Crowson court of appeals also discussed
Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 397 A.2d 640 (1979) (similar except employee's
coma lasted almost three years). See Crowson, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 131-32.
430. Larson, supra note 397, at 521-22.
431. Actually, the amount would be much greater. For example, with 3,142.5 weeks,
as in Mack, supra notes 416-20 and accompanying text, at the current $290 rate, the
amount would be $911,325.
432. Larson, supra note 397, at 521-22.
433. This would be accomplished by repealing MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3a) (1982) and
deleting all references to subdivision 3a or lump sum from MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3)
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erally has very little justification, 434 and when it produces results
like this it clearly should be abolished. Permanent partial disabil-
ity payments, like other disability payments, should be paid peri-
odically, and when an employee dies before receiving payments for
ascertainable permanent partial disability, the survivors should re-
ceive compensation only for the weeks elapsing between the time
of injury and the time of death.
Further, the legislature should convert compensation for bodily
impairment to a system of periodic payments not based upon the
claimant's previous wage,435 which payments would be for life (as
long as the bodily impairment lasts), so that a claimant would ac-
tually be compensated on an ongoing basis for having to endure
the bodily impairment. This would eliminate the current law's ir-
rationality of paying identical permanent partial compensation to
a very old worker who will suffer the impairment only for a few
years as to the very young worker who must endure it for an entire
adult lifetime. If this kind of system were adopted, it should not
be based on the completely irrational jerry-built existing schedule
which, for example, provides almost three times as much compen-
(1982). MINN. STAT. § 176.165 (1982) (quoted supra note 424), which authorizes approval
of lump summing in particular cases, could be retained, but should be changed to allow
lump summing only where it is affirmatively shown to be in the best interests of the claim-
ant's rehabilitation. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 82.71. This could be done by amend-
ing the Minnesota law to provide:
176.165 LUMP SUM PAYMENTS. Amounts of compensation payable peri-
odically may be commuted to one or more lump sum payments only by order of
the commissioner, compensation judge, or workers' compensation court of ap-
peals in cases upon appeal, upon an affirmative showing that doing so is in the
best interests of the claimant's rehabilitation. The order may prescribe appropri-
ate terms and conditions. A lump sum payment shall equal the present value of
the periodic payments that would be made but for the lump sum payment.
434. See Larson, supra note 397, at 512-13; 3 A. LARSON, supra note 61, §§ 82.71-.72.
It is interesting to note the start of a trend to substitute periodic payment for lump
sums in common law personal injury cases. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS, MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT (1980); Corboy,
Structured Injustice. Compulsoy Periodic Payment ofJudgments, 66 A.B.A. J. 1524 (1980); Hen-
derson, Restoring the Tort Victim to Pre-Injuy Position. A Coal on Which All Can Agree, 67
A.B.A. J. 301 (1981); Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Inyuy Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734
(1980); Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527 (1980).
435. As Professor Larson explains (with examples of how the Minnesota law could give
a high-earning recluse twice as much for loss of voice mechanism as a low-earning amateur
opera singer, or a high-earning executive five times as much for loss of testicles as a low-
earning manual worker), there is no rational basis for compensating functional bodily
impairment on the basis of previous wage. Larson, supra note 397, at 515-16.
Statewide average weekly wage, as defined in MINN. STAT. § 176.011(20) (1982), could
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sation for loss of voice mechanism as for loss of hearing. 436 It
should have medical evidence rate the claimant's impairment as a
percentage of the body as a whole in each case, and then provide a
weekly benefit 437 equal to some percentage, for example one per-
cent, of statewide average weekly wage4 38 for each percent of im-
pairment of the body as a whole. It should exclude whatever
percent the employer can prove was caused other than by the em-
ployment injury, and should exclude some percentage, for exam-
ple five percent, to give the employer some quid pro quo in return
for being subjected to non-fault liability and being stripped of the
common law defenses and to save the benefit and administrative
expenses of minor cases.4 39 This idea could be effectuated by a
subdivision like the following:
Bodily impazrment. For personal injury producing permanent
bodily impairment, compensation shall be one percent of the
statewide average weekly wage for each one percent of impair-
ment caused to the entire body by the injury less (a) five per-
cent and (b) whatever percent the employer proves was caused
other than by the employment injury. Payments shall be made
during the period of bodily impairment, nearly as possible at
the intervals when the wage was payable, except that they may
be made less frequently to cause each payment to exceed
$100.440
The money saved from benefits and administrative expenses
would enable not only premium reduction but such reforms as
abolishing the 100% of statewide average weekly wage maximum
on disability and death benefits44 1 which works a severe injustice
upon high-earning workers and their dependents. For example, a
claimant injured just before October 1, 1982 who earned $1,000
per week ($25 per hour, $52,000 per year) is limited to the same
$267 per week as a claimant who earned $400 per week ($10 per
hour, $20,800 per year). The first claimant gets 26.7% of wage
loss, the second 66.7%. It is completely indefensible to pay so liber-
436. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(23), (38) (1982) (170 weeks for loss of hearing;
500 weeks for loss of voice mechanism).
437. Such a benefit should be subject to the "escalator provision" of MINN. STAT.
§ 176.645 (1982).
438. Defined at id. § 176.011(20).
439. See Kirwin, Workers' Compensatiot? Benefit Ideas, BENCH & B. MINN., Dec. 1982, at
31.
440. See id. at 38.
441. See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.011(20), .101(1)-(4) (1982).
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ally for bodily impairment while so inadequately compensating
some workers' wage losses.
The Minnesota Workers' Compensation Study Commission and
the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws have recommended increasing the maximum to (at least)
200% of the statewide average weekly wage, 442 and some jurisdic-
tions have done this. 443 Minnesota should follow suit and (in order
to prevent benefits from exceeding take-home pay) should replace
the current 66/3% of gross wage measure 444 with a "spendable
earnings" measure as recommended by the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 445 and the "Markman
Report" 446 and as utilized in Iowa 447 and Michigan, 448 for exam-
ple, 90% of spendable earnings. 449 (Spendable earnings are those
after deduction of social security and income tax under withhold-
ing tables as though the employee had claimed the maximum
number of exemptions to which the employee was entitled. 450 )
This proposal could be effectuated by the following amendments:
176.011 DEFINITIONS
Subd. 15a. Partial dzsabih'ty. "Partial disability" means re-
442. See MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMP. STUDY COMM'N, supra note 222, at 17-18
(Recommendation 5) (legislature should raise maximum to 200% of state average weekly
wage; present limit is unfair to some employees and change could prevent financial disas-
ter); REPORT OF NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMp. LAWS 62, 65 (1972) (Rec-
ommendations 3.9, 3.16; maximum should be at least 200% of state average weekly wage
by July 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF NAT'L COMM'N].
443. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 84.34(3) (West
Supp. 1982).
444. MINN. STAT. § 176.101(1), (3), (4) (1982).
445. See REPORT OF NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 442, at 56, 60, 64, 71 (Recommenda-
tions 3.1, 3.13, 3.20; at least 80% of spendable earnings).
446. MINNESOTA INSURANCE DIVISION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN MINNESOTA:
AN ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 128 (1982) (Recommendation 4; basis should be
spendable earnings).
447. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 84.34(3) (West Supp. 1981) (80% of spendable earnings);
cf. MINN. STAT. § 176.102(5) (1982) (rehabilitation compensation for on the job training
"in an amount equal to the after tax wage the employee received at the time of the per-
sonal injury").
448. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.301 (Supp. 1982) (80% of after-tax wage).
449. Although compensation at an amount less than 100% of spendable earnings is
justifiable because of claimant's savings in commuting and clothing expenses and to give
claimant an incentive to return to work, the 80% figure specified in the Iowa and Michi-
gan laws seems inadequate. Since MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(3) (1982) provides no-fault auto
accident benefits at 85% of gross, it is appropriate to fix workers' compensation total disa-
bility benefits at 90% of spendable earnings.
450. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.61(10), (11) (West Supp. 1982); cf MINN. STAT.
§ 176.102(5) (1982) ("After tax wage shall be determined by subtracting federal and state
income tax from the employee's gross wage.").
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duction in ability to earn.
Subd. 17a. Spendable earnings. "Spendable earnings"means
weekly wage after deduction of social security and income tax
under withholding tables as though the employee had claimed
the maximum number of exemptions to which the employee
was entitled.
Subd. 17b. Total disabih. "Total disability" means inca-




Subdivision 1. Total disabihty. For personal injury produc-
ing total disability, compensation shall be 90 percent of spend-
able earnings. Payments shall be made during the period of
total disability, as nearly as possible at the intervals when the
wage was payable.
Subd. 2. Partial disability. For personal injury producing
partial disability, compensation shall be 90 percent of the dif-
ference between spendable earnings at the time of injury and
spendable earnings employee is able to earn in employee's par-
tially disabled condition, the latter being corrected to corre-
spond with wage level for the work at the time of injury.
Payments shall be made during the period of partial disability,
as nearly as possible at the intervals when the wage was
payable.
Subd. 3. Maximum compensation. During the year commenc-
ing October 1, 1983, and each year thereafter, commencing on
October 1, maximum compensation for total disability and for




One might argue that it was improper to apply the simultane-
ous injury fifteen percent increase provision to the back benefits in
Lerich and Mack and the voice mechanism benefits in Crowson and
Mack. The simultaneous injury provision specifies in relevant
part, "In cases of permanent partial disability caused by simulta-
451. This derives from current MINN. STAT. § 176.101(5) (1982), and is not intended
to change the meaning of total disability.
452. Further subdivisions could be added regarding minimum compensation, offsets,
and inmate of public institution. See Kirwin, supra note 439, at 38.
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neous injury to two or more members, the applicable schedules in
this subdivision shall be increased by 15%. This clause shall not
apply when the injuries are compensated under paragraphs 22 to
37 inclusive, of this subdivision. ' 453 The latter "double sched-
ule" 454 paragraphs compensate for loss of hearing, an eye and a
leg, an eye and a hand, an eye and a foot, two arms other than at
the shoulder, two hands, two legs other than so close to the hips
that no effective artificial member can be used, two feet, one arm
and the other hand, a hand and a foot, one leg and the other foot,
a leg and a hand, an arm and a foot, or an arm and a leg.
455
In Tracy v. Streater/Litton Industries,456 holding that the fifteen
percent increase does not apply to the section 176.101, subdivision
3(40) internal organ provision, 457 the supreme court reasoned:
The claim for simultaneous injury benefits applies to injuries
to two or more "members" when the injuries are not commpen-
sated under the provisions relating to ears, eyes, legs, arms,
hands and feet. Since those provisions do not include internal
organs. . . the 15 percent multiple would not apply in this case
458
This seems to focus not so much on the fact that an internal
organ is not a "member ' 459 as on the fact that it is not covered by
paragraphs 22 through 37 of schedule.
On that analysis it was improper to apply the fifteen percent
increase provision to paragraph 38 voice mechanism benefits in
Crowson and Mack and to paragraph 42 back benefits in Lerich and
Mack .46
453. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(46) (1982).
454. See Jacobson v. Stone & Webster, 177 Minn. 589, 591, 225 N.W. 895, 895 (1929).
455. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(22)-(37) (1982).
456. 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979).
457. Id at 918; see Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 289,
293 (1980) (per curiam).
458. 283 N.W.2d at 918.
459. MINN. STAT. § 176.011(14) (1982) (" 'Member' includes leg, toe, hand, finger,
thumb, arm, back, eye, and ear when used with reference to the anatomy.").
460. It may be noted that even though the court in one of the cases decided in the
Tracy opinion held that the 15% increase does not apply to the internal organ provision,
see supra notes 456-58 and accompanying text, in another of the cases decided in that
opinion, where neither party raised any issue about this point, the court upheld an award
in which the 15% increase had been applied to internal organ and back benefits. See 283
N.W.2d at 911, 917; Relator's Brief and Appendix at A-24, A-25, Tracy v. Streater/Litton
Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979); see also Bisson v. Minnesota Bearing, Inc., No. 474-
26-7105 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1981) (3-2) (15% increase does not
apply to head provision).
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d Internal Organs
It was also questionable for the Mack court of appeals to award
ninety percent under the internal organ provision for brain dam-
age and another ten percent under that provision for loss of use of
internal sexual organs.
461
In one of the cases decided in Tracy, the employee was initially
awarded fifty percent permanent partial disability of the respira-
tory system. After he submitted additional claims for thirty per-
cent disability to the circulatory system and twenty percent to the
emotional system, the award changed to specify fifty percent "due
to injury to the pulmonary system, an internal organ," accompa-
nied by a statement that the pulmonary system damage had af-
fected the circulatory system and emotional system, and the fifty
percent disability was to the body function as a whole. 462 The
supreme court rejected the employee's contention that he was enti-
tled to separate, aggregated ratings for the circulatory system and
the emotional system, saying that "an overall rating of disability to
body function as a whole" was required and that "Aggregation of
separate ratings is inappropriate because the degree of disability to
an organ does not necessarily equal the degree of disability to the
body as a whole, and aggregation could easily result in the impos-
sible situation where whole disability would be more than 100
percent.1"463
This indicates that the court of appeals in Mack erred in giving
separate ratings of ninety percent for brain damage and ten per-
cent for loss of internal sexual organs.
464
461. See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
Regarding compensation for injury to the brain or "emotional system" under the
internal organ provision and regarding compensation under the head schedule, see supra
note 396.
Regarding compensation under the internal organ provision for loss or loss of use of
internal sex organs, the Mack court of appeals made its award of 50 weeks for loss of use to
a 36-year-old male in reliance on the fact that the same award was made in Tracy to a 28-
year-old male. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 294; see Anderson v. Husky Hydraulics,
Inc., No. 396-36-4999 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1976) (100 weeks for loss
of testicle); Garcia v. Twin City Monorail, No. 474-64-4501 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct.
App. Dec. 16, 1976) (125 weeks for loss of testicle). Anderson and Garcia are cited with
apparent approval in Getter v. Travel Lodge, 260 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1977).
462. 283 N.W.2d at 912.
463. Id at 918.
464. See Peterson v. Ronald Bowman Excavating Co., No. 471-60-3356, slip op. at 5
(Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. May 28, 1982) (Gard, J., dissenting). Judge Gard
stated:
Here, the Compensation Judge instructed the parties that it was necessary to
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Another significant ruling under the internal organ provision
came in Tidwell v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,465 wherein the court of ap-
peals held that a claimant may recover under the internal organ
schedule for post-traumatic neurosis. Affirming the compensation
judge's award for ten percent loss of function of the body as a
whole attributable to claimant's brain as an internal organ, the
court of appeals reasoned:
We find that the evidence warrants the disability awarded by
the Compensation Judge for it establishes that the employee's
injury has caused a post-traumatic neurosis resulting in a per-
manent loss of function to her body as a whole. This psycho-
logical disability within the mental processes of the employee
has for an extended time manifested itself by depression, anxi-
ety, nervousness, inability to concentrate and forgetfulness.
Our Supreme Court has previously determined in the case of
Mitchell vs, White Castle Systems, Inc. 466 . . . that permanent par-
tial disability can be awarded for a disability of a purely psy-
chological nature.
46 7
The Tidwell holding is appropriate, and must be understood to
overrulepro tanto the court of appeals' rationale in a case it decided
rate the "internal organs on specific organs." . . . The Compensation Judge
awarded 40 percent of the whole man for the urinary-bladder dysfunction, 15
percent for ano-rectal dysfunction, and 22.5 percent of the whole man for loss of
sexual function, indicating in his memorandum that a total of 77.5 percent of the
maximum allowable was reasonable, when considering the importance of inter-
nal organs not rated such as the heart, lungs, brain, liver, stomach, spleen, ad-
renals and others. The majority adopts this multiple determination ....
I do not believe that. . . pyramiding individual determinations is rea-
sonable, but rather the entire effect upon the employee should be examined and
determined not only from the separate medical dysfunctions, but from the entire
effect which it is shown to have upon this particular individual.
Id slip op. at 6 (Gard, J., dissenting).
465. 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 170 (1982), aJdmem. No. C3-82-1129 (Minn. Apr.
6, 1983).
Regarding the recent prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-
94 and accompanying text.
466. 290 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1980); see supra note 396.
467. 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 172 (citation omitted). The court of appeals
went on to provide an additional, alternative ground, saying,
In addition, we determine that there is sufficient [evidence] based upon the
circumstances of the employee's injury and the resulting symptoms and expert
findings that the employee has sustained some organic brain damage. The em-
ployee fell and hit her head and has symptoms described in part as headaches,
dizziness, incoordination, slurring of speech and loss of vision. This coupled with
a review of the medical opinion of record and the fact that the employee was
functioning well before her injury leads the Court to find that certain organic
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eight months earlier, Bendel v. ALC Madison Lutheran Home.468 In
Bendel, the court of appeals denied permanent partial disability
compensation for traumatic neurosis, on two grounds:
(1) Claimant had not proven that the condition wasperma-
nent. (Two psychiatrist-neurologists opined that her neurosis
was treatable; only one thought it was not. The court of ap-
peals said, "Therefore, the preponderance of the evidence dic-
tates that the traumatic neurosis is not permanent," and added,
"This case demonstrates why awarding permanent partial disa-
bility for an emotional disturbance is not feasible due to the
uncertainty of the prognosis. ' 469)
(2) There was no functional damage to claimant's brain.
4 70
(In this connection, the court of appeals distinguished Crow-
son 471 and Mack ,472 each of which involved organic brain dam-
age from interruption of oxygen.4 73)
Tidwell must be understood to restrict the Bendel rationale to the
point that the claimant therein had not proved that her traumatic
neurosis was permanent. (This was the only ground upon which
Judge Rieke, the author of the unanimous Tidwell opinion, con-
curred specially in Bendel.4 74) Tidwell's result is inconsistent with
Bendel's dictum that "awarding permanent partial disability for an
emotional disturbance is not feasible due to the uncertainty of the
prognosis"; the Tidwell result shows that this is not always true.
Tidwell also implicitly overrules Bendel's requirement of functional
or organic damage to the brain. As noted above, in this regard the
court of appeals relied upon the supreme court's decision in Mitch-
ell v. White Castle Systems, Inc., a case not cited or discussed in the
Bendel opinion.4
75
468. No. 501-42-5557 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1982).
469. Id. slip op. at 2.
470. Id. slip op. at 2-3.
471. Crowson v. Valley Park, Inc., 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 127 (1980); see supra
notes 412-15 and accompanying text.
472. Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 289 (1980) (per
curiam); see supra notes 416-20 and accompanying text.
473. Bendel v. ALC Madison Lutheran Home, No. 501-42-5557, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1982).
474. See id slip op. at 3 (separate opinion of Reike, J.). Judge Wallraff, the author of
the majority opinion in Bendel, took no part in Tidwell.
475. It should be noted that in Mitchell, Bendel, and Ti/well, mental disability was
caused by a physical injury, so that the holding in Lockwood v. Independent School Dist.
No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1981), precluding (total) disability compensation when
work-related mental stress without physical trauma produced only mental disability, is
inapplicable. See supra notes 178-214 and accompanying text.
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e. Loss of Vsion
The Mack court of appeals, without discussing the matter, made
an award for 100% loss of vision under paragraphs 21, 44, and 46
(first sentence) of the schedule4 76 ("loss of an eye," loss of use, and
15% increase) (160 X 2 = 320 + 15% = 368 weeks) rather than
under paragraph 46's last sentence which provides for "disability
due to injury to both eyes resulting in less than total loss of vision"
that proportion of 450 weeks "which the extent of the combined
injury to both eyes bears to the complete loss of industrial
vision."
477
This is difficult to square with a 1962 case478 wherein the
supreme court upheld a 100% award under the latter provision
when the employee did not have a total loss of vision-indeed, he
could see 20/20 with glasses-on the ground that he had less than
20/200, complete loss of industrial vision, without glasses.
479
Either the Mack court of appeals simply overlooked paragraph
46's last sentence or it found it inapplicable because it specifies
"less than total loss of vision.
'480
The latter approach produces the absurd result of providing
476. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(21), (44), (46) (1982). These provisions specify in
relevant part:
For permanent partial disability compensation shall be that named in the
following schedule, subject to a maximum compensation equal to the statewide
weekly wage:
(21) For the loss of an eye, 66 2/3 percent of the daily wage at the time of
injury during 160 weeks;
(44) In all cases of permanent partial disability it is considered that the
permanent loss of the use of a member is equivalent to and draws the same
compensation as the loss of that member ...
(46) In cases of permanent partial disability caused by simultaneous injury
to two or more members, the applicable schedules in this subdivision shall be
increased by 15 percent.
477. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(46) (1982). The last sentence specifies:
In cases of partial disability due to injury to both eyes resulting in less than total
loss of vision in one or both eyes compensation shall be paid at the prescribed
rate during that part of 450 weeks which the extent of the combined injury to
both eyes bears to the complete loss of industrial vision.
478. Yureko v. Prospect Foundry Co., 262 Minn. 480, 115 N.W.2d 477 (1962).
479. Id. at 485, 115 N.W.2d at 481.
480. The fact that it covers disability from "injury to" the eyes did not make it inappli-
cable. See supra note 420; Johnson v. Par-Z Contracting, Inc., No. 343-24-6470 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1981) (award under this provision for 49% disability to
both eyes caused by rupture of aneurysm in brain).
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eighty-two weeks more 48' permanent partial482 compensation for
being almost blind than for being totally blind.
C Death Benefits
In Chandler v. Minneapolis Star & Trbune ,483 the court of appeals
stated that, for purposes of death benefits, the term "foster
child '48 4 may include a child of employee's wife's daughter by a
previous marriage.485 Although it denied benefits on the ground
that decedent's employment was not a significant contributing fac-
tor in his fatal heart attack,486 the court of appeals specified that if
the death were compensable employee's wife's daughter's son
would be entitled to partial dependency benefits. 48 7 It said, "The
facts reveal that [the child], although not blood-related to the de-
ceased, lived for extended periods of time with [employee and his
wife] and was provided partial support by the employee, including
lodging, money, meals and clothes.
' 488
This result seems consistent with the liberal approach normally
pursued respecting issues of this kind.
489
481. Four hundred fifty weeks under paragraph 46's last sentence in a situation like
Yureko versus the 368 weeks awarded in Mack.
482. It should be noted that MINN. STAT. § 176.101(5) (1982) provides permanent to-
tal disability benefits for total loss of sight without regard to actual earning capacity.
That provision specifies:
The total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both arms
at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no effective artificial
members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total and permanent
loss of mental faculties, or any other injury which totally incapacitates the em-
ployee from working at an occupation which brings him an income constitutes
total disability.
Id; see Ford v. Willis J. Kruckeberg Roofing & Sheet Metal, 308 Minn. 371, 241 N.W.2d
653 (1976) (employee who lost use of legs from paralysis is entitled to permanent total
benefits notwithstanding return to work).
483. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 525 (1980), afdmem., No. 51334 (Minn. Apr. 20,
1981).
Regarding the recent prohibition on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-
94 and accompanying text.
484. See MINN. STAT. § 176.011(2) (1982).
"Child" includes a posthumous child, a child entitled by law to inherit as a
child of a deceased person, a child of a person adjudged by a court of competent
jurisdiction to be the father of the child, and a stepchild, grandchild, or foster
child who was a member of the family of a deceased employee at the time of his
injury and dependent upon him for support.
485. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 529-30.
486. Id at 528-29.
487. Id at 529-30.
488. Id. at 529.
489. See Lunceford v. Fegles Constr. Co., 185 Minn. 31, 239 N.W. 673 (1931)
("stepchild" includes spouse's illegitimate child as well as spouse's child by previous mar-
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VIII. EXCLUSIVITY OF REMEDY AND THIRD PARTY
ACTIONS
4 9 0
A. Employer's Subrogation to Third Party Action Proceeds
In Keay v. St. Paul Housing &Redevelopment Authority ,49 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court dealt with the construction of section
176.061, subdivision 6,492 which specifies in relevant part that pro-
riage); Jansen v. Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc., 23 Minn. Workmen's Comp. Dec.
343, 350 (1964) (even if relationship was not valid common law marriage under law of
other state, children would be entitled to dependency benefits as foster children). See gener-
ally MINN. STAT. § 518.055 (1982) (putative spouse statute); Weber v. Anderson, 269
N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978) (action to establish paternity may be brought after alleged
father's death, but paternity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence); 2 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 61, §§ 62.21-.23.
490. See Bradt, ThirdParty Issues, in WORKERS COMPENSATION: BENEFITS AND THIRD
PARTY ISSUES 51 (Win. Mitchell Forums 1981); Steenson, supra note 1; Note, Workers'
Compensation." The Dual-Capazty Doctrine, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (1980) (examining
exception to exclusivity rule some courts are beginning to recognize which permits
employee to sue employer for negligence committed in capacity other than that of
employer); cf Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d
465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (exclusive remedy provision does not bar
imposing common liability upon corporate employer for aggravating work-related disease
by fraudulently concealing fact that employee had disease); Billy v. Consolidated Mach.
Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980) (plaintiff may sue
employer that through merger absorbed manufacturer of defective machine, even though
New York rejects dual capacity doctrine).
As to notice to employer regarding third party settlement, see supra notes 9-46 and
accompanying text.
In Teske v. Young, 309 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1981), the court held that compensation
liability for which an employer obtains reimbursement and credit under MINN. STAT.
§ 176.061(6)(c), (d) (1982) does not count toward the "25,000 of weekly compensation . . .
paid" after which social security disability benefits are subtracted from workers'
compensation benefits under § 176.101(4).
In Kordosky v. Gambles/Red Owl, 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 372 (1981), afd
mem., No. 81-1299 (Minn. Feb. 5, 1982), the court of appeals held that for purposes of
§ 176.061(6) allocation, "proceeds" includes interest. (Regarding the recent prohibition
on citing summary dispositions, see supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text.)
In Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1982), a seven-two court
held that the trial court correctly refused to aggregate the merely concurrent fault of the
tortfeasor (20%) and the employer (45%) to compare with the employee's fault (35%).
In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982), a seven-one court
held that a tortfeasor may recover contribution from an employer even though the
comparative fault statute would have barred the employee from recovering directly from
the employer. Thus a tortfeasor 35% at fault and a tortfeasor 25% at fault were able to
recover contribution from an employer whose 20% fault equalled the employee's fault, in a
case arising when contributory fault barred recovering if it was "as great as" that of the
person against whom recovery is sought. It should be noted that contributory fault now
bars recovery only if it was "greater than" that of the person against whom recovery is
sought. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (codified as
MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1982)).
491. 303 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1981), rev'g 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 434 (1980).
492. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1982) specifies (with strikeouts and underlining to
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ceeds of third party actions be divided as follows:
(a) After deducting the reasonable cost of collection . . .
then
(b) One-third of the remainder shall . . .be paid to the in-
jured employee ....
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer . . .shall
be reimbursed in an amount equal to all [compensation] paid
. . .less the product of the costs . . . divided by the total pro-
ceeds received by the employee. . . multiplied by all [compen-
sation] paid ....
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee
. . . and shall be a credit [against future compensation]
show the effect of the amendment in Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 65, 1981 Minn. Laws
1611, 1649) that:
The proceeds of all actions for damages or settlement thereof under this
section, except for damages received under subdivision 5, clause (b) received by
the injured employee or his dependents or by the employer, or the special com-
pensation fund, as provided by subdivision 5, shall be divided as to ows:
(a) After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, including but not
limited to attorneys fees and burial expense in excess of the statutory liability,
then
(b) One-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured
employee or his dependents, without being subject to any right of subrogation.
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer, or the special compensa-
tion fund, shall be reimbursed in an amount equal to all empen~a:een benefts
pa--"iier this chapter to or on behalf of the employee or his dependents-b-y-te
employer, or special compensaionlfund, less the product of the costs deducted
under clause (a) divided by the total proceeds received by the employee or his
dependents from the other party multiplied by all eempenseatiei benefits paid by
the employer or the special compensation fund, to the employee o--Fis depen-
dents.
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid the employee or his dependents,
and shall be a credit to employer, and the special compensation fund, for anyeeimpensetoe benefits which employer is obligated to pay, but has not paid, and
for any eer=pesm benefits that such employer shall be obligated to make in
the future.
There shall be no reimbursement or credit to the employer, or the special
compensation fund, for interest or penalties.
Regarding the 1981 amendment's addition of references to the special fund, see Lehn
v. Kladt, 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 571 (1981), affdmm., No. 81-1015 (Minn. Apr.
20, 1982), where the court of appeals held that previous to the amendment the special
fund as subrogor to an uninsured employer's rights could share in a third party settlement
as provided in § 176.061. (Regarding the new prohibition on citing summary dispositions,
seesupra notes 290-94 and accompanying text.) See Bartlett v. Northwest Exhibition, Inc.,
No. 483-62-7328 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 21, 1982) (special fund entitled to
division of proceeds where it was not notified of impending Naig settlement although un-
insured employer was notified). Also noteworthy is Stahel v. St. Paul Yellow Cab Co., 34
Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 642 (1982), in which the court of appeals equated the special
fund with an employer regarding Metropolitan Transit Comm'n v. Bachman's, 311
N.W.2d 852 (Minn. 1981), barring employers suing tortfeasors for reimbursement of disa-
bility (as opposed to medical) compensation.
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493
In Kealy, employer had paid $30,283 compensation previously to
employee's $49,000 tort recovery. 494 The court held that the allo-
cation was to be as follows:
495
Proceeds $49,000 Lawyer Employee Employer
(a) Costs 16,788 16,788
Remainder 32,212
(b) One-third to employee 10,737
Balance remaining 21,475
(c) $30,283 less 10,375
(16,788/49,000 X
30,283) 19,908 19,908
(d) Balance and credit 1,567 1,567
The court rejected the court of appeals' approach to clauses (c)
and (d) of section 176.061, subdivision 6, which was:
496
(c) $21,475 less (16,788/ Employee Employer
49,000 X 21,475) 1A5 7,357 14,118
(d) Balance and credit 0
It will be noted that the differences in applying clause (c)
respected:
(1) the "compensation paid" by which the cost/proceeds
fraction is to be multiplied and from which the product of that
multiplication is to be subtracted, and
(2) the figure to be deducted from the "balance remaining"
after clause (b)'s allocation of one-third to the employee.
As to the "compensation paid" by which the cost/proceeds frac-
tion is to be multiplied and from which the product of that multi-
plication is to be subtracted, the court determined that the
statute's specification "all compensation paid" left no choice other
than $30,283, the total amount of compensation employer had
paid previously to the employee's tort recovery.
49 '
The court of appeals, however, chose $21,475, all compensation
493. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1982).
494. 303 N.W.2d at 470. (All amounts in this discussion are rounded to the nearest
dollar).
495. See id at 471-73.
496. See id. at 471.
497. See id at 472-74.
The court referred to the statutory construction provision specifying, "When the
words of a law ... are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be
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paid capable of reimbursement under clause (c), on the view that the
obvious purpose of clause (c) is to charge the employer's subroga-
tion recovery with a proportional share of the cost of collecting the
proceeds, and that that purpose is frustrated by the construction
the supreme court ultimately adopted whenever the compensation
paid exceeds the "balance remaining" after clause (b)'s allocation
of one-third to the employee. 498 (For example, if employer had
paid $32,667 compensation previously, it would pay no part of the
cost of collection.499 )
The court of appeals' view seems vastly superior, as better effec-
tuating clause (c)'s overall purpose. But the supreme court's view
is the law.
As to the figure to be deducted from the "balance remaining"
after clause (b) allocates one-third to the employee, the court,
again reasoning that the wording of the statute left no choice,
500
ruled that it was $49,908, employer's subrogation after subtracting the
cost-over-proceeds-times-compensation-paid figure.501
The court of appeals' approach, which again seems superior in
better effectuating the provision's apparent overall purpose, chose
$21,475, all compensation paid capable of reimbursement under clause
(c) .502 The court of appeals' rationale was that employer is reim-
bursed for all of that amount, but is required to pay employee a
proportional share of the cost of collecting the proceeds.50 3
The supreme court's construction of section 176.061, subdivision
6 makes the amount of collection costs an employer bears vary
depending on the happenstance of whether the compensation was
paid before or after the tort recovery. For example, in Keal'y, if
employer had paid $32,667 compensation before the tort recovery,
it would have been reimbursed $21,475 without paying any part of
the costs of collection, 50 4 whereas if it had been responsible for
$32,667 worth of compensation after the tort recovery, $7,357
would be deducted from its $21,475 credit by virtue of the holding,
reaffirmed in Kealy , of Cronen v. Wegdahl Cooperative Elevator Asso-
498. See 303 N.W.2d at 473-74; 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 436-42.
499. $32,667 less $11,192 ((16,788/49,000) x $32,667), equals $21,475 (the total
amount of the "balance remaining").
500. See 303 N.W.2d at 475.
501. See id.
502. See id. at 471-72; 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 435, 438, 442.
503. See 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 437.
504. See supra note 498.
505. 303 N.W.2d at 475.
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cia/ion ,506 that a proportionate share of costs of collection should be
deducted from employer's credit.5 0 7 As it was in Keal'y, where em-
ployer paid $30,283 previously to the tort recovery, it paid no part
of the costs of collection on its $19,908 reimbursement, but the
Keaoy court recognized that it would have to deduct $537 from its
$1,567 credit. 50 8 Thus, depending on the timing of payment of
compensation, employer would bear $0, $7,357, or $537 of the
costs of collection.
The supreme court's construction of section 176.061, subdivision
6 is inappropriate. The legislature should amend the provision to
adopt the court of appeals' approach, e.g., by having clause (c)
specify:
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer 50 9 shall be
reimbursed in an amount equal to all benefits paid. The em-
ployer shall then pay the employee or dependents, from the re-
imbursement, a pro rata share of the costs. That share shall be
the product of the costs divided by the proceeds multiplied by
the reimbursement.
If the legislature adopted this approach on subrogation under
clause (c), it would make sense to pursue the same approach for
credit under clause (d) by providing, for example:
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee or
dependents and shall be a credit to the employer against future
compensation obligations. As the employer uses the credit, the
employer shall pay the employee or dependents, at the time
each compensation payment would have been made but for the
credit, a pro rata share of the costs. The pro rata share shall be
the product of the costs divided by the proceeds multiplied by
the compensation payment that would have been made but for
the credit.
It should be noted that instead of this "pay as you go" method of
having employer pay employee a pro rata share of the costs period-
ically as employer utilizes the credit, 510 the Kea/y opinion indicates
a "deferred payment" method of having the entire amount of
506. 278 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979).
507. Id at 105.
508. See 303 N.W.2d at 475 (credit to be "reduced by 34.26%" (16,788/49,000)).
509. Instead of repetitiously adding "or the special compensation fund" after "em-
ployer" as the 1981 amendment does, see supra note 492, it would be preferable to either
omit this as unnecessary, see id, or to add a provision saying that for purposes of the
subdivision, "employer" includes the special fund.
510. See Steenson, supra note 1, at 297, 301.
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credit reduced by a pro rata share.51 1 Under the latter method,
employer actually bears its full share of the costs only when (and
if!) it uses all of its credit.
51 2
B. Third Party Contribution from Employer
In Kordosky v. Conway Fire & Safety, Inc. ,513 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that in an employee v. tortfeasor v. employer
action, where damages were $70,000, tortfeasor's negligence was
40% and employer's negligence was 60% and employer had paid
$21,948 compensation, employer had to pay tortfeasor $21,948
contribution but, because of section 176.061, subdivision 6(c)'s de-
duction for costs of collection 51 4 could recover only $14,632 in sub-
rogation. 51 5 The court recognized that employer ended up paying
more than its compensation liability, but could find no better solu-
tion consistent with the statute.
51 6
The court rejected the solution suggested in an article by Profes-
sor Steenson, 51 7 that employer be required to pay tortfeasor only
the amount it recovers in subrogation, 51 8 saying:
If the court adopted Professor Steenson's solution, the contribu-
tion that the third party is able to obtain from the employer,
already severely limited in many cases, will be further reduced.
Moreover, since the reduction mandated by [Minn. Stat.
§ 176.061(6)(c)] reflects attorneys fees expended by the em-
ployee to obtain the recovery from the third party, to pass this
reduction on to the third party would be to require the third
party to pay for the privilege of being sued.5 9
511. In Kealy v. St. Paul Hous. & Redev. Auth., 303 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Minn. 1981),
the court said:
[F]or every dollar of benefits paid in the future, the subdivision 6(d) credit
should be reduced by 34.26%, the percentage derived in the subdivision 6(c)
computation. Therefore, in addition to the $19,908.19 [employer is] entitled to
under the subdivision 6(c) computation, [it] will receive as a credit under subdi-
vision 6(c) the sum of $1,566.68, reduced by 34.26%, as mandated by Cronen.
[Employer is] liable for 100% of all workers' compensation benefits payable
thereafter.
See Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 102, 103, 105 (Minn. 1979).
512. See Steenson, supra note 1, at 297.
513. 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981), noted in 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 283 (1982).
514. See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
515. 304 N.W.2d at 617-18, 620. (All amounts in this discussion are rounded to the
nearest dollar.)
516. See id at 620-21.
517. Steenson, supra note 1.
518. Id at 306.
519. 304 N.W.2d at 621.
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The Kordosky court's result may be as good as can be achieved
without changing the statute, but it has the shortcoming of requir-
ing employer in effect to pay for the privilege of being sued (al-
though technically employer is helping pay the attorney fees of
employee, not of tortfeasor who sued employer for contribution or
indemnity).
Although there may be objection to taking anything away from
employee, it would seem appropriate to restrict employee's ability
to require employer to pay a pro rata share of costs of collection
where this in effect makes employer pay for the privilege of being
sued. This could be accomplished by adding a new clause to sec-
tion 176.061, subdivision 6 which, assuming clauses (c) and (d)
were amended as recommended above,5 20 would specify:
(e) When the employer is liable to the other party for con-
tribution or indemnity, reimbursement and credit shall be as
provided in clauses (c) and (d) except:
(1) The employer's payment of costs under clause (c)
shall be reduced by a contribution offset. The offset shall
be the product of the employer's contribution or indem-
nity liability divided by compensation paid multiplied by
the employer's payment of costs under clause (c).
5 2
1
(2) The employer shall not pay costs to the employee
or dependents under clause (d) when making a contribu-
tion or indemnity payment to the other party equal to the
payment that would have been made to the employee or
dependents but for the credit under clause (d).
It will be noted that part (2) of the above proposal contemplates
the employer making contribution payments to the tortfeasor
while utilizing the credit under section 176.061, subdivision 6(d).
It is quite clear that employer should do So.
52 2
More questionable is whether employer should be required to
keep making contribution payments to the tortfeasor after the
520. See supra text accompanying note 509.
521. Credit for this formula goes to Phil Powell, J.D., William Mitchell College of
Law, 1981, who developed it while writing a research paper as a student in the author's
workers' compensation course.
Under the formula, employer would beA/0, relieved of the duty to pay a pro rata
share of costs only in cases like Kordosky, where the employer's contribution liability is as
large as the amount of compensation paid. Where it is less, employer should be relieved
from paying part of the costs only to the extent that the costs are, in effect, "for the privilege
of being sued." If a miniscule amount of contribution liability fully relieved employer
from paying a pro rata share of costs, employer would have an incentive to be found a bit
negligent.
522. See Steenson, supra note 1, at 300-02.
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clause (d) credit is exhausted, if employee remains disabled or
needs further medical treatment or dependents remain dependent,
and employer has not yet paid its percentage of damages to
tortfeasor. Because of section 176.061, subdivision 6's removal of
attorney fees and costs and one-third of the remainder to employee
from the amount available for subrogation and credit, 523 it is quite
possible that an employer charged with a high percentage of fault
would exhaust the credit before paying its percentage of damages
to tortfeasor. The Kordosky court's approach requiring employer to
pay tortfeasor more in contribution than it can recover in subroga-
tion indicates that an employer in certain circumstances may have
to make simultaneous payments of compensation and contribution
after the clause (d) credit is exhausted.
This may be illustrated using the figures from Kordosky, damages
$70,000, compensation already paid $21,948, tortfeasor negligence
40%, and employer negligence 60%, and assuming costs one-third
($23,333). The district court would give employee a judgment
against tortfeasor for $70,000 and tortfeasor a judgment against
employer for contribution of up to $42,000 or compensation liabil-
ity. Employer would pay tortfeasor $21,948 (present compensa-
tion liability). Tortfeasor would pay $70,000 allocated as follows:
Proceeds $70,000 Lawyer Employee Employer
(a) Costs = 23,333
Remainder 46,667
(b) One-third to employee 1,5 15,556
Balance remaining 31,111
(c) $21,948 less 7,316
(23,333/70,000 X
21,948) 1463 14,632
(d) Balance and credit [Credit
16,479 16,479 10,986]524
While utilizing the $10,986 credit (e.g., if employee remained dis-
abled), employer would have to make periodic payments to
tortfeasor of the amounts employer would have made to employee
but for the credit. When the $10,986 credit is exhausted, employer
will have had $32,934 compensation liability, compared to its
$42,000 percentage share of damages. Accordingly, if employee's
disability persists, employer will have to resume paying compensa-
523. See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
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tion and will have to make up to $9,066 in "matching payments"
to tortfeasor. Thereafter, if employee is still disabled, employer re-
verts to single payments to employee.
C Reallocation of Uncollectible Amount
In Vieths v. Riey , 5I a complicated employee v. tortfeasor v. em-
ployer situation, 52 6 the Minnesota Supreme Court included a foot-
note stating, "[Defendants] did not raise, and we do not decide,
the possible effect of Minn. Stat. § 604.02 subd. 2 (1978), on the
reallocation of the contributions to [defendants] in the event [em-
ployer's] workers' compensation liability does not equal its allo-
cated percentage of contribution. ' 527 Section 604.02, subdivision
2, part of the Comparative Fault Act, 528 provides:
Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is
entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a
party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from
that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount
among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, accord-
ing to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose lia-
525. 295 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1980).
526. Actually, it was employee v. two alleged tortfeasors v. employer and another.
Employee, injured by electricity coming from a power line through a crane cable, sued the
crane operator and the crane owner. Defendants impleaded employer and the power line
owner. The crane owner and operator settled with employee for $120,000, but continued
their third party action against employer and the power line owner. The jury found em-
ployee 10% negligent, employer 40%, and the power line owner 50%. The jury also found
that employer was acting as the power line owner's agent. Based on that finding, the trial
court imputed employee's and employer's negligence to the power line owner, and allowed
the crane owner to recover the full amount of the settlement from the power line owner.
Id. at 661-62.
The supreme court held that the evidence did not support the finding that employer
was acting as the power line owner's agent, and that it was thus erroneous to impute
employee's and employer's negligence to the power line owner, and so reversed and re-
manded with instructions to adjust the allocation of the parties' liability accordingly. Id
at 664-65.
Regarding settling defendants' right to recover where they are ultimately found not
to have any liability, see Lemmer v. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864, 869-70 (Minn.
1980).
527. 295 N.W.2d at 664 n.1, citing Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114,
257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
As pointed out in Steenson, Comparative Fault and Loss Reallocatian, 6 MINN. TRIAL
LAW. 8, 32 n.25 (July-Aug. 1981), "the reallocation statute would not apply to the [Vieths]
case because the causes of action arose prior to April 15, 1978, the effective date of the
comparative fault act." The comparative negligence act, which the comparative fault act
replaced, did not have a loss reallocation provision. See id. at 8.
528. See generally Steenson, supra note 1, at 333-51; Steenson, supra note 527, at 8.
For a quotation from MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1982), see infra note 533.
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bility is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to
any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
529
The issue raised in the Viths footnote, then, is whether the un-
collectibility covered by this provision should include uncollecti-
bility resulting from an employer's immunity from contribution
greater than its workers' compensation liability. As Professor
Steenson concludes, "[I]t is difficult to argue that reallocation
should not work in this situation as well as in situations involving
uncollectibility due to either insolvency or nonliability.
' '530
It should be noted, however, that employer's workers' compen-
sation liability may extend beyond the amount of compensation
paid previously to the tort recovery. 53 1 An employee's disability
may continue or recur, employee may need further medical treat-
ment, or a dependent's dependency may persist. Accordingly,
only in a death case where dependency has ended or in a case
where it is otherwise clear that employer will have no further com-
pensation liability should the district court reallocate under sec-
tion 604.02, subdivision 2. Otherwise, assuming the motion is made
not later than one year after judgment, 532 the court should retain
jurisdiction of the matter until such time as it becomes clear em-
ployer will have no further compensation liability.
This may be illustrated using figures from Kordosky--damages
$70,000, compensation already paid $21,948, and employer negli-
gence 60%--but instead of tortfeasor negligence 40% assume em-
ployee negligence 20% and tortfeasor negligence 20%. Tortfeasor's
judgment against employer would be for contribution of up to
$42,000 or compensation liability. 533  Employer would pay
tortfeasor $21,948 (present compensation liability).
If employee by this time has died from an unrelated cause534 or
if employee died from the work injury but no dependents remain
dependent or if it otherwise is clear that employer will have no
further compensation liability, the district court should determine
that $20,052 ($42,000 less $21,948) of employer's equitable share of
529. MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1982).
530. Steenson, supra note 527, at 26.
531. See supra notes 522-24 and accompanying text.
532. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1982) (quoted supra text accompanying note 529).
533. See id. § 604.01(1) ("Contributory fault shall not bar recovery.., if the contribu-
tory fault was not greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attribu-
table to the person recovering").
534. This would rule out dependency benefits. See id § 176.021 (1) (employer liable for
compensation for death arising out of and in course of employment).
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the damages is uncollectible and reallocate it between the remain-
ing parties, including employee, "according to their respective per-
centages of fault. '535 Since employee and tortfeasor were equally
negligent, $10,026 would be allocated to each. Thus the amount
employee can recover from tortfeasor would be reduced $10,026,
from $56,000 to $45,974.536
If this reallocation is accomplished previously to the section
176.061, subdivision 6 division of proceeds, 537 employee's reduced
recovery ($45,974) should be deemed the "proceeds." If the reallo-
cation is accomplished subsequently (which may entail employee
making a partial refund), it seems that the section 176.061, subdi-
vision 6 division of proceeds should be recomputed, with appropri-
ate adjustments to attorney fees, employee's one-third share, and
employer's subrogation and credit.
538
535. See id § 604.02(2) (quoted supra text accompanying note 529).
536. It will be noted that tortfeasor, whose percentage share of damages is $14,000, has
a net liability of $24,026 ($45,974 less $21,948).
For further illustration, see Steenson, supra note 527, at 25-26.
537. See supra notes 491-94 and accompanying text.
538. For example, assuming costs at one-third, division of $56,000 would be as follows:
Proceeds $56,000 Lawyer Employee Employer
(a) Costs 18,667 18,667
Remainder 37,333
(b) One-third to employee 12,444 12,444
Balance remaining 24,889
(c) $21,948 less 7,316
(18,667/56,000 X
21,948) 14,632 14,632
(d) Balance and credit -1 10,257 [Credit
6,838]
By contrast, division of $45,974 would be:
Proceeds $45,974 Lwyer Employee Employer
(a) Costs 15,325 15,325
Remainder 30,649
(b) One-third to employee 10,216 10,216
Balance remaining 20,433
(c) $21,948 less 7,316
(15,325/45,974 x
21,948) 14,632 14,632
(d) Balance and credit 5,801 5,801 [Credit
3,867]
In this situation, lawyer would refund $3,342 to employee and employee would refund
$10,026 (the $3,342 from the lawyer plus an additional $6,684) to tortfeasor.
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IX. CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. In-State Injuries
In Stolpa v. Swanson Heavy Moving Co. ,539 a unanimous Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin employee injured in Minne-
sota who accepted voluntarily paid Wisconsin workers' compensa-
tion benefits could seek benefits under the Minnesota law without
first returning the Wisconsin benefits, under section 176.041, sub-
division 4, which specifies:
If an employee who regularly performs the primary duties of
his employment outside of this state or is hired to perform the
primary duties of his employment outside of this state, receives
an injury within this state in the employ of the same employer,
such injury shall be covered within the provisions of this chap-
ter if the employee chooses to forego any workers' compensa-
tion claim resulting from the injury that he may have a right to
pursue in some other state.
54°
Rather than focusing on the "forego" language which had led the
court of appeals to bar recovery on the view that to "forego" bene-
fits a claimant "must make a positive, affirmative election by re-
turning the compensation benefits he has received," the Minnesota
court focused on the word "pursue," and reasoned, "Mere accept-
ance of the Wisconsin benefits is not equivalent to a choice of law
on the part of the employee or to his pursuing a claim for benefits
in that state. ' ' 54i The court went on to say:
Moreover, the obvious hardship facing a disabled employee if
he must return out-of-state benefits before he can seek compen-
sation under the Minnesota statute persuades us that the inter-
pretation given the statute by the majority of the Court of
Appeals is contrary to the remedial construction historically ac-
corded compensation legislation. . . . We hold that the statu-
tory language itself warrants a construction which permits an
injured employee, in spite of his acceptance of compensation
voluntarily paid by a compensation insurer pursuant to the
laws of another state, to make an affirmative election of Minne-
sota coverage by filing a claim petition in this state after ob-
taining legal advice concerning his rights. The filing of that
petition is, in effect, an intelligent choice on the employee's part
"to forego any workers' compensation claim resulting from the
injury that he may have a right to pursue in some other
539. 315 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1982).
540. MINN. STAT. § 176.041(4) (1982); 315 N.W.2d at 617.
541. 315 N.W.2d at 617.
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state. "
5 4 2
Then the Stolpa court referred to a 1980 case, Flink v. K & K Con-
struction &Repair, Inc. ,543 wherein the court of appeals had allowed
a North Dakota employee to seek Minnesota benefits after filing a
North Dakota claim which was dismissed when the employee did
not appear at the hearing, and said,
If an employee who files and abandons a claim in another
state can be viewed as having foregone any claim he had a right
to pursue there by the act of filing a claim petition in this state,
the employee who has never filed a claim petition in another
state should as reasonably be viewed as having foregone any
claim he had a right to pursue in that state by filing a claim
petition in Minnesota.
544
Finally, the Stolpa court concluded:
We recognize that the majority of the Court of Appeals may
have construed the statute to contain the repayment require-
ment so that an employee would not obtain excessive compen-
sation by receiving benefits from more than one state. There is
no reason, however, to impose so onerous a burden on an in-
jured employee in order to avoid that outcome since any bene-
fits voluntarily paid him pursuant to the laws of another state
can be deducted from the compensation awarded in a proceed-
ing in Minnesota.
545
The Stolpa decision is sound. The court reached an appropriate
result upon appropriate reasoning.
More troublesome is the court's recent decision in Pauli v. Pneu-
matic Systems, Inc. 546 In Pauli', an Oregon employee of an Oregon
employer was injured in Minnesota. He received chiropractic
treatment under the Oregon statute.54 7 Subsequently, after peti-
tioning for permanent partial disability benefits under the Minne-
542. Id (citations omitted).
543. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 9 (1980).
544. 315 N.W.2d at 618. The court went on to say:
We believe that the legislative intent was plainly to deny coverage under the law
of this state to an out-of-state employee injured here only if, with full knowledge
of his rights, he has filed a claim and pursued it to an award, settlement, or
denial of compensation in another state.
Id However, this dictum was necessarily rejected in the case next discussed, Pauli v.
Pneumatic Sys., Inc., 328 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1983), where the court held that an em-
ployee's pending request for a hearing before another state's compensation agency pre-
vented him from proceeding under the Minnesota act. See id at 746 (Todd, J., dissenting).
545. 315 N.W.2d at 618 (citation omitted).
546. 328 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1983).
547. Id at 744. This was paid pursuant to the employee's filing a claim form furnished
by the insurer with the Oregon compensation board. Id. at 745.
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sota law, he filed a request for hearing with the Oregon Workers'
Compensation Board because he wanted to preserve jurisdiction
under the Oregon law pending a ruling on his Minnesota peti-
tion .548 He also filed an affidavit in the Minnesota proceeding
stating that he elected to forego any Oregon compensation bene-
fits. 549 A five-four court held that he could not proceed in Minne-
sota because he had not chosen to "forego" his Oregon claim as
required by Minnesota Statutes section 176.041, subdivision 4.
The court said:
[W]hen, with advice and assistance of counsel, an employee
files legal papers to request a hearing in another state, he
chooses to "forego" any workers' compensation claim here. In
effect, what the employee seeks to do is "hedge"-if he loses in
Minnesota, he will continue his claim in Oregon; if he wins in
Minnesota, he says in his affidavit he will dismiss his appeal in
Oregon. This, we hold, Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 4 does not
permit.
[R]eliance . . . on . . . Stolpa . . . is misplaced. There, the
insurer had voluntarily paid some small medical expenses and a
small amount of total disability pursuant to the Wisconsin
Workers' Compensation Act. The employee had accepted
those payments, but had taken no affirmative action, either by
himself or through counsel, to pursue his claim further in Wis-
consin before the Wisconsin Compensation Board. Had Mr.
Pauli only accepted reimbursement of his chiropractic and
other medical expense in Oregon, Stolpa would be dispositive,
but here he did more by affirmatively making a claim, with aid
of counsel, before the Oregon Workers' Compensation Board,
and at the time of the hearing on these motions had not dis-
missed his pending appeal before that board.
550
Justice Todd, joined by Justices Yetka, Scott, and Wahl, dis-
sented, saying:
The claimant has now filed an affidavit agreeing to forego any
benefits under the Oregon proceedings. This is exactly what
the statute requires. In Stolpa . . . we cited with approval a
decision of [the] Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals,
Flink v. K & K Construction & Repair, 33 WCD 9 (1980), which
involves the same facts as this case with the exception that a
548. Id. Employee's attorney claimed he did this to toll Oregon's one-year statute of
limitations. See Pauli v. Pneumatic Sys., Inc., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 633, 640
(1982) (McCarthy, J., dissenting), aj'd, 328 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1983).
549. 328 N.W.2d at 745.
550. Id. at 745-46.
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dismissal and not an affidavit was used to establish that the
claimant would forego benefits in the foreign jurisdiction. I fail
to perceive any difference. Obviously, if claimant attempted to
proceed in the foreign jurisdiction, his affidavit is an admission
against interest and would preclude further proceedings. Fur-
ther, the decision of the compensation case in this state would
be res judicata.
55 '
As indicated by Justice Todd, the Pauli majority opinion may
make it essential for an out-of-state employee striving to proceed
under section 176.041, subdivision 4 to take action to dismiss any
pending out-of-state proceedings the employee may have com-
menced after consulting a lawyer.
Stolpa probably undercuts the continued validity of the court of
appeals' pre-Stolpa ruling in Koshen v. Froemke Builders & Distribu-
tors552 that a North Dakota employee who filed for and received
North Dakota benefits could not proceed in Minnesota for the
$2,400 difference between Minnesota's and North Dakota's bene-
fits. 5 53 The facts did not indicate that in filing for and receiving
the North Dakota benefits the employee acted with legal advice
concerning his rights as specified in Stolpa and Pauli. In a similar
situation, Judge Adel recently stated:
The stipulated facts . . . make no reference to the depen-
dents' knowledge of their rights at the time [their] claim was
made in North Dakota.
I infer that, had the dependents known of their Minnesota
rights and the benefits available, which are several thousands of
dollars greater than in North Dakota, they would not have
elected to file their claim in North Dakota and preclude them-
selves from Minnesota benefits.
5 5 4
551. Id at 746 (Todd, J., dissenting).
Justice Todd went on to decry the fact that the majority opinion was inconsistent
with the Stolpa court's statement that it believed the legislative intent was to deny an out-
of-state employee coverage for an in-state injury "only if, with full knowledge of his rights,
he has filed a claim and pursued it to an award, settlement, or denial of compensation in
another state." Id; see supra note 544; cf Tierney v. Hardee Food Sys., Inc., No. 482-78-
5244 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1983) (employee regularly employed in
Iowa but injured in Minnesota may proceed in Minnesota where he did no more than file
petition in Iowa to preserve claim because of statute of limitations and would dismiss Iowa
claim if Minnesota accepted jurisdiction).
552. 33 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 519 (1981).
553. Id at 519-21.
554. Souers v. Agassiz Nursery, Inc., 35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 183, 185 (1982)
(Adel, J., concurring). The Souetrs majority thought it unnecessary to consider the question
of coverage under § 176.041(4) because "where a Minnesota resident received an injury
... in Minnesota ... we need not consider the M.S. 176.041 provisions of the statute at
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It should be noted that the court of appeals has recently held
that payments of compensation under another state's law do not toll
the section 176.151 statute of limitations.
555
B. Out-of-State Injuries
In Hutchi'ns v. Murphy Motor Freight Lihes, Inc. 556 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that in a case arising after the 1974 repeal of
section 176.041, subdivision 5, which had stated, "Except as specif-
ically provided by subdivisions 2 and 3 of this section, injuries oc-
curring outside of this state are not subject to the provisions of this
chapter, '557 injuries may be covered under the judicially-devel-
oped "business localization" test558 even though they do not fit
within subdivision 2 or 3 of section 176.041. 5 5 9  The court
all, since clearly Minnesota's interests and the Workers' Compensation Law of Minnesota
apply." Id at 183. See generaloy ingfa notes 556-60 and accompanying text. Judge Adel
disagreed, stating:
I believe we must apply Minn. St. 176.041, subd. 4 in this case. This is so
even though we have a Minnesota resident who was injured in Minnesota, which
may confer jurisdiction under the common law theory of "legitimate governmen-
tal interest" or under a statutory provision. A specific statute, when applicable,
prevails over common law and over general statutes covering the same subject
matter.
Id at 185 (Adel, J., concurring). Judge McCarthy dissented, but his opinion did not rule
out compensation if the claimant applied for and received North Dakota compensation
without full knowledge of her rights; he called for a remand for, inter alia, "the taking of
proper evidence to ascertain exactly what the employee's widow knew at the time of the
acceptance of the benefits from the State of North Dakota." Id at 188 (McCarthy, J.,
dissenting).
555. See Meester v. Hanson Silo Co., 34 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 552 (1982).
556. 331 N.W.2d 761 (Minn. 1983).
557. Act of June 2, 1967, ch. 40, § 6(5), 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 2225, 2229.
558. See Marrier v. National Painting Corp., 249 Minn. 382, 386, 82 N.W.2d 356, 358
(1957); Aleckson v. Kennedy Motor Sales Co., 238 Minn. 110, 117-19, 55 N.W.2d 696,
701-02 (1952); State ex re. Chambers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 209, 166 N.W. 185,
187 (1918).
It would seem that the Hutchznzs opinion should be read to also allow application of
another common-law approach, the "legitimate government interest" test. See Follese v.
Eastern Airlines, 271 N.W.2d 824, 829-32 (Minn. 1978); Souers v. Agassiz Nursery, Inc.,
35 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 183, 185 (1982) (Adel, J., concurring) (in-state injury to
Minnesota resident satisfies test); Butrimas v. North Am. Van Lines, No. 465-38-4159
(Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 30, 1979), slip op. at 6 (employee's in-state resi-
dence and employer's doing business in state satisfy test). The Hutchrns opinion repeatedly
refers to Follese regarding other matters. See Hutchins, 331 N.W.2d at 762-63.
559. Hutchins, 331 N.W.2d at 763-64. MINN. STAT. § 176.041(2), (3) (1982) specifies:
Subd. 2. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION. If an employee who
regularly performs the primary duties of his employment within this state, or
who is hired within this state, receives an injury while outside of this state in the
employ of the same employer, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to such
injury unless the transfer is normally considered to be permanent. If a resident
of this state is transferred outside the territorial limits of the United States as an
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reasoned:
Respondent has successfully argued below that the effect of re-
pealing subdivision 5 was to expand the scope of extraterritorial
jurisdiction beyond the previously exclusive subdivisions 2 and
3, and to reinstate the business localization test. Relators' main
argument before us is that the repeal had no effect whatsoever
and that subdivisions 2 and 3 are still exclusive.
[I]t is difficult to believe that the legislature intended the
repeal of subdivision 5 to be utterly without meaning, espe-
cially when the main thrust of the bill containing the repealer
was the expansion of worker's compensation benefits.
We believe that the repeal of Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 5
(1971) should be held to end the exclusivity of subdivisions 2
and 3 of the same section and to revive the common-law busi-
ness localization test.
56 °
The Hutchins ruling is eminently appropriate for the reasons
stated by the court.
X. CONCLUSION
By and large, the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Court of
Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court have proceeded ap-
propriately in construing and applying the workers' compensation
law. The general quality of consideration in court of appeals opin-
ions seems to have improved somewhat with that body's 1979 in-
crease from three to five judges. 56 1 The supreme court opinions,
on the other hand, sometimes indicate that the court has not had
employee of a Minnesota employer, he shall be presumed to be temporarily em-
ployed outside of this state while so employed.
Subd. 3. TEMPORARY OUT-OF-STATE EMPLOYMENT. If an em-
ployee hired in this state by a Minnesota employer, receives an injury while tem-
porarily employed outside of this state, such injury shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter. If the employer's business is in Minnesota and the
employee's residence is in Minnesota, employment outside of this state shall be
considered temporary.
See Butrimas v. North Am. Van Lines, No. 465-38-4159 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App.
July 30, 1979) (alternative ground; Minnesota resident who worked for nationwide mov-
ing company that "tried to keep [truckers] operating out of the area in which they lived
and [returning] to the same" and who drove about 10.5% of his mileage in Minnesota
could be found to "regularly [perform] the primary duties of his employment within [Min-
nesota]" under subdivision 2).
560. Hutchins, 331 N.W.2d at 763. As evidence that the employer met the business
localization test, the court noted that the company was headquartered in Minnesota and
had 15 terminals, including one of its largest terminals, in Minnesota. Id at 762.
561. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 26, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1268 (codi-
fied as MINN. STAT. § 175.006(1) (1982)).
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adequate time to study all the issues in great depth. One may
hope that adoption of an intermediate court of appeals machinery
will ameliorate this.
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